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SUMMARY 
This study explores the qualitative difference in performance between those who are 
more successful and those who are less successful in simple arithmetic. 
In the event that children are unable to retrieve a basic number combination the study 
identifies that there is a spectrum of performance between children who mainly use 
procedures, such as count-all in addition and take-away in subtraction, to those who 
handle simple arithmetic in a much more flexible way. 
Two independent studies are described The first contrasts the performances of children 
in simple arithmetic. It considers teacher selected pupils of different ability from within 
each year group from 7+ to 12+. It takes a series of snapshots of different groups of 
children and considers their responses to a series of simple number combinations. This 
first experiment shows qualitatively different thinking in which the less successful 
children are seen to focus more on the use of procedures and in the development of 
competence in utilising them. The more successful appear to have developed a flexible 
mode of thinking which is not only capable of stimulating their selection of more 
efficient procedures but, the procedures they select are then used in an efficient and 
competent way. 
However, the use of procedures amongst the more successful is seen to be only one of 
two alternative approaches that they use. The other approach involves the flexible use 
of mathematical objects, numbers, that are derived from encapsulated processes. The 
below-average children demonstrate little evidence of the flexible use of encapsulated 
processes. 
It is the ability of the more able children to demonstrate flexibility through the use of 
efficient procedures and/or the use of encapsulated processes that stimulates the 
development of the theory of procepts. This theory utilises the duality which is 
ambiguously inherent in arithmetical symbolism to establish a framework from which 
we may identify the notion of proceptual thinking. 
The second study considers the development of a group of children over a period of 
nearly a year. This study relates to aspects of the numerical component of the 
standardised tests in mathematics which form part of the National Curriculum. It 
provides the data which gives support to the theory and provides evidence to confirm 
the snap shots taken of children at the age of 7+ and 8+. It indicates that children who 
possess procedural competence may achieve the same level of attainment as those who 
display proceptual flexibility at one level of difficulty but they may not possess the 
appropriate mental tools to cope with the next. 
The evidence of the study supports the hypothesis that there is a qualitative difference in 
children's arithmetical thinking. 
ix 
CHAPTER1 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE STUDY 
1.1 THE RESEARCH RATIONALE 
Mathematics has been notorious over the centuries for the fact that so many of the 
population fail to understand what a small minority regard as being almost trivially 
simple. Within the context of school mathematics in Britain, the overwhelming 
impression gained by those involved in the CSMS research (Hart, 1981), which shows 
that for some understanding improves only slightly as the child gets older, "is that 
mathematics is a very difficult subject for most children" (p. 209). In the context of 
arithmetic this impression would seem to be substantiated by the results of the APU 
studies (D. E. S., 1980 -1989) which indicate that the lower 10% to 35% of eleven- 
year-old children were unable to perforin many of the arithmetic tasks that pupils were 
regarded as capable of doing by the time they moved to secondary school. Indeed, the 
serious difficulties that many children have with coping with elementary arithmetical 
operations were reported as early as 1935 by Brownell. 
It is the observation of such difficulties that provides the rationale for this study. Earlier 
observations (Gray, 1988b) had indicated that there appeared to be a link between the 
way in which children responded to basic number combinations and the difficulties they 
were experiencing with addition and subtraction algorithms . For example, children 
who relied extensively on counting to obtain the number combinations to twenty 
frequently tended to compute their two and three digit addition and subtraction 
problems from left to right. Focusing particularly on the basic number combinations 
(Gray, 1988a) provided a notion of the differences in behaviour in children's attempts 
to obtain solutions to these combinations if they could not retrieve them from memory. 
Consider Andrew who was eight. He placed unifix blocks one by one on his fingers to 
represent the amounts to be added when resolving the solutions to addition 
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combinations to ten. He then recounted the combined set by removing the unifix 
blocks, one at a time, from each finger. Neil, aged 9, used his fingers for combinations 
to ten and integrated the use of his fingers with counters when finding a solution to 
20 - 5. To obtain her solutions, Mary, 9, counted imaginary lines in her head. In 
contrast, Andrew, 7, knew all of the addition and subtraction combinations to twenty 
whilst Jonathan, who was also 7, knew many of them but others were obtained 
through the use of counting or the flexible use of other known combinations. To obtain 
the solution to 17 - 6, for example, he counted down six from seventeen. When 
attempting 20-5 he knew that "fifteen add five is twenty so twenty take away five is 
fifteen! '. 
Such differences, perceptible amongst children of different ages, obviously indicate that 
some know basic number combinations whilst others do not. But, when they don't 
know solutions why, for example, should a nine-year-old be demonstrating an 
approach which contrasts so sharply with that of a child two years younger when both 
are attempting 20 - 5? What is it that suggests to Neil that he should count, that the 
problem should be interpreted as the integrated use of fingers and counters to represent 
twenty and then counting off five from this twenty and recounting the remainder, whilst 
Jonathan sees the problem quite differently? 'niis study suggests that the answer lies in 
the fact that the children are doing qualitatively different arithmetic. 
Gray (1991) revealed the divergence that may be observed when children solve simple 
number combinations when they do not know the solution. This led to initial 
conclusions about the preferences children had when dealing with unknown 
combinations. What is interesting was that the preferences indicated by the children 
show that some wished to remain at a procedural level, which, in terms of information 
processing made things very difficult for them, whilst others operated at a conceptual 
level which was very flexible. It fact what the children were revealing, without 
articulating, was a divergence based upon their procedural and conceptual thinking 
(Hiebert & Lefevre, 1986). Through this divergence it appeared as if the less able, who 
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relied on procedures, were "making things more difficult for themselves and as a 
consequence become less able"(Gray, 1991, p. 570) In contrast, "condensing the long 
sequences (of procedures) appears to be almost intuitive to the above-average 
child"(ibid. ) 
Several different studies (e. g. Dubinsky, 1991; Sfard, 1989) suggest that such 
differences may occur because some children go through a process of 'procedural 
encapsulation' whilst others do not. This study proposes that there is a more supple 
underlying theory that relates not just to conceptual differences but to the versatility that 
may be achieved through the flexible use of process and concept. Such differences 
suggest that the arithmetic of the successful is conceived in such a way as to be, for 
them, relatively simple, whilst the less successful are doing a different kind of 
arithmetic which is often intolerably hard. 
1.2 THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Piaget (1971) believed that children gave us the best chance of studying, amongst other 
things, the development of mathematical knowledge and physical knowledge. He drew 
the distinction between the two by indicating that mathematical knowledge is abstract 
whilst physical knowledge, "knowledge based on experience in general - is concrete" 
(p. 16). His belief was that the abstraction that is mathematical knowledge stemmed not 
from abstraction from the objects themselves but from the abstraction of the action 
carried out upon the objects. 
Underpinning the Piagetian notions of the cognitive development in mathematics are the 
means through which a coordinated series of actions, for example, counting, became 
objects of thought, for example, the number T. Using objects as referents is 
qualitatively different to using representations of numbers as if they were objects. 
Piaget referred to the notion of "reflective abstraction" (Piaget, 1973) to indicate the 
cognitive shift from action to object. The notion of reflective abstraction may be linked 
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to other notions that attempt to account for actions as processes becoming objects of 
thought, or concepts; it has been variously termed "encapsulation" (Dubinsky, 1991), 
"entificatioif ' (Kaput, 1982), and "reificatiorf ' (Sfard, 1989). 
Within this study the action through which a process is carried out - the counting 
procedure - and the means whereby the counting'process is encapsulated, as first a 
number concept and then as the concept of sum, provides a framework from which a 
theoretical appraisal of the link between static conceptual entity and dynamic process is 
made. The analysis grows out of Piaget's work as exemplified by Sfard (1989,1991) 
and Dubinsky (1991) and it is placed within the field of information processing as 
exemplified Klahr & Wallace (1976), Greeno (1983) and Kaput (1982). 
1.3 SIMPLE ARITHMETIC AS AN AREA OF STUDY 
Abstraction from the use of physical objects forms the background for the conceived 
cognitive development of simple arithmetic (e. g. Piaget, 1965,1973; Steffe et A 198 1, 
Kamii, 1985). An analysis of the literature into the development of number concepts 
amongst young children indicates that counting plays a sophisticated and central role in 
the procedural encapsulation of number (e. g. Steffe et al, 1982; Wagner & Walters; 
1982, Fuson & Hall, 1983; Gelman & Meck 1986a); the sequence of number words 
become part of a procedure to point at successive elements; each number word is 
uttered in turn until the last word is identified as the number of elements in the 
collection; an object is produced through a counting process. 
Children's simple arithmetic is an area of research that has received considerable 
attention in recent years. Not only has this attention provided a wealth of information 
about children's cognitive development, but it has also provided a wealth of 
information about the different approaches they use to produce the solutions to basic 
number combinations within both contextual and context free situations (e. g. Carpenter 
& Moser, 1982; Gray, 1991) and within infon-nation processing paradigms (e. g. Groen 
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& Parkman, 1972; Ashcraft, 1982). Thus, children's solution strategies are well 
documented and relatively well understood and yet, children still find it difficult to learn 
number combinations. 
1.4 FRAMEWORK FOR A THEORY 
Within the context of simple arithmetic, the notion of procedural encapsulation is 
somewhat complicated because as well as carrying out a procedure to establish 
conceptual understanding of number some children learn specific facts by rote which 
can muddy the theoretical waters, in the sense that known facts may be either rote or 
meaningful (in the sense of Ausubel, 1968). The distinction between a rote learned fact 
and a fact that is known, and, then used to establish one that cannot be retrieved from 
memory, is a distinction that may be identified in the flexibility a child may exhibit to 
produce number triples. For example, 5+38 and 3+ 5= 8 which in turn 
incorporate the subtraction combinations 8-35. The object 8, may be flexibly 
decomposed and recomposed 5+3=4+4=8. 
The theoretical notion of procept (Chapter 6) aids the description of the flexibility 
attached to the phenomena of decomposition and recomposition which is inherent 
within encapsulated mathematical objects. Thinking that projects the ability to use this 
flexibility through the use of a procedure, an encapsulated procedure or the flexible 
compression and decompression of encapsulated procedures, proceptual thinking, 
provides a framework for discussing qualitatively different thinking. 
Within the United Kingdom the imposition of a National Curriculum (1989) is aimed at 
"raising standards" of performance in all subjects, including mathematics. The 
requirements of this curriculum distinguish between the skills or procedures that an 
individual needs to have acquired in order that they can do things, and the concepts or 
basic facts which they are expected to know on which they operate with their skills. 
Such a requirement in itself suggests a fundamental dichotomy between procedures and 
5 
concepts, between things to do and things to know. It is conjectured that it is through 
their applications of doing or knowing that children display qualitatively different forms 
of mathematical behaviour. 
1.5 STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESIS 
In this study I do not pretend to 'prove' the theory of procepts, but I do offer specific 
hypotheses and evidence which are consistent with the theory. 
From the theoretical construct of procept it is hypothesised that there is a qualitative 
difference between children which is: 
(i) on the one hand manifest as a spectrum of performance in the operations 
on numbers as a procedure that relates to counting and 
(ii) on the other, the flexible manipulation of procepts. 
Identifying these distinctions leads to an analysis of the attempts of two samples of 
children to solve basic addition and subtraction combinations. From the evidence 
'qualitative difference' is considered against the following operational hypotheses 
which are consistent with the theory that is developed : 
1. Count-all does not lead to an encapsulated process therefore it is very 
unlikely that children who use count-all will also use a derived fact. 
2 Children who remain procedural and use count-on for addition are more 
likely to use count-back for subtraction. 
3. Where children are using count-on for addition it will be seen that: 
Procedurally oriented children will generally use a count-back 
procedure for subtraction 
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(ii) The proceptually oriented children will use count-back or count-up 
in a flexible, and more efficient manner. 
4. Children who are procedurally oriented are likely to show evidence of 
improving procedural competence. 
5. Less successful children who demonstrate procedural competence may not 
demonstrate this competence through procedural flexibility. 
6. Children who think proceptually will demonstrate the flexible use of 
symbol as process and object. More specifically they will do it through 
the use of derived facts. 
7. More successful children will provide evidence of the more efficient use 
of procedures than do the less able. 
8. Procedurally oriented children will take longer than children who display 
proceptual flexibility to acquire basic number facts. 
9. Even when they know proportionately the same number of facts as the 
younger more successful able children, older less successful children will 
not use them to derive new number facts to the same extent. 
The implications behind several of the operational hypotheses indicated above is that 
although procedural competence improves with the age of the child, and this in turn 
may increase procedural efficiency, some children are in fact improving in a technique 
which in the longer term may not provide them with the competence to cope with more 
subtle situations. Because children are faster at procedures it does not imply that they 
are conceptually better at them. On the other hand, children who display procedural 
efficiency coupled with procedural flexibility may be at the interface of procedural 
encapsulation. 
It is hypothesised that children"s qualitatively different thinking in simple arithmetic, as 
evidenced through the notions of proceptual and procedural thinking, may be explained 
through mathematical symbolism which inherently projects process/object ambiguity. 
To support the thesis two experiments are used. Through individual interviews, the 
first considers groups of children of different abilities over a six year span to reveal 
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evidence of the diverging approaches to simple arithmetic. The second establishes that 
the divergence revealed through the snap shots of the first experiment provide an 
indication of the behaviour of a group of seven and eight year old children with a ten 
month time gap between interviews. The conclusions not only support the view that 
there are qualitative differences in children's arithmetical thinking, but they indicate that 
children who possess procedural competence may achieve the same levels of attainment 
as those who think in more flexible ways, However, the conceptual differences are 
such that the quality of their arithmetical thinking may differ to such an extent that the 
long term prognosis points to very different outcomes. 
It is not the intention of the study to speculate on relationships that are too complex for 
application within the classroom. It is the intention to provide a tool which may go 
some way forward in helping our understanding of why some children are successful 
in simple arithmetic and others are not. 
1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
Two chapters are presented which review the research literature. Chapter 2 considers 
theories that relate to cognitive development whilst Chapter 3 looks particularly at the 
cognitive development of simple arithmetic. 
Chapter 2 acknowledges the existence of a wide range of influences on children's 
cognitive development. It considers this development from three perspectives; the 
organisation of mathematical knowledge, the formation of mathematical knowledge and 
mental knowledge structures and the representations which lead to mathematical 
behaviour. Piagetian notions of cognitive development emphasise the need for actions 
to become seen as objects of thought. The processlobject interface is placed within the 
context of current theories on procedural encapsulation and the role that symbolism may 
play in ambiguously representing a process that may become an object of thought. 
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Chapter 3 extends the discussion in Chapter 2 to the cognitive development of simple 
arithmetic. It presents a review of the literature into the development of children's 
understanding of number and the way in which this understanding is used in number 
fact acquisition. Underlying this development is the notion of process encapsulated as 
object; the process of counting encapsulated into first the concept of number and 
secondly the concept of sum. Within the discussion different approaches that children 
may use to resolve number combinations are considered. 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 consider the method and analysis of the results of the first 
experiment. This was designed to examine whether or not a divergence in arithmetical 
thinking may be determined through the procedural and conceptual approaches that 
children employ to solve basic number combinations. It is clear from the analysis 
presented that two issues clouded the distinction. Firstly those who may be regarded as 
conceptual thinkers also used procedures, whilst all children used known facts to a 
greater or lesser extent. 
The more subtle nature of the dichotomy that exists between those who, in 
contemporary terms, would be defined as procedural thinkers and those who would be 
defined as conceptual thinkers is discussed within Chapter 5. Here, the "duality 
ambiguity and flexibility" (Gray & Tall, 1991,1993a, ) which may arise from, and is 
inherent within, mathematical symbolism is placed within a perspective which leads to 
the notion the cognitive construct of procept (Gray & Tall, 1991). This notion is then 
used to discuss the theoretical development of simple arithmetic from a proceptual 
perspective. 
Because the first study is seen as a snapshot of different children, the second study, 
reported within Chapter 7, considers the arithmetical thinking of children of different 
arithmetical attainment. The ability of the children was identified through their response 
to numerical aspects of the 1992 Key Stage I Standard Attainment Tasks in 
Mathematics. This second study provides data which supports the theory. The analysis 
presented within the theoretical framework of procepts concludes that there is 
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qualitatively different thinking between children who are identified by ability through 
their level of arithmetical attainment. 
Chapter 8 reflects upon the conclusions of this thesis within the realms of simple 
arithmetic and suggests a broader development of the theory of procepts in other areas 
of mathematics which opens up avenues for future research action. 
Comment 
Several areas of the study have been the subject of published papers or of papers 
currently in press. 
Chapter 5 draws fairly extensively on an article within Educational Studies in 
Mathematics (Gray, 199 1), whilst Chapters 5 and 6 formed the basis for an article to be 
published in the Journal of Research in Mathematics Education (Gray & Tall, in 
press). The pivotal role that count-on plays in the development of thinking in simple 
arithmetic forms the focus of a paper be published within the proceedings of PME 




A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Following their evaluation of the instructional principle of structure-oriented 
mathematics, Resnick & Ford (198 1) address an interesting issue: 
'Vhen one teaches a part of a larger mathematical structure, even in a mathematically 
"honest" way, is the partial structure not qualitatively different from the way it is 
later to be understood as a component of the whole mathematical edifice. In other 
words, can we be sure that such an approach is not creating double work for the 
childT'. 
(Resnick & Ford, 1981, p124) 
Resnick & Ford place the notion of structure in mathematics within a context which 
views mathematical knowledge as a body of knowledge which is internally organised 
and interrelated. For them, an important relationship that needs a sharper focus is that 
which exists between formal mathematical structures and the intuitive psychological 
structures that enable children to use and acquire mathematical knowledge efficiently 
and flexibly. Behr et al (1992) conjecture that intuitive knowledge stems from the 
possession of an organised set of associations, propositions and relations and is similar 
to the qualitative knowledge that an individual has about a situation. They describe 
qualitative knowledge as "... knowledge that "belongs" to the individual, is constructed 
from real experience and provides for considerable flexibility in thought' ' (p. 32 1). 
Whilst acknowledging the existence of a wide range of influences on a child's cognitive 
development, this chapter largely focuses on mathematics learning and thinking. 
Theoretical notions of cognitive development stem from a Piagetian standpoint. The 
perspective then moves towards information processing paradigms from which 
contemporary views of mathematical thinking are considered. Historically there have 
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been various ways of describing and distinguishing between different but 
complementary forms of mathematical thought; Piaget (1970) used the notions of 
"figurative and operative", Skemp (1978) introduced the terms "instrumental and 
relational" and more recently Hiebert & Lefevre (1986) consolidated the contemporary 
views of mathematical thinking into notions they described as "procedural and 
conceptual". Since pairs of these notions help to describe a quality of thinking that may 
be ascribed to mathematical actions they are also used within this study underscore the 
intuitive psychological structures possessed by children within the first experiment. 
Drawing upon the work of, for example, Dubinsky (1991) (who suggests that 
sophisticated mathematical structures can be found in the thinking of young children) 
and Sfard (1989,1991), the later part of the chapter considers the cognitive shift 
implied by the encapsulation of process as object and the role mental representations 
may play in holding mathematical information. 
2.2 INFLUENCES ON MATHEMATICAL BEHAVIOUR 
Many issues have roles of different importance to play in the development of maturity 
in mathematical thinking. Gruszczyk-Kolczynska & Semadeni (1988) indicate the 
importance of mutual connections that should be made between levels of operational 
thinking, manual skill, perception and emotional maturity in the development of young 
children's understanding of number. They see operational thinking as the ability to 
handle symbolism and manual skill as the ability to handle, for example, the counting 
process. Such concerns could, of course, be firmly placed within the behaviourist 
tradition. Within such a framework behaviour is specified and analyse it into 
components but von Glasersfeld (1988) believes that such a tradition has no room for 
what is ordinarily called 'understanding'. Since Gruszczyk-Kolczynska & Semadeni's 
wider considerations are to be seen within the context of the child's level of 
understanding it would be an injustice to suggest that are purely behaviourists. 
However, by identifying some of the components that play a part in mathematical 
development they give some notion of the wider context within which mathematical 
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behaviour may be viewed. Amongst those influences that affect the way in which the 
young child develops mathematically Gruszczyk-Kolczynska & Semadeni specify the 
home, interpersonal relationships made by the child with adults outside school and the 
perspectives within school. However, the child's social context is only one context - 
there are cultural contexts too. 
Smith, Stanley & Shores (1971) consider the relationship between the culture of the 
society and its context within a school curriculum. The emphasis arising from such a 
relationship may well be on a cultural core and its values and its sentiments, together 
with, for example, the "knowledge, skills and understanding" (D. E. S., 1989) 
associated with them. Nickson (1992) points out the danger of assuming that there is 
only one culture associated with the mathematics classroom. For example Cobb (1987) 
indicated that it was possible to relate children's mathematical behaviour to social 
interaction patterns that typified classroom life during arithmetic instruction whilst 
teacher's hidden perspectives ( e. g., Bassam, 1962; Begle, 1979; Desforges & 
Cockburn, 1987) and those of pupils ( e. g. Biggs, 1967; Desforges & Cockburn, 
1987; Jaworski, 1989) also need consideration. 
Cobb (1988) draws the Conclusion that students' mathematical and social cognition's 
are interdependent; the process of accounting for students' mathematical activity 
involves co-ordinating analyses of their mathematical and social cognition's. He 
clarifies this by extending the notion of "context" to include, for example, "an 
understanding of the institutionalised, taken for granted activities and practices that give 
rise to observed patterns and norms" (p. 9). 
2.3 THE ORGANISATION OF KNOWLEDGE 
That there was qualitatively different thinking in the kinds of learning engaged in by 
individuals was a conclusion drawn by Katona (1967). To him learning did not consist 
merely of memorising a set of associations or a procedure but it could also mean the 
reorganisation of information so as to form a structure that had the power to explain 
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other similarly structured problems. An important conclusion that may be drawn from 
his work is that people who remember the principle for generating knowledge have less 
to remember than those who do not. 
The influence of gestalt thinking is clear in Katona's explanations: knowledge that is 
organised into a structured whole is retained as part of that whole. Though each part 
may be remembered because of its place within the whole, the whole is greater than the 
sum of its parts. Gestaltists believe that such an organisation of learning may lead to 
more efficient remembering partly because it decreases the number of separate pieces of 
information that must be retained. However, from a cognitive point of view, the notion 
of gestalts appears to be linked to notions of mathematical structure in such a way that 
they do not provide us with insight into the ways in which children acquire knowledge 
and mentally represent it in the way that notions of concept and schema do. 
At its simplest, Skemp (1971) sees a concept as an idea, whilst Vergnaud (1988) 
identified a concept is a triplet of three sets: 
(i) the set of situations that make the concept meaningful in a variety of aspects, 
(ii) the set of operation invariants (properties, relationships, objects, theorems in 
action) that are progressively gasped by students in a hierarchical fashion, 
(iii) the set of linguistic and non linguistic symbols that represent those invariants and 
are used to point at them, to communicate and discuss about them, and therefore to 
represent situations and procedures. 
(Vergnaud, 1988, p. 45) 
The notion of concept may provide us with some useful insights into mathematical 
behaviour which to Vergnaud (1988) is a behaviour that relies on some mathematical 
ideas. He considers that different kinds of mathematical behaviours and different levels 
of such behaviours are tied to understanding of mathematical concepts and that such 
understanding is only implicit through the child's behaviour. 
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The distinction between the idea and its name is a theme developed by Skemp. He 
believes that naming, which is identified as the sound, sign or symbol associated with 
the concept, can play a useful, indeed sometimes an essential part, in the formation of 
new concepts and its communication. Skemp indicates that hearing the same name in 
connection with different experiences helps us to collect ideas together in our minds and 
"helps us abstract their intrinsic similarities" (p. 23). However, just as Vergnaud draws 
a note of caution to indicate that it does not mean that a child is fully aware of the 
relationship between the ideas and the way they behave just because a concept exists 
and a child uses it, Skemp draws a note of caution within the context of naming a 
concept: 
The criterion for having a concept is not that of being able to say its name, but that 
of behaving in a way indicative of classifying new data according to the similarities 
which go to form this concept. 
(Skemp, 1971, p. 27). 
The interrelationship of concepts Skemp called a "schema7' (p. 37). As with the notion 
of gestalt, the idea of a schema extends beyond the separate properties of its individual 
concepts. A schema functions as the integrator of existing knowledge, a tool for future 
learning and an enabler for "relational" understanding and, as such, it may be 
considered as a major instrument in adaptability. However, Skemp indicated that whilst 
a schema may be the most effective organiser of existing knowledge, its very strength 
may be the source of its potential downfall; a strong tendency may emerge towards the 
self perpetuation of existing schema. It may then be necessary to change the structure of 
the schema. Skemp signifies that this may be difficult and, if it fails, the new 
experience can no longer be successfully interpreted. Adaptive behaviour may break 
down. 
The central importance of the schema as a tool of learning means that inappropriate 
early schema's will make the assimilation of later ideas much more difficult, perhaps 
impossible. 
(Skcmp, 1971, p. 48) 
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2.4 THE ACQUISITION OF MATHEMATICAL KNOWLEDGE 
2.4.1. The Piagetian View 
The observation of children's mathematical actions form a central component of this 
study. It is from such actions that it is believed that qualitative differences in thinking 
may be inferred. In this sense the study follows a Piagetian approach although the 
outcome is a much coarser grained analysis than that given by Piaget. 
The formation of mathematical knowledge and the possession of knowledge identified 
by mathematical behaviour was one aspect of the work of Piaget. He worked within the 
realm of genetic-epistemology which "deals with both the formation and meaning of 
knowledge" (Piaget, 197 1, p. 12). The concern of genetic-epistemology was to resolve 
the question "By what means does the human mind go from state of less sufficient 
knowledge to a state of higher knowledge? " (ibid. ). Piaget believed that learning as 
. well as perfonning mathematics was a matter 
of active thinking and of operating on the 
environment. It was not a matter of passively noting or even of memorising what is 
presented. 
The basic processes that underpinned the ability to think mathematically Piaget termed 
the 'logico-mathematical' experiences which he considered gathered information, "not 
from the physical properties of particular objects, but from the actual actions (or more 
precisely their coordinations) carried out by the child on the objecte' (Piaget, 1973, 
p. 80). Thus, activity with objects was seen as indispensable to the comprehension of 
arithmetical relations. Whilst the importance of logico-mathernatical experiences were 
noted, Piaget also felt that these were strongly linked to 'physical experience' which 
"consists of acting on objects to discovery the properties of the objects themselves" 
(Piaget, 1973, p. 80). 
The observation and co-ordination of actions are central to the Piagetian view of the 
development of mathematical thinking. Indeed, he thought that all humans would 
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develop certain structures of thinking as long as they maintained a normal interaction 
with both the social and physical environment. Structure was defined as "a totality; that 
is it is system governed by laws that apply to the system itself and not only to one or 
another element in the system" (Piaget, 1970, p. 22). The term was used as a means of 
describing the organisation of experience by an active learner; the system of whole 
numbers was identified as an example. However, many different mathematical 
structures could be discovered in this "number" system, for example, the additive 
group with its rules for associativity and commutativity, whilst number itself was seen 
as part of a larger system which includes fractions. Piaget saw the notion of number 
resting on the combination of two primitive structures, class inclusion, in the sense that 
two is included in three and three is included in four, and relationships of order, in the 
sense that elements in a set are counted one after the other. Thus any structure could be 
seen as part of a larger structure. Resnick & Ford (1981) indicate that building 
structures in the Piagetian sense appears to involve constructing relationships such that 
change in any part of the system effects the whole system. They identify Piaget's 
notion of "scheme" as a "small scale version of structure" (p. 182); "whatever is 
repeatable and generisable in an action" (Piaget, 1971, P42). Piaget, then, sees the 
notion of scheme in terms of organised mental and physical patterns of behaviour. Each 
scheme is itself a co-ordination of a number of sub schemes; it is the relationship of 
class inclusion - the sub schemes included within the total scheme - which gives rise to 
concepts. Counting may be seen as an example. When called upon to count a child 
quantifies the collection numerically only when all of the objects are put into a single 
relationship, synthesising (reciprocal assimilation) the scheme of ordering and the 
scheme of class inclusion. Through such action the child eventually develops the 
concept of number. Vergnaud's (1988) sense of concept would appear to arise from the 
Piagetian view whereas Skemp's concept to schema relationship appears to be the 
reverse of Piaget's scheme to concept. However, the important departure of these two 
from Piaget is that, in the mathematical context, they not only see concept in terms of 
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naming but also in terms of symbolic representation: "a concept is not a concept until it 
has a name and one or more symbolic representations" (Vergnaud, 1987, p. 52). 
One of Piaget's concerns was the means through which the co-ordination of actions, 
for him the roots of mathematical structures, became mental operations and how these 
operations became structures. An operation is seen as a special kind of mental action- 
it could be reversed. He identified it as "an action that can be internalised" (Piaget, 
197 1, p. 2 1), spoke of "actions that are destined to become interiorized as operation" 
(Beth and Piaget, 1966, p. 251) and indicated that an operation can be carried out in 
thought as well as executed materially; "actions or operations become thernatised 
objects of thought or assimilation" (Piaget, 1985, p. 49). "Interiorised actions" are the 
mental or intellectual operations that stem from actions. However, he believed that once 
this interiorisation, with the co-ordination it supposes, is sufficient for deductive 
thought then logico-mathematical experience in the form of material actions is no longer 
necessary and interiorised deduction is sufficient. Further, whilst coordinations of 
actions and logico-mathernatical experiences may interiorise themselves they also give 
rise to logico-mathernatical abstraction which he termed "reflective abstraction" (Piaget, 
1973, p. 81). Such a form of abstraction reflects both the process through which action 
is projected to thought or mental representation, and the sense of reorganisation of 
mental activity which reconstructs at a higher level everything drawn from the 
coordinations of actions. 
Reflective abstraction is seen as essentially the self referential use of existing structures 
to construct new ones by observing ones thoughts and abstracting from them. It 
involves the construction of relationships between and amongst objects but such 
relationships may not have an existence in external reality; it only exists in the minds of 
those that can create it between objects. Kamii (1985) suggests that 'constructive 
abstraction' might be a more appropriate term than reflective abstraction since this 
would indicate that this form of abstraction is a construction of the mind rather than 
something that exists in objects. 
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Underscoring Piaget's theory of intelligence and mental development is the belief that 
children's sophistication in thinking increases as they become older; children do not just 
acquire more knowledge but they also develop more complex cognitive structures. 
Evidence of qualitatively different cognitive structures was drawn from the 
interpretations of observations on children engaged in mathematical tasks. These 
structures were not only seen as evidence of different understandings which led to the 
solutions of the tasks but they were also believed to develop in sequence encompassing 
defined stages. 
From a Piagetian standpoint we note that the fundamental assumption is that new 
knowledge is in part constructed by the learner through the use of "active methods" and 
these "require that every new truth to be learned be rediscovered or at least 
reconstructed by the student" (Piaget, 1976, p. 15). von Glasersfeld (1988) indicates 
that Piaget took cognitive construction for granted. Such a view is a basic assumption 
of cognitive learning psychology and in the field of early number development can be 
seen in the work of, for example, Groen & Resnick (1977), Steffe et al (1982), Kamii 
(1985). 
The importance of the Piagetian perspective for this study rests in the type of thinking 
that children acquire from actions that may be identified as 'logico-mathematical 
experiences'. The real issue is whether all children who display competence with 
experiences which are almost 'partial structures', for example, count-on, actually 
undergo the process of reflective abstraction to internalise the action, or whether for 
some competence with the experience is an end within itself. 
2.4.2 The Constructivist Perspective 
Piaget's work established the basis for the constructivist perspective and Vergnaud 
(1987) described him as the "most systematic theorist of constructivism" (p. 43). 
Jaworski (1988) defined constructivism as "an abstract philosophical stance about 
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knowledge and its relation to the world and to people's attempts, through their 
experiences, to try and rationalise the world" (p. 292). The philosophy has, she 
believes, important consequences for mathematics education although some 
commentators "share a wary and cautious approach to it, especially the radical variety" 
(Wheeler, 1987 p. 63) and indicate that the "virtue some constructivists need most is 
that of humility" (Kilpatrick, 1987, p. 22). 
von Glasersfeld, who I believe is currently one of the most formidable intellectual 
advocates of constructivism, indicates that the task of education is 
a task of inferring first of all models of the students conceptual constructs and then 
generating hypotheses as to how students could be given the opportunity to modify 
their structures so that they lead to mathematical actions that might be considered 
compatible with the instructors expectations and goals. 
(von Glasersfeld, 1988, p. 6). 
The constructivist approach to education "is predominantly interested in the students 
conceptual structures and operations and focuses on behavioural manifestations only 
insofar as they serve the teacher or experimenter to infer the student's understanding" 
(ibid., p. 7). It is this notion that has guided Steffe et al as they take on a mainly 
Piagetian conception of knowledge to present the epistemological position of 
constructivism as a key to the way in which concepts are organised. Constructivists 
believe that children are fundamentally constructivist rather than analytic, and, like 
Piaget, they place an emphasis on the need for reflective abstraction. 
The one implication of Piaget's work, and that of the constructivists, is that the 
knowledge and beliefs that students bring to a given learning situation can influence the 
meanings they construct in that situation; a child's mathematical knowledge is viewed 
as co-ordinated schemes of action that are functioning reliably and effectively. 
Questions central to the thesis of this study evolve around the meaning that may be 
placed on 'reliably and effectively'. More particularly, if a co-ordinated scheme of 
actions is functioning in such a way, is it a limiting action or is it an action that 
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promotes reflective abstraction? Is the observed behaviour stemming from such action 
an indicator of the inflexible use of a procedure or of flexible thinking? As an additional 
point, a constructivist perspective of children's cognitive growth in counting (Steffe et 
al, 198 1) will be considered in Chapter 3. 
2.5 STRUCTURING THE USE OF KNOWLEDGE 
2.5.1 Remembering 
Byers and Erlwanger (1985) indicate that one of the outcomes of learning is 
remembered knowledge. Although Piaget and the constructivists are interested in the 
formation of conceptual structures they are less interested in questions which provide 
some notion of how knowledge is stored in the mind and cued from memory; they have 
not explored the nature of conceptual representations. However a central tenet they hold 
is that memory is a constructive or reconstructive process. Complex information is 
structured to impose some meaning on it and this implies modification of the 
information that can be remembered. Ausubel (1968) did not accept the full implications 
of Piaget's stage theory but he accepted his notions of assimilation and accommodation. 
For him meaningful learning was a process through which new knowledge was 
absorbed by connecting it to some existing relevant aspect of the individual's 
knowledge structure. If there were no relevant concepts already in the mind to which 
the new knowledge could be linked it would have to be learned by rote and it would 
have to be stored in an arbitrary and disconnected manner. 
One advantage of the inclination to create connections between knew and existing 
knowledge is that well connected knowledge is better remembered (Baddeley, 1976; 
Bruner, 1960). Memory, if viewed as a reconstructive process, involves the same 
cognitive activity as understanding. Indeed, this may well be the rationale for Skemp's 
(1978) distinction between instrumental and relational knowledge. An entire network of 
knowledge is less likely to deteriorate than an isolated piece of knowledge and retrieval 
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of information is enhanced if it is connected to a larger network; there are more routes 
of recall. The possessor of a conceptual structure established through learning relational 
mathematics "can (in principle) produce an unlimited number of plans for getting from 
any starting point ... to any finishing poinf ' (Skemp, 
1978, p. 25). 
2.5.2 Information Processing 
The structure of knowledge in the mind and the mechanisms by which that knowledge 
is manipulated, transformed and generated is the focus of attention of information 
processing methodologies. Through such processes, knowledge structures can be 
hypothesised for particular learners and the learner's performance on mathematical 
tasks used to verify the content and organisation of mathematical knowledge. The 
resulting network structure models account for how people know things without having 
to list every separate item of knowledge. 
Davis (1983) sees the ability to match input data with some kind of knowledge 
representation structure stored in memory as fundamental to the ability to make links 
between two areas of mathematics. He has postulated four steps which offer a typical 
information processing explanation of the process. After cues are used to trigger from 
memory some specific knowledge representation structure, a search through the 
specific present input enables certain specific information to enter into the "slots" or 
"variables" that exist within that structure. Following checks to evaluate the suitability 
of this process, and a cycling back if necessary, then the result is used for the next 
stage in the information processing. Within the context of this study this view of 
information processing can relate to the notion of the strategies children may use to 
obtain solutions to addition and subtraction combinations; the cues are taken from either 
written or verbal symbolism and related to the underlying knowledge structure 
possessed by the child and then these used for an appropriate solution strategy. 
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Information processing paradigms are in essence seeking to provide models of the 
relationship between working memory, where actual actions are carried out and where 
operations are performed on information, short term memory, where information is 
stored to be used in a relatively short period of time, and, long term memory, where 
everything a person knows is stored. Short term memory plays a crucial part in the 
actions carried out by individuals. Resnick & Ford (198 1) believe that only through 
being processed in working memory can information from the sensory part of the 
system enter a person's long term memory; only when information is called out of the 
person's long term memory can stored information be used in the course of thinking. 
The most important aspect of short term memory is its limited capacity. Miller (1956) 
indicated that despite the huge amounts of information humans can remember in 
general, they can only keep and operate on about seven "chunks" of information in 
short term memory. It is possible to retain information in short term memory through 
"rehearsal" ( Resnick & Ford, p. 31), but this does not increase its basic capacity. 'I'hey 
suggest that "automacity" and "chunking" may be ways of extending working 
memory's processing capacity., 
There have been strong suggestions that automacity, or automatic response to basic 
number combinations, can prevent competition for space between them and higher level 
problem solving processes. Indeed, the importance of automacity had been indicated by 
Thorndike (1922) who saw the basis of learning as the internalisation of facts best 
accomplished by means of didactic instruction and drill. Part of the means of achieving 
this end was to ensure that children leant number combinations as "the association 
between two digits and a response" (Baroody & Ginsburg, 1986, p. 100). Such a 
belief led to such information processing models as that of Cambell & Graham (1985) 
whose autonomous fact retrieval system, labelled the "arithmecon", saw each fact 
stored as an independent item of knowledge each distinct and bearing no reference to 
any other. 
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Any view based on autonomous systems is in contrast to those which hold that well 
structured knowledge is the extent to which concepts are associated with each other in 
rich and orderly ways. In an integrated knowledge structure certain concepts are central 
in that they are associated with a large number of other concepts. Larkin (1977) 
pursued the notion that internal integration effects temporal patterns. Like Miller, he too 
used the idea of 'chunk' to identify the information grouped around an organising 
concept. Simon (1980) pointed out that a "chunk is any perceptual configuration 
(visual, auditory, or what not) that is familiar and recognisable. For those of us who 
know the English language, spoken and printed words are chunks ....... (p. 83). The 
notion of chunk provides meaning to the aggregation of tiny "meaningless" bits of 
information - "small pieces of input data are suddenly linked up with an important 
memorised data representation structure" ( Davis, 1983, p. 264). To avoid loss of 
information during working memory processes, Harel & Kaput (1991) indicate how 
large units of information must be chunked into single units. Such units they see as 
analogous to the notion of conceptual entity, "a cognitive object for which the mental 
system has procedures that can take that object as an argument, as an input" (Greeno, 
1983, p. 227). 
The important focus that information processing presents for this study is its central 
idea that humans are information processors who construct symbolic representations of 
the world in their minds. This view sees thinking about and acting in the world as 
mental operations on such representations and then taking actions externally that 
correspond to the results of the mind's internal workings. A fundamental issue for this 
study is the nature of the knowledge and meaning that may be behind symbolic 
representations and the interpretation that is placed on children's mathematical thinking 
as a result of their interaction with symbolism. 
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2.6 THE DUALITY OF MATHEMATICAL KNOWLEDGE 
Piaget believed that human knowledge is essentially active. He made a distinction 
between two aspects of thinking; the figurative aspect and the operative aspect. In the 
field of cognition he described the figurative functions as perception, imitation and 
mental imagery. Operative aspects of thought includes the actions which transform 
objects or states and it also includes intellectual operations. Piaget indicated that the 
essential aspect of thought was its operative and not its figurative aspect. 
There has been a long standing distinction between two types of knowledge, 
characterised by Ryle (1949) respectively, as "knowing that" and "knowing how". 
Skemp (1978) placed these two types of knowledge in the context of notions of 
"relational understanding - 'knowing both what do and why"', and "instrumental 
understanding - 'rules without reason "'(Skemp, 1978, p. 20). Although the 
differences between relational and instrumental understanding are clearly specified, the 
relationship is not clear cut. Hiebert & Lefevre (1986), using the notions of "procedural 
knowledge" and "conceptual knowledge", brought together a set of contemporary 
studies exploring the connections between them. 
2.6.1 Process and Procedure 
Before examining in some depth the notions of these two types of knowledge it is 
important for the context of this study to distinguish between the use of the terms 
"process" and "procedure". The term "process" will be used in a general sense, as in 
the "process of addition", the "process of multiplication", the "process of solving an 
equation"; to mean the cognitive representation of a mathernatical operation. It need not 
be a process that is currently being carried out in thought, for instance we may speak of 
the process of addition without actually performing it. Nor is there any implication that 
the process must be carried out in a unique manner (for instance, as we shall see, the 
process of addition may be carried out by counting, by subitising, by deduction from 
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known facts or by some other method ). Flexibility in carrying out a process will play a 
fundamental role in the theory that is to be developed within Chapter 6. The term 
"procedure" is used in the sense of Davis (1983, p. 257); it is a specific algorithm for 
implementing a process. Thus "count-on" is identified as a procedure used to carry out 
the process of addition and as such it may be spontaneously constructed and "invented" 
by children (Baroody & Ginsburg, 1986), "personalised" (Gray, 1991), or taught 
(Fuson & Fuson, 1992). 
2.6.2 The Distinction Between Procedural and Conceptual Knowledge 
The focus of procedural knowledge is doing through applying. Hiebert & Lefevre 
indicate that procedural knowledge has two components: the formal language or symbol 
system of mathematics and the algorithms or rules for completing the mathematical 
task. The latter, which are usually hierarchically arranged, prescribe instructions on 
how to complete tasks which operate upon objects. The objects themselves can be 
distinguished as the written symbols of mathematics or objects that are non-symbolic in 
that they are concrete or mental images. 
Almost in contrast, conceptual knowledge makes use of the underlying relationships 
which exist within, or between, the objects themselves. Hiebert and Lefevre describe 
conceptual knowledge as knowledge that can be though of as: 
a connected web ... a network in which the linking relationships are as prominent as 
the discrete pieces of information ... a unit of conceptual knowledge cannot be an 
isolated piece of information; by definition it is part of conceptual knowledge only if 
the holder recognises its relationship to other pieces of information. 
(I liebert and Lefevre 1986, pp. 3-4) 
Conceptual knowledge growth within mathematics may take on two forms: 
In one form the understanding is based upon building relationships between 
existing bits of knowledge. 
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ii. A second form is the creation of relationships between existing knowledge 
and new knowledge that is entering the system: new knowledge is 
connected to existing knowledge. 
Amongst young pre-school children who are learning to count, Gelman & Meck (1986) 
see the relationship between procedural and conceptual understanding as being both 
intricate and dynamic. Carpenter (1986) emphasises the difficulties in sharpening the 
relationship between procedural and conceptual thinking by indicating that a persistent 
problem is the ability to measure conceptual knowledge directly, 
it is often inferred through the observation of particular procedures for which it 
presumably is a prerequisite but there is strong evidence that major advances in 
solving addition and subtraction problems are characterised both by more 
sophisticated procedures and more elaborated conceptual knowledge and that both need 
to be taken into account to understand children's problem solving processes and to 
plan for instruction. 
(Carpenter, 1986, p. 121). 
Although Baroody & Ginsburg indicate that 
'procedural and conceptual knowledge are integral aspects of the leaming, 
representation, and efficient production of the basic nurnber facts' 
(Baroody &Ginsburg, 1986, p. 91) 
there is an element of caution in Carpenters' discussion; learning procedures does not 
ensure that related conceptual knowledge has been acquired. We can often apply 
procedures mechanically without thinking about related conceptual knowledge and, 
whilst there is nothing wrong with automated efficient procedures, there is a need for 
the limits of the procedures to be recognised. 
2.7 THE ENCAPSULATION OF PROCESS AS OBJECT 
Sinclair & Sinclair (1986) focus on the theme of action (process) becoming the object 
of thinking through a brief discussion of the foundation of mathematical reasoning. 
They remain cognisant of the distinction between procedural and conceptual knowledge 
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even though they believe this is inappropriate within the pre-school child's 
environment. The problem is that focusing on separate aspects of mathematical 
knowledge tends to reinforce the belief that the two kinds of knowledge are not only 
distinct but discrete. Nothing could be further from the truth. We have already seen the 
strong relationship that Piaget saw between actions and thernatised objects of thought. 
Procedures form a basic part of arithmetical development and yet thinking based on 
procedures is likely to be very different to the flexible thinking based on conceptual 
knowledge. 
The important issue is the cognitive shift from mathematical processes into manipulable 
mental objects: 
... the whole of mathematics may therefore be thought of in terms of the 
construction of structures,... mathematical entities move from one level to another; 
an operation on such 'entities' becomes in its turn an object of the theory, and this 
process is repeated until we reach structures that are alternately structuring or being 
structured by 'stronger' structures. 
(Piaget 1972, p. 70) 
Within the field of arithmetic the connection between 'count meanings' and 'cardinal 
meanings' is an example of this shift. We have already seen that, in Piagetian terms, 
behaviour which illustrates the ability to quantify an amount involves the synthesis of 
ordering and class inclusion. This co-ordination of sub-schemes underscores the 
counting process which generates and exploits one to one correspondence and 
eventually leads to number invariance, i. e. the "threeness" of three. Full conceptual 
understanding implies that the relationships inherent in all of the different components 
that form 3 are also available (1 and I and 1; 2 and 1; 1 and 2; one less than 4 etc. ). 
However, shifting the focus from action to the value of the set, presents us all with 
uncertainty - we know it is done but we do not know how it is done. At one and the 
same time the process is the object; a mathematical process that is turned into a concept 
and which can be quickly turned back to a process provides a considerable degree of 
flexibility. We can see therefore see the notion of a process being "chunked" into the 
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object. Greeno (1983) distinguishes between cognitive objects from attributes, 
operations and relations which attach to or act upon the objects. He suggests that to 
qualify as an object such a construct must be permanently available in the individuals 
mental representation. Thus we may see how the process of counting five leads to the 
object "five" which can qualify as an object when it is permanently available for future 
manipulation. The notion of object means that we can now refer to the mathematical 
entity as if it was a real thing; we can recognise it at a glance and manipulate it as a 
whole. In contrast, interpreting a notion as a process implies regarding it as a potential 
rather than an actual entity. It comes into existence through a series of actions. Such a 
distinction will have an important bearing on the theory developed later within the 
thesis. 
The problem of maintaining the distinction between process and concept in this context 
is that it may place an inappropriate emphasis on the nature of the mental object. 
Dubinsky (1991), for example, speaks of the process being encapsulated as an object 
and of the object being de-encapsulated into a process, thus maintaining two separate 
terms: process and object with transformations between them. The uncertainties linked 
to encapsulation are noted above, but once this is achieved the individual now has both 
process and object available, so de-encapsulation is trivial. In an analogous way, 
Greeno defines a "conceptual entity" as a cognitive object which can be manipulated as 
the input to a mental procedure. The cognitive process of forming a (static) conceptual 
entity from a (dynamic) process has variously been called "entification" (Kaput, 1982) 
and "reification" (Sfard, 1989,1991). These terms shall be used interchangeably in the 
remainder of this study although the word "encapsulation" is favoured. 
Sfard (1991) draws the conclusion that abstract notions such as number or function can 
be conceived of structurally, as objects, or operationally, as processes and she claims 
that the operational conception is the first step in new mathematical notions. Sfard's 
notions of "structural" arises from definitions that treat mathematical concepts as if they 
referred to some abstract objects whilst her notion of operational refers to processes, 
algorithms and actions rather than objects. There are of course links with the Piagetian 
notions of structure and operation. This is particularly true of her notion of structural 
although her notion of operational does not on the surface appear to carry the same 
underlying notion as that of Piaget "an action that can be internalised". She uses a form 
of stage theory to supply an explanation of the mental changes: interiorisation, 
condensation and reification. Although she indicates that she uses the notion of 
"interiorization" in much the same sense as Piaget, she actually sees it as a stage when a 
"person gets acquainted with processes which will eventually give rise to a new 
concept' ' (p. 18). In one sense she expands upon the Piagetian notion since she implies 
that interiorization is the stage when a person develops the skill to perform mental 
operations efficiently. Condensation is identified as the stage of "squeezing" lengthy 
sequences of operations into more manageable units. It continues to refer to the 
operational component of mathematics and it appears to be analogous to chunking. 
Both interiorization and condensation are seen to be lengthy sequences of gradual 
quantitative rather than qualitative changes; it is reffication that provides the quantum 
leap from operational to structural thinking. 
The importance of Sfard's work for this study is her emphasis on the ontological gap 
between her two forms of thinking. Structural thinking is the ability to see a 
mathematical entity as an object reif ied from operational thought. 
2.8 MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS 
To investigate the notions of qualitatively different thinking must lead to discussion of 
the means whereby the different forms of thinking may be triggered. A partial answer 
to this question may be resolved by considering how episodes are represented within 
the child's mind. Piaget and the constructivists have suggested that mathematical 
development involves the successive restructuring of knowledge which results from 
children's interactions with their environment. Tall & Vinner (198 1) made a distinction 
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between the individual's way of thinking of a concept and its formal definition. Thus 
they distinguish between mathematics as a mental activity and mathematics as a formal 
system. They used the term concept image to describe the total cognitive structure that 
is associated with a concept. They concur with Piaget and the constructivists in that 
they see the concept image successively changing in response to new stimuli. 
The total cognitive structure perceived by Tall & Vinner included all of the mental 
pictures and associated properties and processes that were associated with the concept. 
Such mental pictures were the focus of attention of Bruner (1968). His concern was the 
way in which children conserve past experience in a model and he suggested three 
ways in which in which this was accomplished; enactive representations, iconic 
representation and symbolic representation. 
Enactive representation is seen as a mode of representing past events through 
appropriate motor response and it "is based, it seems, upon a learning of responses and 
forms of habituation" (Bruner, 1968, p. 11). Resnick & Ford (198 1) believe that this 
mode may well be what we are seeing in children who use finger tapping to support 
addition strategies; counting, for these children, may still be represented as a motor act. 
Iconic representation takes us a step away from the concrete and the physical to the 
realm of mental imagery. Bruner suggests that iconic representation is what happens 
when a child pictures an operation or manipulation as a way of not only remembering 
the act but also of recreating it mentally when necessary. Such a stage, and indeed 
formulation of a sequence of modes of representation amount to a stage theory of the 
development of intellect, may well provide some indication of the way knowledge is 
stored during Sfard's stage of interiorisation and may well be the way that, in a 
Piagetian sense actions are initially interiorised. Bruner's third stage, that of symbolic 
representation would appear to be the point where concept formation, in the sense 
defined by Skemp and Vergnaud, actually takes place. To Bruner representations in 
words or language are the hallmarks of symbolic representation, to Skemp and 
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Vergnaud symbolic representation play an essential part in concept formation and 
mathematical communication. But like many others, Bruner had no explanation for the 
transition from action to object represented by symbol. 
To put the matter very briefly, it would seem as if some sort of image formation or 
schema formation-whatever we should call the device that renders a sequence of 
action simultaneous-comes rather automatically as an accompaniment of response 
stabilisation's. But how the nervous system converts a sequence of responses into an 
image or schema is simply not understood. 
(Bruner, J. S., 1968, p. 14) 
We have seen that information processing theorists believe that the knowledge 
structures possessed by humans are symbolic representations of the world. The 
implication of work such as Piaget's, Skemp, Vergnaud, Bruner's and Sfard's is that 
these symbolic representations may change from simply representing an action or 
process to representing an idea or object. But they can take on double meanings; they 
may be both the process and the object. Sfard (1989) reminds us that the ability to 
conceive mathematical notions as processes and objects at the same time, although 
ostensibly incompatible, is in fact complementary. Yet she asks "How can anything be 
a process and an object at the same time? " It is suggested later within this study 
(Chapter 6) that the answer to this question is seen in the way that mathematicians use 
symbols. 
2.9 THE ROLE OF SYMBOLS 
The manner in which symbols are used plays a pivotal role in the discussion of the 
relationship between process and concept. In the Piagetian sense a symbol is a signifier 
that bears a figurative resemblance to the thing represented. As such it can be invented 
by the child and does not need to be taught. This is not a view that is taken within this 
study. For this purpose a symbol is regarded as a conventional signifier, something 
which is perceived by the senses but bears no similarity to the thing represented. It can 
be written or spoken so that it can be seen or heard; the word "five" and the numeral 
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"S' are symbols which require social transmission. The spoken symbol "five" can be 
heard whilst the written symbol "S' can be seen. They both convey the same message 
only the form is different. 
Barnes (1976) indicates that language is the fundamental instrument the learner can use 
to bring order to the environment, but many mathematical language patterns are 
complex and do not come easily to the child (Haylock, 1991). Austin & Howson 
(1979) see the role of language as a means of supplying verbal symbols which can 
represent concepts and be used as stimuli for the internalised manipulation of these 
concepts. However, though concept and language are inextricably linked, concept 
formation depends on linguistic development (Vygotsky, 1962). Pimm (1987) accepts 
these general principles but provides some indications of the confusion that may arise if 
the focus of attention is on the language rather than on the meanings behind the 
language. To Skemp (1986) the meaning of the symbol whether spoken or written is 
the idea it expresses: "without an idea attached a symbol is empty, meaningless" 
(p. 6 5). 
Written symbols can be thought of as intellectual tools which serve the public function 
of recording what is already known in order to share and communicate it, and the 
personal function that involves organising and manipulating ideas. To facilitate the latter 
symbols are seen as not only revealing their referents but objects in their own right. 
Mathematical symbols are an efficient means of storing and conveying information not 
least because they allow the compression of a lot of information into a small space 
(Pimm (1987) and elevate mathematical activity to a new plane (Resnick & Ford 
(1981). Ernest (1987) notes that the economy of symbolism facilitates and encourages 
chunking, whilst Harel & Kaput (1991) indicate that through the use of symbols 
"complex ideas or mental ideas can be chunked and thus represented by physical 
notations which, in turn can be reflected up or manipulated to generate new ideas" 
(p. 88). The paradox is that symbolism is both the reason for the power of 
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mathematics and the reason for its complexity for many of those trying to learn it 
(Cockcroft, 1982). 
2.10 SUMMARY 
Within the chapter we have traced the notion of cognitive development from physical 
action on objects to interiorised actions represented by symbolism. In contemporary 
terms this cognitive shift has been theorised as the encapsulation of a proceýs giving 
rise to mathematical objects that are available for manipulation as if they were real 
things. Objects formed at one level of difficulty may be utilised within the procedural 
aspects of the next until that process is encapsulated as a new object. Each successive 
encapsulation may increase the complexity of the object. Symbols have a crucial role to 
play in being representations of objects as encapsulated processes. 
Within this study we consider cognitive shifts as they relate to simple arithmetic. We 
look at both the flexibility and the inflexibility that may arise from the interpretation of 
mathematical processes. We see the consequences of using an un-encapsulated 
procedure and reflect upon the advantages that may be gained from the flexible use of 
process and object. It is such a distinction that is hypothesised to be a source of 
qualitatively different thinking in simple arithmetic. 
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CHAPTER 3 
FROM COUNTING TO NUMBER FACT RETENTION: 
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Action interiorised as object is central to the discussion of the development of early 
number skills. It is the action of counting interiorised as "sum" or "difference' that is 
the focus of this chapter. 
Such has been the attention given to the development of numerical concepts and skills 
in young children that the importance of meaningful counting as a basis for arithmetical 
development would now appear to be beyond question. Researchers have been able to 
provide some insight into the development of early counting skills ( e. g. Steffe et al, 
1982; Fuson et al, 1982; Gelman & Meek 1983(a), 1983(b), Gelman & Gallistel, 
1986), the development of children's ability to solve arithmetical word problems (e. g. 
Briars & Larkin, 1984; Riley, Greeno, & Heller, 1983), the strategies used to solve 
elementary arithmetical word problems (e. g. Carpenter et al 1981,1982; Hiebert et al, 
1982), the results of instruction in the development of higher order strategies (e. g. 
Secada et A 1983; Fuson, 1986; Thornton, 1990), and the order in which children 
acquire number concepts (Denvir & Brown, 1986a, 1986b). 
The purpose of this chapter is to review some of the literature relevant to the 
development of counting skills and place this within a framework which considers the 
development of competence in the addition and subtraction of basic number 
combinations. We consider the subskills and principles that are coordinated into the 
process of counting. The encapsulation of the process of counting into the concept of 
number forms the next stage of the chapter and this forms a basis for the ensuing 
discussion on the strategies that children use to solve simple number combinations. 
These enable the focus to be redirected at procedural and conceptual approaches to 
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simPle arithmetic when the methodology for the first investigation is discussed within 
Chapter 4. 
3.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTING SKILLS 
Within the mathematical context a major use of counting is to determine the number 
within a given set; knowing how to count is fundamental to the acquisition of early 
arithmetic skills. Herscovics & Bergeron (1983) see understanding based on counting 
procedures as only one stage in the process of constructing a conceptual schema for 
number. Fuson & Hall (1983) indicate that number concepts and meaningful counting 
interact in powerful and sophisticated ways: through their application of more efficient 
counting procedures children gradually discover or construct numerical concepts. This 
belief supplies implicit support for the Piagetian view of action becoming interiorised as 
object and, although the counting procedures do not involve formal mathematics, 
efficient and meaningful (in the sense of Ausubel) counting forms the basis for early 
arithmetical development. 
3.2.1 Counting Principles 
It has been inferred by Gelman & Meek (1983a, 1983b) and Gelman & Gallistel (1986) 
that specific principles govern and derine counting. As developmental psychologists 
they were committed to the empirical investigation of the counting skills possessed by 
young children. Within their analysis they suggest rive principles which are either 
wholly or partly possible candidates for the initial competence that children bring to the 
task of acquiring skill in counting: 
(a) one-one correspondence - each item counted is assigned a unique 
name; 
(b) the stable order principle - the names are drawn from a stable list; 
(c) the cardinal principle - the last name used in the count has a special 
status; 
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(d) the item indifference (or irrelevance) principle - there are no 
restrictions on the collection of items that can be counted 
(e) the order-indifference principle - the order in which the items are 
named is irrelevant. 
Within these principles we see a series of sub schemes that would comprise the 
Piagetian notion of scheme. Gelman & Meck believe that knowledge of these principles 
provides an indication of the constraints actions must reflect if they are to yield 
acceptable counting behaviour but it is hypothesised that the principles are available to 
children before they produce such behaviour. It is not suggested that knowledge of the 
principles guarantees correct performance nor is it indicated that such knowledge may 
guide successful performance: "the first three principles deal with rules of procedure or 
how to count; the fourth with the definition of countables, or what to count. Ile final 
principle involves a composite of features of the other four principles" (Gelman & 
Gallistell, 1986, p. 77). 
Although the "how to count principles" form a scheme in the Piagetian sense because 
they reveal characteristic properties that Piaget attributes to schemes, Gelman & 
Gallistell claim that their conclusions cast doubt on aspects of Piaget's theory, not least 
because they believe his focus was more on what children couldn't do rather than what 
they could do. Their study shows that children at Piaget's pre-operational stage are 
much more competent at number than he allows for. 
Klahr & Wallace, (1973), working within an information processing paradigm, present 
a contrasting view. They suggest that initially children memorise, without 
understanding, various counting behaviours and only eventually induce principles or 
components of the counting principles. 'Me implication is that counting ability develops 
in a hierarchical fashion and gradually, through practice, becomes automatic. 
Counting may be the dominant, but not the only, way that children may quantify. Klahr 
& Wallace (1976) argue that subitising - immediate recognition of a quantity - develops 
earlier and is a prerequisite to the development of counting. The conjecture is that 
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subitising is constructed by the child as the result of experience with small collections 
of objects. Klahr, Langley & Neches (1987) see this process as completely different 
from quantification by counting which in information processing terms "requires 
conscious management of attention for effective application of the technology of 
counting in ones" (p. 385). Counting, they argue, "remains essentially a ritual without 
semantic basis until the realisation that it performs the same function as subitising 
confers the status of an indicator of quantity" (ibid. ). 
Gelman & Gallistel challenge this view. They suggest counting precedes subitising and 
believe that "perceptual chunk-ing" (p. 70) arises from practice at counting. Indeed, they 
indicate that the notion of subitising should be redefined; it should not be thought of as 
a developmental mechanism that precedes counting but rather as a way of grouping 
elements to enhance counting. (There is the possibility that both views are correct. 
Current research by the writer indicates that subitising of very small numbers is a 
characteristic possessed by some children who cannot count at the point of entry to 
school. It will also be seen later that older children use a "subitised" display of fingers 
to support a very efficient procedure when dealing with addition and subtraction 
combinations to ten. Such an approach, which involved no actual counting, involved 
the visual display of numbers to ten in a concrete form represented by the appropriate 
number of ringers). 
3.2.2 The Number Word Sequence and Counting 
Although counting is the method used by all cultures to differentiate and label quantities 
not easily or accurately differentiated by perceptual means, central to the ability to count 
is the acquisition of the number word sequence but this is not spontaneous. Memory 
plays an important part in this process; children have to have the ability to memorise 
and recite the number word sequence of their own culture. Within the English speaking 
world this is particularly true of the number sequence one to twelve but 'after 
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THIRTEEN a preliminary composition procedure may set in and after TWENTY a 
general one' (Steffe et al, 1982, p. 22). 
Fuson & Hall (1983) indicate that the number word sequence seems to be an 
unstructured list for young children until the decade structure is evident. Distinct 
advantages that may be gained if the number system, as spoken in English, contained 
links between number words and concrete objects were highlighted by Hughes (1986). 
Kamii (1985) believes it is unfortunate that in English the counting (spoken) words 
from eleven through to nineteen correspond so poorly to the Arabic written system 
from the standpoint of the child who, at the same time as learning to write numerals, is 
also learning phonics for reading and spelling for writing. 
Schaeffer et al (1974) indicate that the most basic skill in their hypothesised hierarchy 
of counting skills, which attempts to account for number conservation development, is 
the learning of number words. Secondary to this skill is the skill of enumeration, the 
co-ordination of the number words with each object in the set that is counted, to create 
one-to-one correspondence. Only after repeated exposure and possible adult 
intervention, does the child learn that the last number in the set represents the number of 
items in that set - the action of counting leads to the naming of the value of the set. The 
implications behind this model are Piagetian but we see emphasised here the importance 
of intervention to enhance reflective abstraction to promote encapsulation of the 
process. 
Fuson et al (1982) verified a hierarchy for the development of several abilities 
associated with the memorisation of the number word sequence. In doing so they were 
following Gagnd's (1962) approach of analysing skills into a set of subskills. The 
hierarchy is generated by considering the target task, i. e. the ability to count, and then 
considering what is to be known or performed during counting. Underlying the Fuson 
hierarchy, and indeed every hierarchy, there is an implicit theory of the processes that 
are engaged in to perform the tasks that appear in the various levels of the hierarchy. 
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Using rational task analysis, Fuson et al identified two phases: an initial acquisition 
phase in which the conventional number words were learnt as a meaningless sequence, 
and an elaboration phase during which the number sequence is decomposed into 
separate words for arithmetical and relational purposes. Although ten abilities are 
indicated within the elaboration phase, these abilities may be identified within two 
groups: those directly related to memorisation of the number word sequence and those 
that involve counting. They indicate, for example, the ways in which children acquire 
advanced sequence skills that involve 'counting-on' for addition and 'counting-up' or 
'counting-down from' and 'to' specified number words. 
The six abilities within the first group, which commences with the ability to recite 
starting at one, are learned gradually and are exemplified by the ability to count-on and 
count-back within a given range of numbers. Those in the second group of four 
abilities involve keeping track of the amount counted on or counted back. These latter 
procedures would involve double counting, which, as well as being frequently explicit, 
may also be implicit in the action. Steffe et al (1982) consider such abilities as evidence 
of abstraction of the number concept; they indicate that there is a profound difference 
between counting and double counting. 
3.2.3 The Counting Act 
Steffe et al (1982) and Herscovics & Bergeron (1983) stress the importance of the need 
to distinguish between the ability to recite the number word sequence and the act of 
counting, a procedure based on one-to-one correspondence. In the view of the fonner 
"in order to qualify as [an] act of counting, the vocal or sub-vocal production of each 
individual number word of the sequence must be accompanied by at least a 
momentary awareness of the individual unit to which the number word can be related" 
(Steffe et al, 1982, p 24). 
Units are defined as the objects that the child creates to aid the counting process. 
Herscovics & Bergeron claim that any interpretation which treats the Fuson hierarchy 
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as appropriate to counting must be tentative since, although it has been verified for the 
number word sequence, it has not been verified for counting procedures. 
For counting to take place Steffe et al indicate that children initially require perceptual 
material or things which are countable items. Their 'counting type' model, influenced to 
a considerable extent by Piaget's genetic epistemology, documents five increasingly 
sophisticated types of units that children create when they count. Decreasing 
dependence on perceptual material will allow children to eventually count figural 
representations of perceptual material; the counting process continues in the absence of 
the actual items. A further step away from the use of perceptual items is that an 
increasing awareness of the motor acts, such as pointing, nodding and grasping, that 
accompany the counting process can be taken as further substitute units for perceptual 
items. Counting with motor acts is seen as an important step in the development of 
abstract numerical concepts. Dependence on the first three forms of unit is further 
reduced by the realisation that the utterance of a segment of the number word, the 
verbal unit, can be taken as a substitute for countable items that could have been co- 
ordinated with the uttered number word. The belief is that the concept of unit becomes 
wholly abstract when the child no longer needs any material in order to create countable 
items, and that as a corollary of that development, 'the notion of any number word can 
be taken as a substitute for a series of counting acts involving the co-ordination of units 
of some kind with number words' (Steffe et a 1,1982, p. 43). An essential point that 
arises from the work of Steffe et al is that, following Piaget, it uses both actual and re- 
represented sensory motor activity to characterise children's concepts. Cobb (1987) 
indicates that children at the lower four levels in counting i. e. perceptual, figural, motor 
and verbal, give meaning to number words and numerals by actually performing or re- 
presenting activity. 
Fuson & Hall (1983) indicate how the sequence of number words become a 
representational tool that is used for solving the operations of addition, subtraction, 
multiplication and division in cardinal contexts. The skills identified by Fuson et al 
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(1982), when applied in cardinal problem contexts, have become the solution 
procedures that have been tenned 'counting-on' for addition and 'counting-back' or 
'counting-back to' for subtraction. 
3.3 COUNTING PROCEDURES 
The 'counting types' model proposed by Steffe et al attempts to account for a 
qualitative change in children's arithmetical thinking. It may be seen as a development 
path in which the child first constructs number as an arithmetical object and then 
gradually develops the ability to establish relationships between numbers. However, 
only the fifth of the five qualitatively distinct types of number word meaning, that of 
abstract counting, corresponds to a set with a numerical value so that there is no actual 
performing or representing activity. Arising from this Cobb (1987) suggests that 
"children who have constructed number as an abstract, arithmetical object can initially 
construct only enactive relationships between numbere' (p. 172). 
Riley, Greeno & Heller (1983), working within an information processing paradigm, 
promote a schema based model of early number development which allows for 
qualitative change by adding conceptual abilities. The three computer based models 
which they propose advance in conceptual development from a first level which is 
limited to the establishment of a new set by either adding or removing objects from a 
collection, through level two which, through the use of internal representations, can 
indicate a relationship between the sets that are established, to level 3 which explicitly 
represents the part-whole relationship. 
Both the models of both Steffe et al and Riley et al, which derive their basis from 
children's solutions to word problems, specify a sequence of conceptual levels that 
culminates in the numerical part-whole concept. Resnick (1983) believes that the ability 
to interpret problems in terms of part and whole relationships is probably the major 
conceptual achievement of the early school years. She indicates that if it is to function 
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as a tool in problem solving, "the part-whole knowledge structure must be tied to 
procedures for constructing or evaluating quantities" (p. 114) and that such a schema 
may play a role in the subsequent development of number knowledge. 
With the application of the part-whole schema it becomes possible for children to think 
about numbers as compositions of other numbers; such a schema provides an 
interpretation of number which is quite close to Piaget's definition of the operational 
number schema; "... all the relations in question form an operational system such that 
the whole, which has become invariant, is the result of composition through addition of 
the parts, and that the relationship between the parts are univocally determined by 
combined additions and subtraction" (Piaget, 1965, p. 190). Thus, any quantity, the 
whole, can be partitioned into parts provided the sum of the parts equals the whole; by 
implication the parts are included in the whole. 
Although the part-whole analysis provides a unifying framework for connecting 
numbers of different additive and subtractive situations, Carpenter & Moser (1984) 
"question whether such a specific model [as that of Riley et all can capture the 
variability of children's performance"(p. 199); it does not correspond to the way most 
young children think about word problems. 
3.3.1 Addition and Counting 
Carpenter & Moser (1982) show that, prior to formal instruction in addition and 
subtraction, children make use of physical objects or fingers to represent quantifies to 
be operated upon. The work of Fuson (1982), Resnick (1983) and Siegler & Shrager 
(1984) supports this view. In the same way that, for example, Fuson (1982) and Steffe 
et al (1982) indicate that there is a change in the pattern of counting, there are also 
indications that there are various counting strategies available to children to solve 
problems. 
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Whilst the primary objective of Carpenter et al (1981) was to consider children's 
success at solving addition and subtraction problems prior to formal instruction, a 
secondary one was to characterise the strategies that the children used to solve such 
problems. It was their belief that different strategies implied different conceptions of 
addition and subtraction. Within this study it will be seen that although this belief may 
go a long way towards explaining different conceptions of understanding in addition 
and subtraction, it may not go the whole way. Considering the integrated use of 
strategies may provide a clearer picture. 
The counting strategies that they identify "counting all", "counting on from smaller 
number" and "counting on from larger number" (Carpenter, Hiebert & Moser, 1981. p. 
32) were established from an analysis of what children said they were doing. They 
closely resembled the three basic counting models proposed earlier by Groen & 
Parkman(1972) who used number sentences to test a hypothesised series of models for 
the addition process using mental counting. 
Assuming the addition of m+n, the three models specified different duration for task 
performance: 
9 Model A: Starting a mental count at zero and incrementing m times 
then n firnes. 
Model B: Setting the mental counter to m and incrementing n times. 
* Model C: Setting the mental counter to whichever is the larger of m 
and n and incrementing the smaller. Since the minimum of 
counting is required for this model it has been termed MIN. 
Although identifying two classes of counting-on, Carpenter & Moser's later discussion 
of the 'counting-on from larger' strategy (Carpenter & Moser, 1982, p. 15) indicates 
that this is the MIN strategy of Groen & Parkman. Carpenter et al did not identify a 
strategy analogous to MIN using counting-all. Neither did they make the distinction in 
the additional paper (Hiebert et al, 1982). However, they indicate that there is some 
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evidence that young children carrying out the count-all procedure do not always respect 
addend order and in fact do count out the largest first. They imply that these children 
have a more advanced conception of addition than do those children who always 
respect addend order. 
Groen & Resnick (1977) indicate that the addition algorithm analogous to the count-all 
strategy is one of the accepted mathematical definitions for addition and that it is 
relatively easy to demonstrate and teach to young children. Their belief that young 
children can spontaneously move from count-all to count-on has been supported by 
other research (e. g. Carpenter et al, 198 1; Houlihan & Ginsburg, 198 1). Herscovics & 
Bergeron (1983) suggest that combining two sets of objects and counting them from 
one - count-all - may be considered as an initial procedure whereas taking the first set 
as a starting point for enumeration - count-on - is a procedure so much more efficient 
that it can be viewed as the beginning of abstraction. The theoretical perspective 
developed within this study (Chapter 6) would support this view but it indicates that a 
count-on procedure may have qualitatively different outcomes. 
Focusing on the transition from count-all to count-on in addition, Secada et al (1983) 
worked with children whose ages ranged from six years three months to seven years 
six months. They concentrated on the simplest type of count-on which occurs when 
objects are presented for the second addend. They identified three sub-skills which 
aided the procedural growth; the ability to produce the correct sequence of counting 
words starting from an arbitrary point, the ability to see the cardinal/ordinal qualities of 
a number, and the ability of the child to shift from seeing objects within two separate 
sets to seeing one set of all of the objects taken together. None of these subskills are 
required in count-all. 
The general impression gleaned from the, literature is that count-on is regarded as a 
product of children's invention (e. g. Ginsburg, 1977; Baroody & Ginsburg, 1986; 
Sinclair & Sinclair, 1986). Such invention is seen as an integral component of what has 
come to be regarded as children's use of informal counting methods. Baroody & 
Ginsburg regard such informal arithmetic as an important base from which to learn 
more formal arithmetic. Not only do they subscribe to two classifications of the 
counting-on procedure when considering counting as a mental activity, but they also 
draw together views that enhance the distinction between 'counting-all from the first 
addend' (CAF) and 'counting-all starting with the larger term' (CAL) ( Baroody & 
Ginsburg, 1986, p. 8 1). Such a distinction makes us meet the problem of commutativity 
head-on. In contrast to those who regard the invention of an addition procedure that 
disregards addend order as evidence and understanding of commutativity ( e. g. Groen 
& Resnick, 1977), Baroody and Ginsburg indicate that the use of largest first may be 
more an indicator of a child's attempts to relieve cognitive stress: it reduces the number 
of steps within the keeping track process and reduces the length of time required to 
carry out a procedure. 
3.3.2 Subtraction and Counting 
Woods, Resnick & Groen (1975) confirmed hypothesised models for subtraction 
procedures which were identified as decrementing (count-down), incrementing (count- 
up) and a model which indicated "choice". either incrementing or decrementing 
depending upon which is the quicker. 
Carpenter et al (1981) point out that it is more difficult to identify general solution 
strategies for subtraction word problems because there are more problems and more 
distinct strategies that can be used for each problem. However, Carpenter & Moser 
(1984) identified four strategies that are analogous to the strategies identified for 
addition: direct modelling strategies were "separating from", "adding on" and 
"matching" whilst the counting strategies were identified as "counting down from", and 
"counting up from given" (p. 182). 
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Implicit within the strategy classifications for addition and subtraction that have been 
summarised above, is the implication that the use of counting algorithms can reveal 
something about the child's understanding of counting beyond the mere application of a 
procedure to solve the problems. Young children who use count-all or count-on as 
appropriate strategies to deal with addition will very frequently see subtraction as the 
inverse of these approaches. Consequently the physical aspect of separating or the 
count down strategy would be seen as the most appropriate. Indeed, Steffe et al (1982) 
see that the crucial preconditions for a child to relate addition and subtraction are: 
(i) having constituted addition as count-on with numerical extension (a 
sequence of forward counting acts) and subtraction as counting-back; 
and 
(ii) having constructed reversibility of numerical extension and declension 
(backward counting with double count). 
An implication of this view is that unless such preconditions are met children are unable 
to identify the benefits of the part-whole relationship. As is later seen within the study 
(Chapters 5 and 7) children who flexibly use either count-back or count-up are 
illustrating procedural flexibility which seems to accompany flexible thinking skills. 
There is frequently within the literature a body of opinion which seems to specify that 
counting procedures are age related. Ilg & Ames (1951), for example, indicate that 
whilst five-year-old children used a strategy to be later described as count-all, six-year- 
old children used count-on from the largest. The inverse processes were used for 
subtraction, 'separating' by five-year-old children and 'counting down from' by six- 
year-old children. Woods, Resnick & Groen come to the conclusion that second grade 
children in America (children aged approximately 7+) solved simple subtraction 
problems by methods that could be described as 'counting-back from' and 'counting-up 
to' whereas children of the fourth grade (9+) used the "choice" model. 
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Of course methods that involve counting, although indicating the complementary nature 
of addition and subtraction do not necessarily reinforce the nature of the links between 
the two. As the difference between the numbers increases, the difficulties of not only 
keeping track of the amount counted in the counting-back process but of also reciting 
the numbers backwards also increases (Baroody, 1984; Carpenter & Moser, 1984). 
Fuson (1986) and Fuson & Willis (1988) have shown how, in an attempt to alleviate 
these problems, six-year-old children can learn to solve subtraction problems using 
counting up as the single counting strategy for subtraction. 
The cumulative research on the use of counting to resolve addition and subtraction 
combinations presents us with refined classifications which help us identify the nature 
of the actions which children are undertaking and the units that are used to support 
these actions and represent the numbers involved. Fingers are identified as very 
common perceptual units used to support counting. Hughes (1986) presents some 
interesting case studies of children using fingers whilst Steffe et al indicate how fingers 
may function as countable items, perceptual units, or as a check in the double counting 
process. Indeed such was the anticipated dominance of their use that one portion of the 
item bank included in their study indicated that children should not use fingers. 
Brownell (1935) had indicated that a substantial number of number combinations were 
obtained through the use of fingers. Indeed, he had earlier specified their use as 
evidence of a learned procedure to execute the calculation of a number combination 
(Brownell, 1928). Whilst Baroody (1987) has shown how children may use fingers in 
single digit addition, Fuson (1986) and Fuson & Secada (1986) taught children how to 
use their fingers to support counting procedures in both addition and subtraction. 
In the absence of physical objects, less sophisticated counting procedures, for example, 
count-all and count-back, do not appear to be readily transferable as problem size 
increases; 'it seems that children must learn to count-on before they can solve addition 
problems with sums greater than 10 when physical objects are not available' (Carpenter 
& Moser, 1982, p. 21). Conclusions within this study would support this view but they 
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also indicate that procedural competence in count-on at one level does not guarantee 
procedural competence at the next highest level. 
3.4 FACT RETRIEVAL 
It is recognised that children gradually replace their slower procedural (count-based) 
approaches with efficient fact retrieval processes. Amongst their sample of first grade 
children Mebert et al (1982) identified two further solution strategies that were common 
to both addition and subtraction: 
1. Known Fact 
The response of the child was based on the recall of a particular fact. 
2. Derived Fact 
The solution that was generated by the child was based on a related number 
fact or a property of the number system. For example, to solve particular 
addition and subtraction problems the child may use one of the following 
approaches: 
(i) 4+3 "4 +4=8,4 is one more than 3 so 4+3= 7". 
(ii) 8-3 "two 4's are 8,4 is one more than 3 so 8-3= 5". 
(iii) 6+8 "6 +4= 10,10 +4= 14". 
(iV) 14 -6 "14 -4 = 10,10 =5+5,5 -2=3,3 +5= 8". 
3.4.1 Derived Facts 
As a result of their longitudinal study with children, those in grades one through three 
(children aged 6+ through to 8+), Carpenter & Moser (1984) indicate that children learn 
some number facts before others and, before they have mastered addition tables, they 
make use of a small set of memorised facts to derive solutions for some addition and 
subtraction problems. The results of the current study would indicate that even when 
they know some facts some children do not do this, and, the difference between them 
and those that do, is taken as evidence of qualitatively different thinking about simple 
arithmetic. The results of Groen & Parkman and of Woods et al suggest that doubles 
e. g. 4+4,8 - 4, fall into the category of "easier remembered" combinations. 
Strategies analogous to derived-fact strategies have been described in a number of 
studies. Thornton (1978) used the term "thinking strategies" whilst Houlihan & 
Ginsburg (1981) placed the label "indirect memory" on strategies now considered to 
fall under the classification derived facts. Resnick (1983) notes that such "shortcut 
procedures provide evidence that children understand the compositional structure of 
numbers and are able to partition and recombine quantities with some flexibility" (p. 
122). 
For the purpose of this study, such strategies will not be interpreted as procedural since 
the notions of "thinking" and "flexibility" do not seem to sit easily with the notion of 
procedure considered earlier. Such qualities would appear to provide evidence of the 
use of conceptual knowledge and relational thinking. The notion of procedure can 
imply instrumental thinking. It is conjectured that the use of derived facts provides 
evidence of qualitatively different thinking in simple arithmetic; their use provides some 
children with the flexibility required to achieve success over a range of basic number 
combinations. Children who continually need to resort to procedures may have some 
success but this can be limited since their procedure may not be easily generalisable. 
The "invented strategies" considered by Baroody, Ginsburg & Waxman (1983) may 
also include the notion of derived facts but some care has to be taken with their use of 
the term "invented". Houlihan & Ginsburg (198 1) indicate that the invented strategy is 
the result of children assimilating what is taught into what they already know. Such a 
strategy can be count based or non count based; that the distinction between count 
based and non-count based strategies is made quite clear is very important for this 
study. Carpenter et al (198 1) used the term "heuristic strategies" to describe strategies 
used to generate solutions from a small set of known basic facts. 
Steffe et al (1982) indicate that some factual knowledge seems crucial for the 
development of thinking strategies. The use of derived facts not only indicates a more 
sophisticated use of informal methods but has been seen by some researchers ( e. g. 
Steinberg, 1985; Thornton, 1987) as a strong influence on positive fact acquisition. 
Thornton (1990) suggests that time explicitly spent on teaching such an approach is 
more effective than drill in facilitating the learning, retention and transfer of basic 
number combinations. Interestingly, when reporting the results of the assessment 
component of their main study into the learning of number concepts by low attainers 
Denvir & Brown (1986a) indicated that their sample of "low attainers" made no use of 
derived facts, an observation generally supported by the conclusions within this study. 
3.4.2 Knowing Combinations 
A further interesting point emerging from the Brown & Denvir pilot study was the 
observation that the "most notable failure of the teaching was the attempt to teach 
addition number facts for some small numbers" (1986b, p. 154). 
Learning and using the number facts is the focus of attention of many who teach young 
children, and, particularly at the present time, also a focus of those who set the criteria 
against which children may be judged ((DES, 1989,199 1). A central issue within this 
study is to consider children's use of counting procedures and their interplay between 
the use of fact retrieval methods that may be identified as 'known facts' and fact 
retrieval methods based on the reconstruction of facts that are known to establish new 
known facts - derived facts. Before looking with a little more detail at this relationship 
we first consider how counting, seen as a partial structure for obtaining solutions to the 
number combinations may in fact become interrialised as a known combination. 
Stemming from such seminal research as that of Thorridike (1922), a dominant view 
saw the basis of learning as the internalisation of facts best accomplished by means of 
didactic instruction and drill - repeated exposure and practice led to memorised 
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individual facts. No importance was placed upon invented approaches that may be 
discerned either through procedures or through the use of related facts. Classroom 
implementation of the most extreme forms of these beliefs, practised prior to and 
practised for a decade and a half after, the second world war, followed the course of 
attempting to provide a systematic training in arithmetic whilst at the same time 
providing direct attention to speed and accuracy (Gray, 1991a). Practice was seen as 
the link between initially establishing and then cementing the relationship between 
problem and answer (Ashcraft, 1985; Siegler & Shrager, 1984). The importance of 
procedural methods in setting the context for the learning to take place was not 
discounted but the act of memorising facts stemmed initially from the practice such 
methods afforded; the relationship was established between the problem and the 
solution, and then was reinforced through further practice to increase the efficiency of 
the retrieval method. Thorndike (1922) had argued that the frequency of practice was 
not sufficient to account totally for number fact learning and neither should number 
bonds be formed independently. Brownell (1935) indicated that although drill was 
clearly effective in increasing the speed of recall of facts and in improving fluency in a 
skill, it made no improvement in the understanding of relationships, as shown by the 
ability to work out forgotten facts from remembered ones; in other words simply 
knowing a combination did not mean that it may be used to derive an unknown one. 
Such views can be placed in the learning context set by Skemp (1976): one 
consequence of drill could well be the enhanced instrumental responses without 
relational competence. 
How solutions to basic number combinations are stored in memory is a contentious 
issue. Much of the research on fact retrieval has involved a chronometric approach in 
which reaction times for different number combinations have been used to infer the 
nature of the processing involved and thus, by implication, provide some notion of 
what is remembered (e. g. Groen & Parkman, 1972; Ashcraft, 1982; Siegler & Shrager, 
1984). 
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A number fact may be seen as a relationship between concepts ( in the sense of Skemp) 
and an important issue is how such relationships may be established. In a Piagetian 
sense we are looking for evidence that an action has become internalised; for 
information processors such evidence may be incorporated into a processing model. 
Siegler & Shrager (1984), for example, believe that each problem is associated with a 
particular solution. The link between a procedure and automatic fact retrieval comes 
through the child's inability to make the appropriate response to a stimulus through the 
initial attempts to use fact retrieval. They suggest that in the first instance, any problem 
that is presented to the child i. e. 2+6, is associated with a counting string and in most 
cases, in a first attempt at a solution, the child simply advances to the number in the 
count string after the second addend in the string, in this case T. This response 
produces a mental trace which forms a bond between the problem and the (incorrect) 
response. Within this model the child then applies a corrective mechanism, a procedural 
approach. As the child continues to use such a procedure to compute the sum correctly 
each time it is faced, the bond between the problem and the correct sum is gradually 
strengthened. Eventually the correct solution is produced so frequently that the 
association between the problem and the solution becomes very strong. Byers and 
Erlwanger (1985) believe that such an information processing approach reinforces the 
argument of Bruner (1973) that the old distinction between rote learning and 
understanding is a 'pseudo issue'. 
Ashcraft (1982) claims that older children and adults store simple arithmetic facts in 
memory and then retrieve them from memory as they are needed. To explain such 
retrieval he proposed a 'network retrieval model' of mental arithmetic performance 
which contained two major long term memory components generating performance; the 
'declarative' component and the 'procedural' component: the essence of his theory is 
that knowledge of arithmetic involves 
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knowledge of arithmetic in stored facts and a body of procedural knowledge about 
arithmetic 
(Ashcraft, 1982, p. 232) 
Ashcraft's declarative component indicates how facts are stored and retrieved. Basic 
addition and multiplication facts are stored in network representations with each learned 
fact represented as a 'node' in the network structure. Nodes vary in respect to 
accessibility; more difficult facts are less accessible during the memory search and 
consequently take longer to retrieve. The procedural component indicates essential 
knowledge about arithmetic, such as algorithms, heuristics, rules, informal procedures 
etc. Ashcraft predicted that, in general, the use of procedural approaches to generate 
number facts would be slower than fact retrieval methods, a view supported by the 
analysis of Siegler & Shrager (1984) and confirmed by Siegler & Jenkins (1989). 
Ashcraft reports his research in a purely descriptive way and draws the conclusion from 
his results that it is not 'farfetched that some of us remember our number facts' 
(Ashcraft, 1985, p. 99): to do otherwise "may overwhelm the resources of memory 
when more complex computational problems are handled". In Ashcraft's view, even a 
simple and basic phenomena such as incidental learning would predict eventual memory 
for most, if not all, of the simple addition facts. His research indicates that by the third 
grade (children of about eight years of age), children's reaction times to the stimulus of 
simple addition problems resembles that of adults and if facts were not recalled the 
children relied on procedures such as counting. 
The assumption that when children cease overt counting they have switched to 
automacity is thrown into doubt through the work of, for example, Groen & Parkman; 
the non-recall procedure MIN may account for alternative mental procedures. 
Baroody (1985) and Baroody & Ginsburg (1986) present an alternative view to that of 
Ashcraft and Siegler & Shrager. They argue that, although combinations may be 
obtained through the specific numerical association, many can be accurately and 
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automatically produced from stored rules, procedures, or principles. Such a view 
believes that mastery of the basic number fact combinations is achieved through a 
system of interrelated experiences; the mental representation of number combinations 
involves relations as well as facts. 
The development of 'meaning' implicitly underscores this alternative model. Research 
interest in counting partially carries with it the implied belief that children will attain 
mastery in, and understanding of, basic number combinations after a period in which 
they obtain solutions through the use of procedures considered to be less well advanced 
than automatic responses. Baroody (1985) believes that such experience provides 
underlying meaning to habitual production of the number combinations through what 
he terms reconstructive and reproductivel processes. These would appear to work 
together to generate number combinations; they are parallel operations - each 
underlying the production of different families. Thus the addition of zero or the addition 
to zero may be a rule generated from experience (although he is not explicit as to what 
this experience is or how it may differ from experience in other number combinations). 
So too may be the addition to, or of, one be a rule. More complex problems i. e. 7+9 
may be generated through counting on whilst other combinations may arise from the 
relationship between triples such as 3,4.7 where 3+4=7 and 7-4=3. Thus we see 
Baroody presenting a theory which involves the integrated use of strategies. The 
evidence of this thesis is that the group of integrated strategies that Baroody identifies 
as the reconstructive process is not available to all children. 
When we view the Ashcraft and Baroody models perhaps the real issue of the 
difference between them is a matter of degree - "when do the procedural methods of 
one become the reconstructive methods of the other? " The answer may point to what is 
I Baroody uses the term "reconstructive' to describe the way that many basic number combinations can 
be accurately and automatically produced from stored rules, procedures, or principles. 'Reproductive' 
refers to the 'automatic recall of specific numerical associations' (Daroody, 1985, pp. 83,84). 
Reconstructive, in the sense that it is used by Daroody, would seem to be a general classification which 
implies the inclusion of strategies which involve counting procedural and strategies based on the use of 
derived facts. Baroody's basic argument suggests that these strategies, which had previously been used 
in learning the number combinations, may continue to operate in adults in a more automatic way. 
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in effect a qualitatively different approach to mathematics. Ashcraft's focus is mainly on 
the reproduction from memory of factual knowledge; the use of a procedure is evoked 
only through the failure to recall from memory; procedures are supplementary to 
retrieval. Baroody & Ginsburg consider a balance between the use of remembered 
knowledge and 'reconstructive' processes which make use of known facts, relations 
and procedures linked through rules or principles; the use of procedures is an integral 
part of the retrieval process. Proponents of the former frequently attach caution to the 
extensive belief in models which emphasise the strengths of the latter (e. g. Ashcraft, 
1985): reliance on rules and procedures may easily overwhelm the resources of 
working memory. 
3.5 NOTION OF MATHEMATICAL ABILITY 
At the start of Chapter 2a question drawn from Resnick & Ford focuses attention on 
the possible dichotomy that may exist between the qualitative difference that may 
develop from the understanding of a partial structure and the way in which that partial 
structure is to be understood within the context of a hoped for final outcome. In the 
context of this study a partial structure may be seen as that developed through the use of 
counting procedures and a final outcome that which evolves around knowledge and 
using that knowledge as a result of the ability to identify relationships. Katona's 
conclusion that people engage in qualitatively different learning must be seen as a signal 
that learning is reflected in qualitatively different thinking. Denvir & Brown draw our 
attention to the potential differences when summarising the points that emerge from 
their pilot study: 
It appeared that whilst abler children may perceive relationships which are not made 
explicit, the low attainer may need to engage in both practical activities and 
discussion which explicitly draw attention to such relationships. 
(Dcnvir & Brown, 1986(b), p. 156) 
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The problem is that even when relationships are made explicit some children prefer to 
use their partial structure, a counting procedure, rather than run the risk of adopting 
approaches built upon relationships whilst others "may see attempts to make 
relationships explicit as a new set of rote procedural rulee' (Steinberg, 1985, p. 348). 
The notion of ability to deal with particular aspects of the mathematics is an important 
one for this study. The counting types presented by Steffe et al is an analysis which 
would enable individual differences to be determined by the ability of the individual to 
abstract from particular perceptual properties. Duncker (1965) believes such ability is 
essential for discovering the general in the concrete fact and he regards this ability as 
one of the elements in mathematical thinking. Krutetskii (1976), investigated 
mathematical ability as the ability for a creative mastery of the school mathematics 
course and drew the conclusion that mathematical ability can take shape at a very early 
age, "... and for the most part, in the form of computational abilities - abilities to 
operate with numbers" (p. 222). He recognises; that computational abilities are not true 
mathematical abilities but on the basis of computational abilities real mathematical 
abilities may be formed. 
For Krutetskii some of the components of mathematical ability were seen to be: 
an ability to generalise mathematical material (an ability to discover the general in 
what is externally different or isolated; a flexibility of mental processes (an ability to 
switch rapidly from one train of thought to another); a striving to find the easiest, 
clearest and most economical ways to solve problems; and ability to chiefly 
remember generalised relations, reasoning schemes, and methods of solving type 
problems; curtailment of the reasoning process, a shortening of its individual links; 
(Krutetskii, 1975, p. 222-223) 
Within his analysis of the age dynamics of the structure of mathematical abilities, 
Krutetskii frequently refers to the ability of children within a framework which 
corresponds, in general, to the concept of the structure of mathematical ability seen 
above. Children's mathematical ability is freely described as "less capable or less able", 
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44average or capable, " and "more capable or most capable" (p. 332-333). He indicates 
that whilst mathematically able pupils demonstrate flexibility in their mental processes, 
mathematically less able pupils have difficulty switching from one mental operation to 
another and are usually bound to "conventional trains of thought" ( p. 338). He adds 
that "for such children it is hard to even switch from a harder to an easier method if the 
first is habitual and familiar and the second new and unfamiliar. One method of solution 
is an obstacle to another". Such a comment would no doubt be supported by Steinberg 
(1985) and Thornton (1990) both of whom found that less able children who were 
confident counters were reluctant to change their strategy to solve basic number 
combinations. Haylock (1987) provides an indication of the use of stereotyped or fixed 
ways of solving mathematical problems even if such ways are inappropriate. 
Whilst Krutetskii is primarily interested in the mathematically able, Haylock (1991) is 
concerned with low attainers whose mathematical attainment is such that they are below 
the 20th percentile. The outcome of his analysis of possible factors associated with low 
attainers suggests that such children may be identified as such by the age of eight and 
that they often remain in this category throughout the upper primary years. The 
mathematical difficulties of such children may well carry on into the secondary school. 
Hart (1981) presents evidence to show that 10% of the children examined on their 
understanding of four basic number operations at the end of the first year in secondary 
school "could at best cope with addition and subtraction" ( p. 44). She indicates that of 
the few examples presented within the CSMS test papers that required computation 
'there was no apparent increase in facility commensurate with age' (p. 21 1). Indeed, 
there is the suggestion that if a child could not do subtraction of a three digit number 
from a four digit number with decomposition "when he entered the secondary school he 
was unlikely ever to be able to do if' (ibid. ). We are left to wonder whether or not this 
is a condemnation of the primary school or the secondary school or whether such 
difficulties are reflections of a factor which reflects Krutetskii's notions of mathematical 
ability. 
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Ruthven (1987) expresses concern at any notions that may lead to "ability stereotyping" 
since the perceptions and expectations of pupils so stereotyped may lead to 
inappropriate patterns of differential treatment within the classroom. He indicates that 
such perceptions may be manifest, for those with below-average, perhaps even 
average, levels of attainment, in an emphasis on repetitive activities, on instrumental 
learning and on computation and the setting of a limited range of stereotyped goals. As 
such these may enhance the successful use of informal methods which mitigates against 
the child being confronted with more general, formal and powerful mathematical 
concepts and techniques. Within the broader context of school mathematics informal 
methods, those not teacher taught, may be successful within familiar contexts (Booth, 
1981), may not necessarily be idiosyncratic (Hart, 1982) but they may not be 
generalisable. 
3.6 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Within Chapter I specific reasons were given for choosing children's arithmetic as an 
area within which to examine qualitative difference in thinking. Within this chapter we 
have considered both the development of counting and examined the outcome of well 
documented research into children's solution strategies when they solve basic addition 
and subtraction combinations. Although there are suggestions that children's conceptual 
knowledge of the relations between quantities is related to the acquisition of more 
efficient counting procedures (e. g. Riley, Greeno & Heller, 1983), an implication 
behind some of the cognitive models developed for children's approaches to simple 
arithmetic appears to indicate that children of a given age consistently use a single 
addition strategy. Groen & Parkman's (1972) MIN model is a good example of such a 
model. A variety of other findings tend to support the view that young children 
constantly add in the way postulated by the model. These complement the theoretical 
construct of the MIN model in that the smaller addend has consistently been the best 
predictor of six and seven year old children solution times (Ashcraft, 1982; Haye et al, 
59 
1986). Siegler & Jenkins (1989) indicate that one discordant note arises, chronometric 
analysis does not exactly fit what children said they were doing (e. g. Carpenter and 
Moser, 1982; Fuson, 1982). Of course the conflict between conclusions drawn from 
chronometric data and those drawn from verbal reports may be resolved if the 
children's verbal reports are accurate. In an attempt to resolve this issue Siegler & 
Jenkins conclude that "children used the strategies that they reported using and they 
employed them on those trials where they said they had" (p. 25). 
Groen & Parkman and Ashcraft, in common with, for example, Siegler & Shrager and 
Carpenter & Moser, all indicate how children's solution strategies for resolution of 
basic number combinations change over time. The latter together with other researchers 
e. g. Baroody (1984), Carpenter & Moser (1982), Fuson (1982), all suggest that 
children use a variety of approaches when dealing with arithmetic word problems. The 
outcome may well be that several children perform successfully at the same task but this 
does not mean that they share the same underlying knowledge (e. g. Dean, Chabaud & 
Bridges, 1981). The issues for this study are whether strategy changes can be 
attributable in equal measure to different groups of children, whether there are some 
common factors that may be identified in the variety of strategies used by children 
within different groups and whether different forms of knowledge can be attributed to 
the children on the basis of their ability to solve basic number combinations - are there 





Within Chapter 2 we saw that several different studies hypothesised that there are two 
forms of mathematical thinking which Hiebert & Lefevre refer to as procedural and 
conceptual thinking. Other studies come forward with the hypothesis that there is a 
process of procedural encapsulation such that process or actions become encapsulated 
as objects of thought. Central to this study is the notion that some children remain 
within a procedural dimension which lacks the flexibility of being able to use both 
process and object with ambiguity. 
This leads to the hypothesis for this thesis: 
there is a qualitative difference in children's arithmetical thinking as identified by 
their mathematical behaviour which 
(i) on the one hand is manifest as a spectrum of performance in the operations on 
numbers as a procedure that relates to counting and 
(ii) on the other is manifest in the flexible manipulation of process and concepts. 
Two different experiments are considered to support this thesis. The aim of the first 
series of interviews was to obtain an indication of the qualitative differences that may be 
observed between children of different ages and different levels of success with the 
mathematics normally expected of them. Such differences were to be considered 
through an integrated analysis of the behaviour observed amongst the different groups 
of children to provide some notion of how this may change over a period of time. The 
aim of the second series of interviews was to replicate the first and to Provide a 
platform for the theoretical analysis which arises from the first. The second also 
considers more completely the consequences of the use of procedural methods 
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compared with those that involved flexible within the context of defined levels of 
mathematical achievement. 
Thus the first series of interviews considers through a series of snapshots of children's 
mathematical behaviour the divergence of thinking that occurs between those that 
demonstrate procedural thinking and those who think conceptually. 
4.2 METHOD 
It was the intention that the analysis within the current study built upon many of the 
earlier studies reported within Chapter 3. In particular the counting strategies described 
by Carpenter & Moser (1982), that is count-all and count-on are regarded by them 
(Carpenter & Moser, 1983) and others (e. g. Steffe et al, 198 1) as characteristic of 
distinct stages of development in number understanding. Consequently it should be 
possible to infer some notion of a child's understanding by observing children's 
integrated use of such strategies 
To obtain a notion of the strategies used by children a form of 'structured' and 'open 
interviewing' techniques, (Cohen & Manion, 1985, p. 309) were used. The interviews 
had a structured component in that both samples were asked to provide answers to sets 
of predetermined structured questions. However, where appropriate, subjects were 
asked to reflect upon what had been done to resolve each question such that the 
integration of the structured and open interview components may best described using 
the term revised clinical interview. 
The clinical interview technique was originally used by Piaget to achieve three aims 
central to the study of cognitive development; a description of intellectual activity, the 
specification of the nature and organisation of cognitive processes and an evaluation of 
the child's level of cognitive competence. Designed as an unstructured and open ended 
method intended to give the child his "natural inclination". "the clinical examination is 
dependent on direct observation ...... the practitioner lets himself be led and takes 
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account of the whole of the mental contexf(Piaget, 1929, p8). Interviews of this form 
provided the protocols, formal accounts of interactions between the subject and the 
interviewer, which formed the backdrop for Piaget to develop his stage theory and also 
for Steffe et al to establish their theory of 'counting types'. 
Children's words and behaviour received heavy emphasis within the work of Steffe et 
aL Talking aloud, in a proportion defined by the subject, in addition to the observation 
of elements of behaviour became central to protocols established as the result of 
children's attempts at a particular task. Although subjects were not explicitly asked to 
verbalise, verbalisation, non-verbal behaviour, and responses to clinical interviewing 
were integrated components of the intention of Steffe et al to provide instantations of 
counting types and the development of their theoretical constructs. Concentration on the 
totality of the action provided the protocols from which both analysis and theory 
resulted. 
4.2.1 Research Limitations 
The resolution of the central issues within the study make the assumption that external 
representations of mathematics provides an indication of the nature of the internal 
representations. Although the study draws upon the work of, for example, Greeno 
(1988) and Kaput, (1988,1991) who indicate that the nature of external mathematical 
representations influences the nature of internal representations, it makes the contrary 
assumption that the way in which the child makes an external representation reveals 
something of how the child has represented similar information internally. Although it 
is not made explicit, it is conjectured that such an assumption underlies much of the 
recent work which has provided us with greater insight into children's development of 
the number concept (see for example, Carpenter et al 1982,1983,1984; Fuson, 1988; 
Fuson et al, 1982; Hughes, 1986). 
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The external representations of mathematics may be identified through interaction with 
abstract symbolism, physical manipulation or verbal description but, though it may 
provide an indication of the way in which information is stored internally, no precise 
claims can be made about the nature of internal representations (Kaput, 1991). 
Although revised clinical interviewing is the mode of data collection within the study 
and such interviewing may lead a child to make a verbal statement which complements 
external representation, both external representation and verbal statement may require 
interpretation by the interviewer. It is recognised however, that the interpretation of the 
outcome of a child's responses to numerical sentences given verbally may be 
problematic (e. g. Hughes, 1986, p. 39). 
There is no presumption that children who work with counters represent all quantities 
internally as mental images of counters. What is presumed is that children who interact 
with counters or fingers or some other apparatus to represent the quantities and actions 
through which a relationship between the quantities is identified, represent the 
quantities and actions differently for themselves than do children who interact only with 
the symbols. Kaput not only provides a notion of the distinctions that are to be central 
to this study - the world of mental operations and the world of physical operations - 
but he also provides the note of caution within which the framework of the later 
analysis must be viewed; mental operations are always hypothetical whereas physical 
operations are usually observable. 
The analysis of children's observable behaviour is placed within a context that 
recognises that such behaviour is selected and organised by the researcher. Thus the 
theoretical constructs placed on the analysis are not entirely free of the observers 
expectations and theories, however objective these may appear to be at the time of 
observation. Although this study will attempt to establish a new theoretical construct to 
explain observations, such observations become the data which is established from 
classifications which in turn may also have been subject to expectations and theories of 
their proponents. However, is believed that qualitative differences in thinking cannot be 
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automatically inferred from discontinuity in quantitative measurement if such 
measurement comes from a complex hierarchy of classification. Indeed, the results of 
the second experiment confirm this. It is partially for this reason that the study attempts 
to view the differences in children's behaviour in a qualitative way based upon their 
integrated use of strategies. Consequently, analysis of children's behaviour does not 
concern itself with the finer gradations of performance in simple arithmetic that have 
been the focus of studies by, for example, Steffe et al (1982) on counting, Siegler & 
Shrager (1984), addition, and Baroody (1984) on subtraction. Thus, it is not the 
intention of the study to speculate on fine grained behaviours that are too complex for 
application within the classroom but rather to consider a tool which may, through the 
integrated application of these behaviours, provide a little insight into why some 
children may be successful and others not. 
Within this study protocols within the first sample were established through the 
analysis of a comprehensive series of field notes and, in some instances taped 
interviews. 
Thus attempts at description will be constrained by the aspects of data collection and the 
levels of. reporting subsequently presented. Since the study is concerned with an 
integrated rather than a fine grained analysis of children's behaviour, the levels of 
recording, to be considered later, will reflect this. A further possible source of error 
may be that the nature of the interaction could cause children to employ different 
approaches during interview to those that may have been used if the interviewer was 
not present. The request to the child that (s)he reflect upon what has been done may 
alter the nature of the response. The use of revised clinical interviewing is aimed at 
minimising this since, at least for those children who use physical manipulation and/or 
unsolicited verbal utterances during the attempt to obtain a solution, verbal explanation, 
in response to open questioning, should serve to reinforce the interviewers 
interpretation of the action. 
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A major concern within the study was to present problems which, theoretically at least, 
minimised the level of personal interpretation of the requirement of the problem; a 
concern was that each child understood the question in the way intended. The aim was 
to consider children's responses to combinations that could be seen as generalised 
arithmetic. Although much of the research considered in the previous chapter has its 
focus of attention on the arithmetical word problem, the guiding light within the current 
study was the numerical generalisations that children may bring to the development of 
computational algorithms. Contextual based arithmetic has considerable importance in 
the development of arithmetical skills but the application of algorithms has as its base 
the knowledge of decontextualised basic number combinations. 
4.3 THE SAMPLE 
4.3.1 The Schools 
A fuller description of the second series of interviews will be provided at the start of 
Chapter 7. Here we will confine ourselves to the first series. 
Two schools, considered to be fairly representative of English schools, were 
approached to take part in the investigation. At least one teacher from each school had 
participated within INSET courses at the University of Warwick. 
Both schools were combined schools, that is both schools taught children aged five to 
twelve. 
School A: A one form entry combined school in a small town and in a semi rural 
location. The children feeding into the school were from backgrounds 
representing a cross section of the social structure. 
The school was a well integrated school with explicit aims and objectives 
to direct teaching and learning. A designated teacher co-ordinated 
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mathematics activities and this teacher had attended numerous INSET 
courses organised by the local authority and by the University of 
Warwick. Teaching approaches in individual classes did vary somewhat; 
very active and very passive learning was noted. At the instigation of the 
mathematics co-ordinator, class teachers ensured that there was a 
continual "tick-over" of previously learned facts and skills. The Nuffield 
mathematics scheme was in use within the school and this scheme was 
used with a considerable degree of flexibility. New topics were introduced 
through class teaching and although various teaching styles were in 
evidence i. e. individual learning, group work and class teaching, 
organisational aspects of children's learning were balanced to suit the 
learning situation. The general ability of the children was regarded as 
average to above average. 
School B: A two form entry school operating on a split site within a medium sized 
town. The children were drawn from an urban catchment area. 
The teachers in school B were less homogeneous than those in school A. 
Although there was a designated mathematics co-ordinator this teacher 
was far less in evidence than the one in school A. There was no explicit 
statement of aims and objectives in mathematics and, moreover, school B 
lacked the flexibility of school A. It appeared to be far more traditional, 
and, through a more formal approach, was skills oriented. The lack of 
homogeneity amongst the teaching staff emphasised the superordinate 
nature of each teacher within their own classroom. The more traditional 
view of the mathematics curriculum was emphasised in the rigid 
adherence to the commercial scheme in use - Scottish Primary 
Mathematics. There was very little evidence of class teaching in 
mathematics; children tended to work through the commercial scheme. 
There was however some intensive small group teaching although this 
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took up a very small proportion of the time allocated to mathematics. The 
general ability of the children was considered to be average. 
4.3.2 The Children 
The children were chosen in such a way that in the class teacher's opinion they would 
be representative of those who may be considered "above average", "average" and 
"below average" in mathematical attainment. The notion of "below average" is used in 
the sense indicated by Ginsburg & Allardice (1984) in that the children were not 
performing at the normal level in classroom mathematics. Such children may equally be 
described as 'low attainers' (Denvir & Brown, 1986a, 1986b; Haylock, 199 1). 
Class teachers were asked to consider their classes as being divided equally into ability 
groups reflecting three levels of mathematical achievement; those who were performing 
at what may be considered a normal level in arithmetic, those who had less success than 
the normal and those who had more success than the normal. Since the interviews were 
carried out during the summer term each teacher had a period of two terms to gain 
intimate knowledge of the mathematical achievement of the children in their class. 
Following this initial grouping the teacher's were then asked to select two children 
from each group who they would consider to be "representative" of the group. In this 
way a total of 72 children representing the chronological ages 7+ to 12+ were 
identified. Apart from the 12+ group, which through movement and sickness 
eventually contained only nine children, equally spread over the three arithmetical 
ability levels, each of the other five age groups contained twelve children equally 
divided over the three teacher identified ability levels: "below-average7', "average", and 
"above-average" in their performance in arithmetic. In the analysis of the study I shall 
refer to the year groups by age, so that, for instance, 9+ refers to children who would 
be nine during the school year. The children were interviewed over a two month period 
starting six months after the beginning of the year, so at the time of interview a child 
designated as 9+ would be in the range 8 years 6 months to 9 years 8 months. 
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Although the focus of attention was mainly on the solutions used by children who had 
moved beyond the point of pedagogic input in developing knowledge of number 
combinations, a group of children who were still working at this stage, the 7+ children, 
were included. The class teachers felt that the 8+ and 9+ age groups knew sufficient 
number combinations to move on to the development of computational skills in addition 
and subtraction with and without exchange, whilst those above these ages were felt to 
be at least reasonably competent with such problems. 
4.4 INTERVIEW COMPONENTS 
4.4.1 Questionnaire Design 
Five issues were uppermost in selecting appropriate number combinations and 
arithmetical number problems which would reflect the approaches that the children used 
to obtain solutions: 
The number combinations should be representative of the addition and 
subtraction combinations that a child would normally be expected to 
remember by the time they were entering the middle primary school years i. e. 
ages 8 to 9: 
i. Addition combinations for pairs of numbers where the sum of 
the addends was ten or less 
ii. Addition combinations for pairs of numbers where the sum of 
the addends was between ten and twenty. 
iii. Subtraction combination for numbers which had a subtrahend of 
ten or less. 
iv. Subtraction combinations which had a subtrahend of between 10 
and twenty. 
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" They should include a sample of a range of number combinations where the 
difference between the pair of numbers to be either added or subtracted 
varied in size. 
" They should include samples of number combinations where the solution 
may reasonably be expected to be obtained by other known knowledge, for 
example, doubles and halves. 
" Both the addition and subtraction problems within the range 10 to 20 should 
include a sample of problems which make use of basic number combinations 
previously solved within the range of problems dealing with combinations to 
ten. 
"A small sample of the subtraction problems should include some that make 
use of previously solved addition facts. 
" The problems should be representative of problems commonly found in 
school mathematics texts used by average ability seven and eight year old 
children. 
With these considerations in mind, the number combinations were selected partially 
through frequency of occurrence within school textbooks (Fletcher, 1972; Hollands, 
1983; Albany, 1985) and partially to satisfy the parameters presented above, the range 
of problems presented to the children were classified into the following categories: 
Category A: Addition and subtraction combinations to ten. The numerical 
problems within this stage included: 
" the addition and subtraction of zero, and the addition and 
subtraction of one. 
" addition and subtraction involving doubles i. e. 4+4,6 - 3, 
" addition and subtraction involving two evens i. e. 6+2,8 - 2; odd 
and even i. e. 5+2,9 - 4, and two odds i. e. 3+5,7 - 5. 
addition and subtraction of a pair of numbers with a difference of 
one i. e. 4+5,9 - 8. 
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Category B: Addition and subtraction combinations within the range ten to twenty 
which included: 
"a sample of addition problems involving teens where the units to 
be added included pairs that were considered in Stage I i. e. 12+ 0, 
13+5,3+16. 
" the subtraction problems also included a sample which involved 
the use of Stage 1 subtraction combinations i. e. 15 - 4,16 -3 and 
"new" or extended subtraction combinations to twenty i. e. 12 - 8, 
18-9,15-9. 
Category C: problems included: 
the addition of single digit numbers the sum of which was 
between ten and twenty i. e. 9+8 and 4+7, and 8+6. These 
were considered as "new" or extended addition combinations. 
simple subtraction problems which involved double digit 
subtraction without exchange i. e. 16 - 10,17 - 13 and 19 - 17, 
and one additional problem involved exchange i. e. 20 - 8. 
The full range of combinations are given in Appendix A (Al and A2) 
4.4.2 Item Presentation 
After an initial series of visits to the schools to establish mutual familiarity with children 
in each class, each child was interviewed separately on at least two occasions with a 
week in between each interview. At the start of the first interview each child was told 
that the interviewer would present several problems and the child would be asked to 
find an answer to each problem using the method (s)he thought was best. 
During each of the two interviews the children were presented with between 18 and 20 
addition and subtraction numerical problems in two stages of difficulty. At the first 
interview the child was presented with the Category A combinations, consisting of 
number combinations to ten, and at the second interview the Category B and Category 
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C combinations which involved number combinations to twenty and a sample of 
arithmetical combinations which included 'teens' numbers. A third interview was given 
to those children who had required a substantial amount of time for interviews one and 
two. Each interview lasted approximately half an hour. Responses were recorded 
through the use of field notes. 
In an attempt to eliminate variables which may have provided a cue to the solution 
procedure of the problems each problem was presented orally, and on paper. The oral 
presentation of the problems involved the attempt to use language in such a way that it 
did not present a clue to the use of a particular strategy. At the start of the first block of 
questions the exchange with the child would take the form of the following: 
'Vould you like to do some addition (subtraction) sums for me? 
Do you like doing addition sums? 
I think you will get all of the ones you are going to do correct. They are all like 
this one". (At this point the sum 3+2= was written for the child). 
"Try doing this sum best way you can". 
(After the problem was completed the child and the interviewer discussed the 
way that the child had completed the problem. The child was also asked why a 
particular method was chosen. ) 
"I am now going to give you some more sums that are like this one. Do each 
one the best way that you can. " 
Further combinations were then presented. A similar introduction was given as each 
category of problems changed. 
As each addition problem was presented symbolically on paper, for example, when 
presenting the combination 4+5= the interviewer stated "four add five". In the case of 
as each problem was presented the interviewer stated used the word 'subtract' so that 
6-3= was written at the same time as the words "six subtract three" were spoken. 
The use of the word "subtract" was intended to eliminate any procedural cues that a 
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child would receive had "take-away" or "difference" been used. The solution strategy 
that each child used was recorded. If this was not completely clear, the child was asked 
to describe how the answer had been obtained. 
After the first problem the children were reminded that they were to use the method that 
they thought was best. When children changed strategy they were asked to try to give a 
reason for the change. The problems within each stage were presented separately until 
the child had completed a section. If a child was either unable to give an explanation, or 
began to experience considerable difficulty, as measured by three incorrect solutions or 
by the length of time involved, the interview was terminated. Structured apparatus i. e. 
counters, unifix blocks, and colour factor rods, was available. Children were told that, 
if they wished, they could use it. However, the usual practice in both schools was pen 
and paper so these too were available. 
4.5 STRATEGY CLASSIFICATION 
Carpenter et al (1981,1982) had established a classification for a range of solution 
strategies used by first grade American children in solving addition and subtraction 
verbal problems. It is their classification that is taken as the basis for identifying 
strategies used by the children within the current experiment. 
We have seen earlier in the chapter that qualitative difference in the children's thinking 
is to be identified through the use of a procedure or the use of fact retrieval through 
derived facts. It is of course fact retrieval that can cloud the issues of qualitative 
difference. Children may either remember a combination or use a remembered 
combination to establish one that cannot be remembered. Here we face the issue of 
known-fact or derived fact. Indeed what may appear to be a known fact may be an 
almost instantaneous derived fact; what may be a derived fact which may provide 
evidence of the use of a "thinking strategy" may be in essence a procedure, for example 
when adding 5+4a child may indicate that "I always do f ive and five for this and then 
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take away one". Such a response may reasonably be seen as a procedure rather than a 
thinking strategy. The problems of interpretation have already been indicated and with 
this in mind, in general terms, the strategies that children use were classified according 
to the Carpenter & Moser's terminology. Previous interviewing (Gray, 1988) had 
provided indications of procedures that could be included within each of the integrated 
groups. 
4.5.1 Addition 
So that we may describe the strategies that were used to solve the addition problems, let 
m+a=p where m is the first of a pair of numbers given to the child and a is the 
second or the number to be added (additament) and p is the sum of the two. 
Procedural Methods: (following Davis' (1983, p. 257) notion of procedure) 
Count-all 
Carpenter et al (198 1) indicate that this strategy could be carried out making use 
of physical objects i. e. cubes, fingers, or, it could be carried out mentally. In 
the former case it involved the representation of both sets to be added and then 
the union of the two sets was recounted. Thus the strategy commences with the 
construction of the sets m and a and then the counting sequence begins at I and 
ends with p. 
The following examples provide an indication of strategies classified as count- 
all within the current study: 
Interviewer: 'vIbree add five". 
(i) James took three counters, one at a time, from the tray. As he placed each 
counter in from of him to form a line he uttered "one-two ... three". Using 
his right index finger he recounted the three pointing to each counter in 
term and uttering "one... two ... three". In the same way he took five 
74 
counters, again one at a time and placed them in a line slightly to the right 
of the line of three. As he placed each counter in the line he uttered 
"one ... two-three ... four ... five". He recounted the five, starting from the 
left. Starting from the left hand counter in the set of three and pointing 
with his right index finger he indicated each counter in turn and counted 
"one .... two .... three ... four ... five ... six .... seven-eight" He looked at the 
interviewer and said: "Eighf '. 
(ii) Using her right index finger Felicity pointed to each of the three middle 
fingers of her right hand and uttered "one ... two .... three". Maintaining the 
display of these three fingers, whilst bending the small finger and the 
thumb of the left hand she then displayed the five fingers of her right 
hand. Starting with the thumb of her right hand she touched her forehead 
with each finger in turn whilst uttering "four .. five ... six-seven... eighe'. 
She looked at the interviewer and said "Eighe'. 
Any equivalent strategy, even though it initially involved the construction of the 
sets m and a but does not involve the recounting of them both, was also to be 
considered as count-all. 
Interviewer: "Five add nothing". 
Sean displayed five on the fingers of his left hand and nodded at each 
finger from the left in turn with the accompanying verbal utterances one to 
five. He then looked at his right hand and closed his fingers. He looked 
from left to right and then back to the left. 
"Five add nothing ...... that's five. " 
Carpenter et al indicate that in "mental count-all", the sequence begins at one 
and then ends with the number representing the total of the two quantities. 
There was no evidence of the use of this strategy without the use of some 
external referent i. e. a subitised display of fingers, and then the motor act of 
head nodding which momentary focused on each finger in turn. Count-all, 
supported by a "subitised" display of fingers with and without verbal 
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utterances, was also identified. An example of a motor act (head nodding) being 
used as the referent (Steffe et al, 1982) was seen when one child added 2+1. 
Count-on 
Two variants were considered as count-on: 
a) The sequence of counting starts at m or m+1, involves a increments and 
ends with p. This strategy made use of similar units to count-all. The 
sequence starts with the first given number or the successor of that 
number. 
Interviewer: "Five add 2". 
(i) Subject uttered "five", and extended her right thumb and 
right index finger at the same time uttering "six ... seven". 
(ii) Subject uttered "six" and extended his right forefinger to 
utter "seven". 
b) The sequence of counting starts at a or a+1 and involves m or m-1 
increments and ends with p. Again similar units are involved but the 
counting sequence starts at the largest given number. 
Interviewer: "Ibree add five7' 
(i) Subject uttered "five" and then extended right thumb and two 
adjacent fingers in sequence at the same time uttering, "six, 
seven eight". 
(ii) Subject uttered "six" and extended right thumb and index 
finger uttering, "seven, eight. " 
Although frequently evident through the use of fingers and the accompaniment 
of verbal utterances, there were many instances where the identification of the 
count on from first strategy as distinct from count on from largest was identified 
through almost imperceptible head nodding or the slight flexing of fingers but 
no verbal utterances. Many of these instances relied on verbal evidence of 
support from the child. Examples of such procedures are: 
(i) Interviewer: "Iffiree add seven". 
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Subject looked at her left hand and the interviewer noted the 
faintest pressure exerted on fingers of the left hand which 
was placed on the desk. Pressure sequence moved from left 
to right on all five fingers and then back to little finger and 
the next one. No verbal signals. 
Jane: "ren". 
Interviewer "Tell me how you did that one? " 
Jane: "I started from three and counted up seven in my head-its 
ten" 
Interviewer "Did you use your fingers? " 
Jane: "No, I just looked at them. " 
(ii) Interviewer: "Ibree add seven". 
Enzo stared at the desk - no external evidence of counting 
Enzo "Ten. " 
Interviewer 'Tell me how you did that one? " 
Enzo "You have seven and you need three more to make ten". 
Interviewer "How did you do seven add three then? " 
Enzo "'Cos, if you count up that makes ten doesn't it ..... first I 
started at seven ..... and then I went eight, nine, ten ... I 
just 
did it in my head" 
As with count-all there was evidence of the subitised display of fingers used 
as counting referents to support count-on. 
Retrieval Methods 
A distinction was made between those methods which did and did not make use 
of a counting procedure. The analysis of methods which did not make use of 
counting will later be identified under the broad classification of retrieval. The 
identification of such methods generally relied extensively on children's 
explanations of their approach. 
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Derived Fact: Ile solution to a particular problem is generated by the use of. 
i. a related number fact, i. e. "3 +5 is 8, 
because 4x2=8 (3 +I=4 and 5-I= 4)", or 
ii. a property of the number system, i. e. "8 +6= 14, 
because, 6+4= 10 and 10 +4= 14". 
Known Fact: The strategy is identified through retrieval of the particular fact. 
4.5.2 Subtraction 
The possible strategies available to solve subtraction problems of the form m-s=d, 
where m is the minuend, s is the subtrahend and d is the outcome of the subtraction 
process, presents a more complex picture. Reference to the literature helped to resolve 
some of the issues. 
Procedural Methods 
First there is a need to categorise the subtractive process that may be considered 
analogous to the addition 'count-all' strategy. Children who operated subtraction in 
unary form by counting out the minuend and then, from within the set formed, 
counted out the value of the subtrahend and recounting the remainder, were 
considered to be using a strategy the direct inverse to the addition strategy of count- 
all. To make a distinction between the subtractive and additive procedures it was 
decided to refer to the subtractive strategy as 'take-away' (Siegler, 1987). 
Take-away 
The strategy commences with the modelling of the set m. s objects are then 
counted and removed from m. 'Ibe remaining objects are then counted from I 
to d. This process is analogous to the count-on process in addition. As with 
count-on it may be carried out with counters, bricks or fingers. Its most 
frequent application within the current study was with fingers. 
The following examples provide an indication of the use of take-away: 
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Interviewer: "Eight subtract two!. 
(i) Christopher looked at the closed fist of his left hand and then the closed 
fist of his right. Both hands were extended before him. 
Extending the fingers of his left hand, one at a time starting from the 
thumb he counted to five and continued to eight using successive fingers 
on the right hand starting at the little finger. As each finger was extended 
he uttered the appropriate number name. At each count he nodded towards 
the appropriate finger. With eight fingers extended he asked, "How many 
do I take away? ". Interviewer replied "Eight". 
Starting from the thumb of the left hand Christopher counted "one ... two" 
at the same time bending down the thumb and the index finger. This 
action caused him some motor difficulty. As he bent down the index 
finger the next adjacent finger also had a tendency to bend. Christopher 
counted the remaining extended fingers, nodding towards and bending 
down each one as it was counted. Finally he gave the answer "six". 
(ii) As the eight was spoken by the interviewer, Simon quickly extended five 
fingers on the left hand and three on the right. There was no evidence of 
counting. Two on the left hand were bent inwards when the two was 
spoken by the interviewer. The remaining six extended fingers were then 
counted starting at one. 
(iii) As the eight was spoken by the interviewer, Jean put up eight fingers. As 
the interviewer said "two" Jean bent down two fingers and said "six" 
without counting. 
Interviewer: "Six subtract three". 
Rebecca extended both hands before her with the fists closed. She started 
the counting process for six at the thumb of her left hand. She extended 
six fingers, including the little finger of the right hand, one at a time 
synchronised with each counting word. Starting from the little finger of 
the right hand she counted three moving right to left to include the first 
79 
two fingers of the left hand. At each count she bent down the counted 
finger. She looked at the remaining extended fingers on the left hand and 
said "Ibree". 
Count-back. There are two variants of count-back: 
a) A backward counting sequence which starts at m and involved s 
decrements and ends with d. 
The following example illustrate this count back procedure: 
"Seven subtract five". 
Peter uttered "seven" then extended his left thumb and uttered "six". He 
then extended the remaining fingers of the left hand one at a time, uttering 
"Five ... four ... three ... two". Two was given as the solution. 
b) The backward counting sequence begins at rn -1 involves s decrements 
and ends at d. 
Example: 
Shelly extended the little ringer of the right hand and uttered "six". She 
continued to extend the fingers of the left hand in sequence uttering the 
words, "five ... four ... three ... two". The solution was given as two. 
Count-back to 
The sequence of backward counting starts at rn or m-1 and involves as many 
decrements as necessary to reach s. The number of decrements, which may or 
may not need recounting, equals d. 
Where this procedure was used with external referents it was analogous to the 
count-back procedure but it was the number of extended fingers that provided 
the solution. 
Interviewer: "Seven subtract five" 
Carl uttered "seven .... six ..... five". As he uttered six he extended his right 
thumb, at five he extended his right index ringer. He looked at the two fingers 
and gave the solution G'two". 
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Count-up 
The sequence of counting starts at s and continues forward as many increments 
as is necessary to reach m. The number of increments, which may or may not 
need recounting from 1, equals d. 
Some mental procedures involving the count-up or count-back procedure were 
difficult to discern. Such procedures involved explanation by the child, which at 
times the child was not able to completely describe. Final identification of the 
procedure was subject to interpretation by the interviewer. 
Some examples of interpretation would seem to be important here. 
Interviewer: "Nine subtract five". 
Peter: "I had nine in my head then went, nine .... eight-seven-six 
Aive and that leaves me with four ................... Count back to: 
(ii) Jane: (The only visible action was very slight flexing of the fingers of 
the left hand. ) "Four". 
Int.: "Tell me how you did that one. " 
Jane: I thinked it in my brain" 
Int.: "Can you tell me how? " 
Jane: "I counted it. " 
Int.: "How did you count it? " 
Jane: "I started with nine and I ....... what was it again? " 
Int.: "Nine subtract five" 
Jane "Oh yes .... I went eight .... seven ... si ... six .... 
like that... " 
Int.: "Did you use your fingers? " 
Jane.: "No! " 
The conclusion was that the procedure had been count bacL 
Interviewer: "Seven subtract five". 
David: (No external evidence of use of counting) "Two" 
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Int: "Can you tell me how you did that one? " 
David: "Five is five so I added on two ..... I went six, seven. " 
Ile conclusion was that this was count-up. 
The general distinctions between count-up and count-back were made at the point of 
interview. Count-up occurred infrequently but, whilst it does not form part of the 
descriptive analysis, where appropriate it is referred to in later sections i. e. sections 
5.4.2. and 7.5.2. Equivalent strategies, even though they initially involved the 
construction of the sets m and a but did not involve the recounting of them both, were 
also considered to be in the count-up/count back category. 
Retrieval Strategies 
Derived Fact 
Ile solution to a particular problem is generated by the use of 
(i) a related number fact, i. e. "9 take away 5 is 4, 
because 5+4= 9", or 
(ii) a property of the number system, i. e. "15 -9=6 
because 15 - 10 =5 but ten is one more than 9 so 6". 
Known Fact 
The strategy is based on the recall of that particular fact. 
Final recording of the strategies used by the children for the purposes of this study is 
given within the appendices. 
The interviews were carried out during the summer term of 1988. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents an analysis of the results of the first series of interviews. 
Two central sections form the focus of the qualitative analysis contained within this 
chapter: the use of retrieval methods (Section 5.2) and the use of procedural methods 
(Section 5.4) by each of the age and ability groups which formed the sample. 
Subsections detailing the different application of known facts by groups of children 
(5.2.1) and providing some indication of changes in the use of known facts (5.2.2) are 
established within the discussion on retrieval methods. Section (5.3.3) deals with the 
use of derived facts. 
At the end of the discussion on the use of each strategy there is a brief summary which 
highlights the essential differences between the three ability groups. A Chapter 
Summary is presented in section 5.5. 
Discussion within the analysis is based on tables of raw scores presented within 
Appendices 3 to 8. 
5.2 USE OF RETRIEVAL METHODS 
5.2.1 The Known Fact Strategy 
In a preliminary analysis of the results, the overall percentage of the solutions that were 
established through the use of a known fact by each age and ability group are 
considered. 
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1. Number Combinations To Ten: Category A 
Figure 5.1 shows the mean-percentage of solutions to the Category A combinations that 
were obtained through the use of the known-fact strategy by each age and ability group. 
'ne rangel of percentage facts indicates the highest and lowest percentage use of 
known facts by children within each group. 
KNOWN ADDITION AND SUBTRACTION FACTS TO TEN 
ADDITION SUBTRACTION 
KNOWN 100 *1 100 








10 10L 7+ 8+ 9+ 10+ 11+ 12+ 7+ 8+ 9+ 10+ 11+ 12+ 
AGE AGE 
Groups (as identified by to teacher) Mean for each age group. 
Range of % of facts known 
within each age group. 
Above Average Ability Children 0 
Average Ability Children 0 
Below Average Ability Children C3 
N-4 kr each age group &part from the 12+ average and below average ability groups where N=3 
Figure 5.1 Addition and subtraction combinations to tcn: the use of known facts 
Although the general evidence presented by figure 5.1 would seem to indicate that 
children acquire knowledge of basic number combinations over a period of years, 
which would support the notions indicated within earlier research, for example, Groen 
& Parkman (1972), Ashcraft (1982), other issues which are worth noting are: 
the solutions to all of the complete range of addition and subtraction 
combinations were only known by the 'above-average' eleven and 
twelve-year-old children. 
I The 'range' indicated in Figure 5.1, indicates the range between the high and low percentage use of 
known facts by children with each group. In fact, its representation on the figure does no more that 
place the mean in the context of the two most extreme scores within each distribution. 
Groups (as identified by to teacher) Mean for each age group. 
Range of % of facts known 
within each age group. 
Above Average Ability Children 0 
Average Ability Children 0 
Below Average Ability Children C3 
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of the children identified as achieving the nonnal standard within the 
class, those identified as 'average', only twelve-year-olds knew every 
addition combination to ten. 
no complete group of children identified as performing below the 
normal within the class, the 'below-average' group, knew all of the 
addition combinations or the subtraction combinations. 
A further feature emerges which is worth a comment. Differences between the children 
identified as 'average' and 'above-average' were not consistent. Whilst the mean- 
percentage of solutions obtained through known facts appears to increase steadily as 
children grow older, the 'average' ability eight and ten-tear-old children do not appear 
to fit the general trend. The 'average-ability' eight-year-old children used approximately 
15% fewer known facts than their seven-year-old counterparts. This may be no more 
than a feature of selection but it could be a reaction to the current emphasis within the 
schools. These children were being taught the addition and subtraction algorithms with 
exchange. One wonders if the complexity of the broader issues of 'exchange' may be 
responsible for the apparent decrease in the use of known facts. 
Additionally, presenting the data in this way, masks the qualitative difference in the 
responses which are used if children do not know a combination. For example the 
range for the 'above-average' eight-year-olds extends over 60% points for addition 
whilst that for the 'average' group extends over 33% percentage points. What the data 
does not show is that the children represented by the lowest points of the range have 
back-up strategies that are qualitatively different - the child within the 'above-average' 
group used all derived facts, the one within the 'average' group used counting. But 
more of that later. 
2. Number Combinations to Twenty: Categories B and C 
The age and ability "attainment gap" identified in figure 5.1 becomes more apparent 
when the addition and subtraction combinations to twenty are considered (Figure 5.2). 
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This displays the equivalent mean percentages for the number combinations to twenty. 
The parameters established for rigure 5.2 are similar to those established for figure 5.1 
Children identified as 'below-average' amongst the seven-year-olds did not attempt any 
of the subtraction combinations to twenty. 
KNOWN ADDITION AND SUBTRACTION FACTS BETWEEN TEN AND TWENTY 
ADDITION SUBTRACTION 
KNOWN 100 100 1 
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- 7+ 8+ 9+ 10+ 11+ 12+ 7+ 8+ 9+ 10+ 11+ 12+ 
AGE AGE 
Groups (as Identified by the teadxw) Mean for each Range of % of facts known 
age group within each age group 
Above Average Ability Children 
Average Ability Children 
Below Average Ability Children C3 
N-4 for each ability group &part from the 12+ average and below average ability children "ere N=3 
The seven year old below average ability group did not attempt the Stage 2 combinations. 
Figure 52 Addition and subtraction combinations between ten and twenty; the use of known facts 
We note within table 5.1 that over a period of time the percentage of facts known by the 
'below-average' group converges towards the other two groups. A similar trend is 
apparent from table 5.2 for addition. For a few years the difference between the 
percentage of subtraction facts known by two groups seems to diverge. Once again the 
notion of using only one strategy to provide an indication of differences masks the 
qualitative difference in the use of back-up strategies. In every instant the back-up 
strategy used by the eight-year-old 'above-average' children proved to be a derived 
fact. In only two instances was this the case amongst children of the same age within 
the other two groups. 
Groups (as Identified by the teacher) Mean for each Range of % of facts known 
age group within each age group 
Above Average Ability Children 
Average Ability Children 
Below Average Ability Children 0 
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Although once again it may be reasoned that children need time to acquire the ability to 
recall the number combinations to twenty and that once again differences between those 
children identified as 'above-average' and 'average' are not consistent other issues arise 
that are worthy of note: 
0 No one complete group of children solved either every addition 
combination or every subtraction combination through the use of known 
facts. 
There was an age-related increase in the mean-percentage use of known 
facts up to and including the age of eleven. 
Ile picture that emerges from this presentation of the use known-facts by the children 
is that generally the number of solutions obtained through the use of known facts 
increases as children get older. However, it seems that 'below-average' children do not 
make the same extensive use of the strategy as the 'above-average' and the 'average' 
ability children. Although the proportion of addition combinations to ten that are known 
is almost equal across the three ability groups at the age of I I+, this is not be the case 
for the combinations to twenty; the 'below-average' ability children do not appear to 
reach the same facility level as the other two groups in their knowledge of subtraction 
facts during their period in the combined school. 
5.2.2. Growing Competence with Known Combinations: 
5.2.2.1. Number Combinations to Ten 
Table 5.3 shows the extent to which the different age and ability groups used the 
known fact strategy toobtain solutions to the separate number combinations to ten. The 
known fact (KF) strategy is placed within a context which also considers the extent to 
which derived facts (DF) and/or, where appropriate, the combined use of KF and DF 
identified as retrieval methods (R), were used. 
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El 100% children within the age group use the KF strategy 
17-57-1 
L. 2j 75% Children use KF: 25% use DF 
=-3 75% use KF LLJ 
F-7R 100% Children use KF or DF 
r-R--j 75% children use KF or DF 
Mý71 75% children use DF 
SUBTRACTION COMBINATIONS TO TEN 
INDIVIDUAL PROBLEMS AND THE USE OF THE KNOWN FACT STRATEGY 
Below-Average-Abil it y Average Ability Above -Ave rage-Ab iI ity 
AGE 7891011 12 789 10 11 12 7 8 9 10 1112 
6-0 ............ 
3-3 .................. . ..... 
................. 














............ 5-4 ............. 
.. .... .... .... .. 
R 
3-2 ... .... ... .... ..... .... .... ::: R:: ::: R: .... 
6-3 
. ....... ... -R 
R .. -R .... ... ... 9-8 ..... ... ... R :: Iý:: ... :: 4'-' .... R R 8-2 R -R .......... 
9-5 RR *R -R -R 
............ ........... 
........... ............ 7-5 eR eR 
Table 5.3 Addition and subiraction combinations to tcn: Individual problems and the 
use of the known fact strategy. 
What is quickly apparent from Table 5.3 is the extent to which groups use known facts 
and, more interestingly, the extent to which each group appears to use derived facts 
prior to the complete use ofknown facts. 
o The use of derived facts appears to support the known fact strategy amongst 
the 'average' and the 'above-average' groups of children. 
9 Some combinations seem to encourage the use of derived facts amongst the 
I average' ability children, for example, 4+5 and 9-5. These are both 
solved with the use of known doubles which, for example, Groen & 
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ADDITION COMBINATIONS TO TEN 
INDIVIDUAL PROBLEMS AND THE USE OF THE KNOWN FACT STRATEGY 
Parkman (1972) and Woods et al (1975) have shown, are learned before 
most other combinations. 
0 The 'below- average' children show little evidence that they use derived facts. 
5.2.2.2. Number Combinations to Twenty 
Table 5.4 is established in the same way as Table 5.3. It indicates the responses 
obtained for the combinations to twenty. 
ADDITION COMBINATIONS AND PROBLEMS TO TWENTY 
INDIVIDUAL PROBLEMS AND THE USE OF THE KNOWN FACT STRATEGY 
Abi 
100". children within within the age group use the KF strategy 
7591. use KF 
Ij 75% Children use KF: 25% use DF 
F-R-1 75% children use KF and DF 
r5q 75% children use DF 
r= 1-n 1 100% Children use KF and DF 
rZ-Fl 100% children use DF 
9+8* Indicates a Category C number combination 
SUBTRACTION COMBINATIONS AND PROBLEMS TO TWENTY 











Table 5.4 Addition and subtraction combinationsand problems to twenty: Individual 
problems and the use oftlic known fact strategy. 
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As the combinations become less known we note two main trends amongst children 
aged nine and older. 
The general decline in the use of known facts is supported by the use of 
derived facts amongst the 'above-average' and the 'average' children. 
(ii) Ile overall decline in the general use of known facts by the 'below- 
average' appears to be supported by the use of procedural methods as 
indicated by the none marked cells. 
In particular we note that: 
No 'below-average' child used a known fact to obtain a solution to any of the 
category C addition problems. A derived fact was used to solve 9+8 by 15% 
of the children, mostly from the older age groups. There was slightly more 
extensive evidence of the use of known facts and derived facts when dealing 
with category C subtraction combination but this was only amongst the 
twelve year olds. 
" Amongst the 'average' groups only one ten-year-old child used a known fact 
to establish the solutions to all of the category C addition problems. A 
combination of known facts and derived facts was used extensively by this 
and other ten to twelve-year-old children to obtain solutions to both addition 
and subtraction category C number combinations. 
" Only amongst the eleven-year-old 'above-average' ability children was it 
observed that 75% of the age group obtain the solutions to the category C 
combinations through the use of a known fact. Once again there was a 
limited use of known facts to solve Category C subtraction combinations 
although derived solutions were extensively used by children aged eight to 
twelve. 
One conclusion that may be drawn from the results displayed within Table 5.4 is that 
the number relationships appear to be more firmly established by younger 'above- 
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average' children than they are amongst the equivalent aged 'average' children. The 
evidence for this stems from the greater use these children made of derived facts. 
Ilie evidence obtained from tables 5.3 and 5.4 would seem to indicate that amongst the 
'below-average' children the use of known facts is complemented with the use of a 
procedure. In contrast the more extensive use of derived facts, prior to the use of 
known facts amongst the 'average' and the 'above-average' groups of children, would 
appear to act as a cushion to the acquisition of known facts at one level whilst their use 
may also become a viable alternative strategy at another. In one sense the evidence that 
derived facts are used prior to the use of known facts would superficially lend support 
to notions that we should teach "thinking strategies" (Thornton, 1987,1990; Steinberg, 
1985) as a stepping stone to the acquisition of known facts. The essence of the use of a 
thinking strategies is to use what is known. The 'below-average' children do not appear 
to do this easily, whilst the 'above-average' and to a slightly lesser extent the 'average' 
seem to achieve their success from doing it. 
5.3 USING DIVERSE STRATEGIES 
The relationship between the use of procedures and the use of thinking strategies is 
brought into sharper focus when we consider in greater depth the integration of back-up 
strategies used by the children if they fail to recall a combination. The integration of the 
alternatives with the ability to recall some combinations automatically will provide a 
sense of the complexity of the issues that evolve from the children's attempts to solve 
the number combinations within the two stages. 
5.3.1 An Overview of Integrated Strategy Use 
71be network presented in Figure 5.5 is a composite picture of the strategies used by all 
of the children to solve the addition and subtraction problems based on combinations to 
ten. The percentages, obtained by considering the numbers of children who illustrated 
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the use of a particular range of strategies (or one strategy), are rounded to the nearest 
whole and enable comparisons to be made between the proportions of children using a 
range of strategies. 
ADDITION N=70(100%) SUBTRACTION I 
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Figure 53 Addition and subtraction combinations to ten: composite strategy use. 
71irough following particular routes from the point of entry (the top centre of the 
diagram) we are able to trace the extent to which various combinations of strategies 
were used. A link may well have been formed between the derived fact use (DF) in 
addition and subtraction, but at this point it is easier to represent routes if these are 
considered to be discrete although, in practice, knowledge of complementary addition 
facts was used to solve subtraction combinations. 
We can see from figure 5.5 that 97% of the children use known facts (KF) for the 
addition combinations to ten but 72% supplement their use with alternative strategies. 
The comparable figures for subtraction are 97% and 73%. From these figures it can be 
established that 25% of the children knew all of the presented addition facts whilst 24% 
knew the subtraction facts. 3% of the children use count-all only and 1% (one child) 
used take-away only. One other child used only procedural methods for subtraction. 
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It is striking that an almost equal proportion of children used a similar range of 
alternatives for subtraction. The balance between the use of retrieval methods and 
procedural methods is almost equal for addition and subtraction. The notion of 
regression is used to indicate the move from the use of a retrieval method, such as 
known fact or derived fact, to the use of a more naive strategy, such as, for example, 
count-on and then count-all (Gray, 1991a); these more naive strategies are slower to 
operate. The greater need for children to 'regress' to a take-away for subtraction 
compares strikingly with those who regress similarly to count-all for addition. It is 
conjectured that a reason for this may be identified through the application of the two 
methods. Count-on for addition is a natural process. Count-back is its natural reverse 
but not the easiest reverse, and therefore, its difficulties are likely to force weaker 
children to the easier, if less sophisticated, strategy of take-away. (Note that there was 
so little evidence of count-up that it has not been placed within the figures. It was 
generally only used by 'above-average' children as we shall see later. ) 
Apart from this one major difference the percentages that included procedural methods 
as the alternative strategies to known facts were otherwise almost equal; 60% for 
addition and 62% for subtraction. The balance, by implication, used only derived facts 
together with known facts; 12% addition and 11% for subtraction indicating that 88% 
of the sample did not use derived facts for addition and 89% did not use them for 
subtraction. 
I'lie varied use of strategies combinations increases in complexity when a similar 
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Figure 5.6 Addition and subtraction combinations to twenty: composite strategy use. 
Ile following conclusions can be drawn from figure 5.6 when it is compared to figure 
5.5: 
(i) the overall picture increases in complexity since there was a considerable 
decline in the percentage of children who knew all of the facts. 
there is a considerable increase in the percentage of children who use 
derived facts. Once again it is important to note that though no relationship 
is established between the use of, for example, an addition fact used to 
resolve a subtraction combination, this does not imply that there were no 
links between addition and subtraction in the use of derived facts but as 
previously noted it was generally restricted to the 'above-average' children. 
(iii) there was an increase in the percentage of children who only used 
procedural methods. 
(iv) there was greater evidence of errors 
(v) the seven-year-old, 'below-average' children were not asked to attempt 
these combination, hence the change in totals from figure 5.5. 
It is worth noting that apart from one eleven-year-old 'below-average' ability child who 
solved each of the subtraction combinations to twenty through the use of known facts, 
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other instances of the complete use of this strategy was confined to children identified 
as 'above-average. 
5.3.2 Integrated Use of Strategies: Age and Ability Considerations. 
Composite pictures such as those presented within Figures 5.3 and 5.4 give an 
indication of what is happening across the spectrum of the age range but they do not 
help us to easily identify the contrast in strategies used by children of different abilities 
and ages. Clearer pictures are obtained if the integrated use of diverse strategies are 
related to the age and the teacher identified level of the chfldren's arithmetical ability. 
Figures 5.7 and 5.7 are area graphs which illustrate the cumulative percentage of the 
strategies used by the children to obtain solutions to the combinations. The graphs 
indicate trends between age groups and reflect proportions of individual strategies that 
the children of the three ability ranges, and the six age groups, used. Each group 
identified within the graphs, apart from the 'below-average' children and the 'average' 
children aged 12 +, contains a sample of four. The exceptions contain a sample of 
three. 
Several features may be determined from Figure 5.7 that over-ride the obvious 
limitations of the sample sizes and the nature of the samples, which no doubt may 
account for some of the irregularities that are apparent. Although the trends indicate an 
increase in the use of known facts and a decline in the use of procedural methods, it is 
the interface between these two, the use of derived facts, that is of particular interest. 
For the 'above-average' and to a slightly lesser extent the 'average' groups the decline 
in Procedural approaches is not accompanied by an immediate corresponding increase 
in known facts. The use of derived facts would appear to be a transitional stage which 
cushions the children against the need to use procedures. Such a cushion is hardly 
apparent amongst the 'below-average' groups. During the time when 'below-average' 
ability children are effecting the change between count-all and count-on, 'above- 
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average' children, in particular, appear to be resolving the issue of combinations that 
are not immediately known by using the fact that are known. 
STAGE 1 ADDITION AND SUBTRACTION PROBLEMS 
PERCENTAGE OF DIFFERENT STRATEGIES USED BY CHILDREN OF THREE ABIUTY RANGES 
ADEXTION SUBTRACTION 
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Figure 5.7 Addition and subtraction combinafions to icn: Percentage of different 
s(rategics used by children of three ability groups. 
Such distinctions are enhanced when we consider the equivalent combinations for the 
number combinations to twenty (Figure 5.8). 
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STAGE 2 ADDITION AND SUBTRACTION PROBLEMS: 
PERCENTAGE OF DIFFERENT STRATEGIES USED BY CHILDREN OF THREE ABILITY RANGES 
ADDITION SUBTRACTION 
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Figurc 5.9 Addition and subtraction combinations to twenty: Pcrcell(age of 
diffmnt strategies uscd by children offliree ability groups. 
The extensive use of procedural methods by tile 'below-average' group is clearly 
identified and so too is the "cushion" formed through the use of derived facts by tile 
other two groups. 
The extent to which different groups make use ol'derived facts is striking. Even when a 
particular age group of' 'below-average' children, for example, the ten and eleven-year- 
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9+ 10+ 11+ 12+ 
AGE 
8+ 9+ 10+ 11+ 12+ 
AGE 
olds, appear to respond to a similar percentage of the addition combinations through 
known facts as do the eight and nine-year-old 'above-average' children, the back-up 
strategies when facts are not recalled appear to be quite different. Such differences are 
even more striking when strategies used by 8+ 'above-average' and the 10+ 'below- 
average' to solve the subtraction combinations are compared. We now turn to consider 
the use of derived facts in more detail. 
5.3.3 The Derived Fact Strategy 
The use of derived facts may be one key that provides an insight into the qualitatively 
different ways that children described as 'above-average' compare with children 
described as 'below-average'. Based as it is on the use of an alternative known fact to 
establish a new fact, the use of this strategy carries with it the implications that children 
cannot use the derived fact strategy until such time as something is known. 
Over the full sample, twice as many subtraction combinations to ten were solved using 
derived facts strategy than were addition combinations (10% compared to 5%). 
Children identified as 'average' contributed to these percentages in almost equal 
measure to the 'above-average' children. The contribution of the 'average' group, 
within the context of the addition combinations, remained generally consistent over the 
age ranges whereas that of the 'above-average' group was concentrated within two age 
groups - the 7+ and 8+ children. This concentrated use of derived facts amongst the 
'above-average' children is also noticeable when the subtraction combinations are 
considered, but, there are inconsistencies between different age groups of the 'average' 
children. The complete use of derived facts by the 'below-average' children represented 
slightly more than one twentieth of the total for addition and about one tenth of the total 
for subtraction. 
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5.3.3.1 Derived Facts and Number Combinations to Ten 
The pattern of the contributions of each age group differed considerably. 
a) Children identified as 'above-average': 
" The most extensive use of derived facts was noticed amongst the seven and 
eight-year-old children, seven of the eight children making use of the strategy 
at least once to solve either an addition or subtraction problem. 
" The use of known doubles dominated the derivatives used to obtain 
solutions: 
a) 5X2 ("five two's') or 5+5 ("five and five") and then I subtracted, 
were the most frequent strategies used to solve 5+4 through a derived 
fact. 5X2 was the usual known fact used to derive a solution to 9-5. 
b) Similarly 3+3=6 enabled children to solve 6-3 but knowledge of 
multiplication facts was used in some instances to derive the solution to 
6+3,: 3x2=6,3 x3=9. 
c) A known double helped children solve 3+5: most frequently from 
4+4 ("four andfoun or 4x2 ("two fours"). 
Related addition facts were used to derive solutions to subtraction problems 
such as 7-5,9 - 8,8 - 2,3 -2 and 5-4. The seven and eight-year-old 
children made most use of related addition facts, (all of the older children, 
apart from two nine-year-olds, one of whom used count-on, knew the 
solutions to the presented subtraction problems). 
The use of known pairs of numbers that make ten helped children to derive 
solutions to 7+2 and 8+2. 
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b) Children identified as 'average' 
Apart from evidence that 4+5 was solved through the use of a derived fact by 
39% of the 'average' children spread over the age ranges seven to eleven, other 
evidence of the use of the strategy for the addition problems by this group was 
extremely fragmentary. 
" Only one child, a ten year old, solved more than one addition problem using 
a derived fact. 
" On the whole, evidence of the use of derived facts for addition was restricted 
to the solutions for 4+5 and 6+3, the strategies used being similar to those 
used by the 'above-average' ability group of children. 
" Two children obtained the solution to 7+2 through knowledge of a pair that 
made ten whilst one used 4+4 to obtain the solution to 5+3. 
" In contrast to the evidence noted amongst the 'above-average' children, no 
'average' eight-year-olds derived the solution to any subtraction 
combination. 
" The nine-year-olds demonstrated the highest incidence of use of derived 
facts. It was the complementary combination to 4+5,9 - 5, that reflected 
greatest use: 35% of the full sample of solved this combination by deriving it; 
50% using the related addition fact, 4+5; 50% using knowledge of 
combinaflons to ten. Three children, two seven-year-olds and one nine-year- 
old, used a derived fact to obtain the solution to both of these problems. 
The ability to use the related addition fact to solve 7-5 and 9-8 was 
noticed amongst the nine and ten year olds. 
The trend amongst the 'average' children was to use the derived fact strategy 
later and over a longer period of time than the 'above-average' children but, 
perhaps, there was a narrower range of problems solved through the use of the 
strategy although the evidence is not conclusive. 
c) Children identified as 'below-average' 
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Only one eight year old solved 4 +5, through what must by now be recognised 
as a standard solution strategy, 5+5-1, although the solution to 9-5 was 
obtained through the use of a derived fact by four children across the ages nine to 
eleven. Ile only other subtraction problem solved by the use of a derived fact 
was 6-3, the solution derived through the use of the known addition fact, but 
only one child actually did this. 
5.3.3.2. An Interim Summary of the Use of Derived Facts 
From the evidence obtained through the analysis of the use of derived facts to establish 
a solution to either an addition- or subtraction combination to ten, the differences 
between the three ability groups can be summarised as follows: 
The 'above-average' children make use of derived facts at a young age and 
their use suggests the strategy is a stepping stone to establishing new known 
combinations. 
The 'average' children use derived facts at a later age than do the 'above- 
average' children. The evidence suggest that they require a firmer base of 
known facts from which to use derived facts but then they are also used as a 
stepping stone to establishing new known facts. 
Their is very limited use of derived facts amongst the 'below-average' 
children even when they have a fairly extensive repertoire of known facts. 
5.3.3.3 Derived Facts and Number Combinations to Twenty 
'Mere is a considerable increase in the use of derived facts to solve the combinations to 
twenty compared to their use to solve combinations to ten. This increase is marked not 
only by an increase within each separate ability group but by changes within each group 
that relate to both age and problem type as can be seen in Table 5.9. 
Table 5.9 indicates the percentage of each complete ability group that made use of a 
derived fact to solve each addition and subtraction combination to twenty. The 
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problems are arranged high to low in an order identified by the percentage of the full 
sample of children (N=70) who solved a particular problem through the derived fact 
strategy. 
AnniTinti allolrDAPTInLl 
Ability Group Full Sample Ability Group Full Sample 




Below av. 23 22 e ow av. 19 21 





Above av. 24 1 64 Above av. 24 1 42 
Below av. 23 9 Below av. 19 21 
4+7 Average 23 43 31 15-9 Average 23 52 39 
Above av. 24 42 Above av. 24 46 
Below av. 23 22 Below av. 19 26 
8+6 Average 23 43 28 12-8 Average 23 35 38 
Above av. 24 38 Above av. 24 60 







20-8 Average 23 48 33 
Above av. 2 21 Above av. 24 29 
elow av. 23 0 - Below av. 11 
15+4 Average 
1 
23 35 24 16-3 Average e 
= 
23 30 26 
Above av. 24 38 Above av. 24 33 
Below av. 23 0 Below av. 19 0 
3+16 Average 23 26 18 
E5 
V( A erage 23 17 17 
Above av. 24 29 ova a, Above av. 24 33 
Below av. 23 0 - Below av. 1 9 5 
13+5 Av erage 2 9 10 17-131 Average 23 22 17 
Above av. 2 21 Above av. 24 25 





9 6 19-17 
1 
Average 23 17 15 
Above av. 2 Above av. 24 29 
Below av. 23 0 elo av. B w 19 0 
10+2 Average 
1 
23 4 13-21 rage Ave 23 13 12 
















Above av. 24 8 Above av. 24 17 
'n' Indicates the number In each ability group. 
N Indicates the total in the full sample. 
Table 5.9 Percentage of combinations to twenty problems solved by the derived fact strategy: ability 
group and full sample considerations. 
There are several points to note from Table 5.9: 
9 Addition combinations from category C, that is, 9+8,4 +7 and 
8+6 were solved more extensively by derived facts than those 
combinations that contain units previously used in the category A 
number combinations - those of category B. 
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* Subtraction combinations where a single digit number is to be 
subtracted from a teen number where the unit is smaller than the 
number to be subtracted, that is, 18 - 9,15 - 9,12 -9 and 20 -8 
were solved more extensively through the use of derived facts. 
Each combination to twenty was solved through the use of a derived fact by 
at least one 'above-average' child. 
12 -8 and 20 -8 were solved extensively through the use of derived facts 
by the twelve-year-old 'below-average' children. 
The general trends within each ability group and the differences in the use of derived 
facts between each ability groups of children require closer examination. 
a) Children identified as 'above-average' 
(i) Addition Combinations: 
1. Category B Combinations, for example, 14 + 4,3 + 16 etc. 
The focus of attention here is on the 'above-average' children younger 
that ten - older children obtained the solutions to these combinations 
through the use of known facts. The younger children used their 
knowledge of 4+4 and 3+6 and 3+5 etc. to compute the units 
component of 14 +4 and 3+ 16 and 13 +5 and then add ten to each 
solution. 
2. Category C Combinations, for example, 9+8,4 + 7,8 + 6. 
Doubles were increasingly and extensively used amongst the children 
to obtain solutions to 9+8 and 8+6. 
Eight year old children, in addition to using the double nine, 
demonstrated the use of number pair to make ten e. g. when solving 
4+7 they used (7 + 3) +1 but also evidence of (6 + 4) + 1. This 
was a trend continued spasmodically amongst the older children but it 
dominated the solution strategy used by the twelve-year-olds. 
103 
Although every twelve-year-old child knew all of the solutions to the 
addition number combinations to ten all them used derived facts for 
the category C combinations. The strategies used were based on 
known doubles or number pairs that make ten. (This level of use of 
derived facts by the twelve-year-old children was in contrast to that 
displayed by the eleven-year-olds, only one of whom failed to use the 
known fact strategy). 
(ii) Subtraction Combinations. 
Combinations such as 12 - 8,18 -9 and 15 -9 were solved extensively 
by the two youngest age groups and the two oldest age groups through 
the use of a derived fact. 
Combinations such as 17 - 13 and 19 - 17, either using a known addition 
fact, for example, "7 -3=4 because 3+4= 7", and then dealing with 
the tens, or, used knowledge of tens, for example, "20 -8 is 12 because 
10 and 10 is 20,8 from 10 is 2 add 10 is 12". 
Overall there was extensive use of derived facts by the 'above-average' children 
when solving combinations to twenty. Their use dominated as a back-up strategy 
amongst all of the age groups. 
b) Children identified as 'average' 
(i) Addition Combinations: 
1. Category B Combinations, for example, 14 + 4,3 + 16 etc. 
Solutions derived by nine and ten-year-olds were known by eleven 
and twelve-year-olds. 
The ways in which solutions were derived were similar to the 
methods used by the 'above-average' children. 
2. Category C Combinations, for example, 9+8,4 + 7,8 + 6. 
From the age of nine, 'average' children made considerably more use 
of derived facts to solve these problems than did the "above-average" 
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children: derived facts were used in 73% of the instances by average 
ability children, in 48% by the 'above-average' ability children. 
(ii) Subtraction Combinations. 
The general pattern in responses reflects those given by the 'above- 
average' children but it also follows the trends set when the children dealt 
with addition: 
" Although there are very few examples of derived solutions by children 
below the age of nine there is widespread use of the strategy from that 
age onwards. 
" Children above nine use the strategy more substantially for subtraction 
than for addition, more-so even than 'above-average' children of the 
same ages. 
It is worth noting that the 'average' children of ten and older know solutions 
to fewer combinations than their more able counterparts - 52% compared to 
74%. 
Every 'average' child above the age of nine derived at least one solution to the 
subtraction combinations. 37% of the solutions obtained by children nine and 
older were through derived facts. The 'above-average' children within the same 
age bracket derived 20% of the possible solutions. The difference in the figures 
can partly be explained by extensive differences noted in responses to particular 
problems. 
* 81% of 'average' children derived the solution to 15 - 9, by far the most 
common method being 10 - 9,5 + 1. In contrast 33% of the "above- 
average" children derived the solution (50% displayed the use of a known 
fact). 
63% of the 'average' group derived the solution to 18 - 9, all from the 
known double; 66% of the 'above-average' group knew the solution, 33% 
derived it from the known double. This problem may present particular 
difficulty in interpretation. It could be that we may be seeing evidence of an 
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instantaneous derived fact which the 'above-average' children do so quickly 
that when requested to reflect upon their method they are unable to 
distinguish a derived fact strategy from a known fact. 
Apart from the solution to 16-10, which was known by every child above nine in 
both ability groups, solutions to 17 - 13 and 19 - 17 were as likely to be counted 
by the 'average' children who did not use the known fact strategy as they were to 
be derived. 
c) Children identified as 'below-average'. 
In general, deriving facts amongst 'below-average' children was limited to 
individuals or to specific problems. In only three separate instances did children 
derive solutions to any problems that had involved combinations previously met 
within Category A. In each case these illustrated the use of the known double to 
solve 4+4 and then the addition of ten to provide the solution for 14 + 4. 
There were no derived solutions to any of the addition problems involving single 
digits facts by any 'below-average child younger than eleven. (No child from a 
'below-average' group solved any of these problems making use of known facts). 
One eleven-year-old derived the solutions to all such combinations but in general it 
was the solution to 9+8, from "two nines", that was most frequently derived. 
However, Stuart (aged 11+) responded to 8+6 by saying I know 8 and 2 is ten, 
but I have a lot of trouble taking 2 from 6. Now 8 is 4 and 4; 6 and 4 is 10; and 
another 4 is 14. " We may feel we should congratulate Stuart for the breadth of 
arithmetical manipulation that he displays but the truth of the matter is that his 
particular approach indicates not so much what he knows as what he does not 
know. He knows number combinations that make ten but in this context has 
difficulty with 6-2. Such a method may place a severe burden of "inventiveness" 
upon him which in the long term prove too great a burden to bear. 
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There was slightly more widespread use of derived facts to solve the subtraction 
combinations to 20 but rather than efficient contracted approaches usually seen 
within the other groups, the 'below-average' children frequently used derived facts 
in a complex way. There was evidence that fingers were used as a visual support, 
an action not identified within the other two groups. Solutions resolved in this way 
were categorised as "derived fact! 'because there was no visible evidence of actual 
counting and verbal explanations satisfied the interviewer that although fingers were 
needed to support thinking, the explanation indicated that the child used a thinking 
strategy. 
For instance, Karen (11+), showed a subtle understanding of number relationships 
(Figure 5.10). 
DISPLAY EXPLANATION TO CALCULATE 15 -9 
Left Hand Right Hand Child's Explanation Interviewer's Comment 
Fifteen is ten and Five fingers shown on left hand, 
STAG91 five. (Other ten presumably held in 
Forget the ten. mind. ) Right hand closed. 
The child displays the nine to 
STAGE 2 
n 
be taken away as a flve and 
four. 
R-- q The left hand Is closed, to 
STAGE3 cancd the displayed flve with 
the previously displayed five. 
STAGE4 
Fourfivin one of 
thefives making 
ten leaves one. 
The remaining four is taken 
from one of the flves held 
In the mind. 
STAGE5 
One (nd the 
otherfivefrom 
Remaining five in mind now 
displayed, giving a total of 5 
the ten make six. and 1, which is 6. 
Figure 5.10: Subtracting nine from fiftcen by an inventive route 
Karen made considerable use of her ringers. To perform the calculation 15 - 9, 
she held out five fingers on her left hand and closed it completely; she then held up 
four fingers on her right hand closed them and opened the right thumb, then 
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redisplayed the five fingers of her left hand at the same time and responded "six. " 
The whole procedure took about three seconds. 
Other 'below-average' children who attempted to derive facts often had to do this 
based on a limited number of known facts that might not furnish the most efficient 
way to perform the calculation. 
Michael (aged 12+), faced with " 16 - 3", said "ten from sixteen leaves six, three 
from ten leaves seven, three and seven makes ten and another three is thirteen. " 
Michael appears to seek familiar number bonds to solve the problem. He sees 16 as 
6 and 10, but takes the three from the 10 rather than from the 6 and ends up having 
to do the additional sum "six and seven". 
Amongst 'below-average' children then, derived facts were used in a limited if 
occasionally very complex way. The breadth of combinations resolved through the 
use of derived facts did not match the range resolved through their use by the other 
two groups. 
5.3.4 A Summary of the Use of Derived Facts 
Overall the use of derived facts by the children in the sample can be surnmarised as 
follows: 
(i) Derived facts were more extensively used for the number combinations 
to 20 than for number combinations to 10. 
(ii) There was more evidence of the use of derived facts for subtraction than 
for addition. 
(iii) 'Above-average' children tended to make extensive use of derived facts 
at a younger age than children from the other two groups 
(iv) Evidence of more than a very limited use of derived facts by the 'below- 
average' children was only apparent amongst the twelve year olds. 
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Some important issues are noted that begin to suggest qualitative differences in the 
mathematical behaviour of the 'above-average' children compared to the 'below- 
average' children: 
" Amongst the 'above-average' children there is evidence of more extensive 
use of derived facts as an alternative method of resolving solutions to number 
combinations if they do not recall the solution through a known facts. 
" 'Above-average' children use derived facts efficiently. 
" The use of derived facts as an alternative to known facts by the 'above- 
average' children may: 
a) help younger children to establish new known facts as seen in the trends 
apparent when the deal with number combinations to 10. 
b) release older children from the need to remember all of the combinations 
as seen in the trends apparent when they deal with number combinations 
to 20. 
'Average' ability children appear to follow the same trends as the above average 
ability children but at a later stage. 
Apart from some common exceptions that appear to be problem and age 
related, children from the 'below-average' group did not generally use 
derived facts as a viable alternative to the use of known facts. Some 
examples of their use display complexity rather than efficiency. 
The 'above-average' and the 'average' ability children use derived facts more and 
with greater efficiency than do the 'below-average' children. 
The 'below-average' children, even as they grow older, seem to rely extensively 
on procedural methods. It is these methods that are now considered. 
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5.4 THE USE OF PROCEDURAL METHODS 
5.4.1 Number combinations to Ten 
Tables 5.11 and 5.12 show the percentage of each individual number combination 
solved through the use of procedural methods by each of the three groups of children. 
The order in which the problems is presented was established from the overall use of 
known facts. Thus 5+0 was most frequently solved using a known fact whilst 3+5 
least frequently. 
N 5+0 0+2 4+4 2+1 8+2 6+3 7+2 4+6 3+5 
'Below-Average' Group 23 13 17 21 26 48 52 56 69 83 
'Average'Group 23 4 4 0 9 30 48 43 9 52 
'Above-Average' Group 24 0 0 0 13 8 13 21 13 25 
Full Sample 70 6 7 7 16 29 38 40 30 53 
Tbe percentage use of procedural metbods to solve addition combinations to 10 
Table 5.11 
N 6-0 3-3 5-4 3-2 6-3 9-8 8-2 9-5 7-6 
'Below-Average' Group 23 13 13 30 35 52 61 65 52 73 
'Average'Group 23 4 9 18 22 22 30 47 26 47 
'Above-Average' Group 24 0 0 4 8 0 12 12 21 12 
Full Sample 70 6 7 17 22 25 34 41 33 44 
The percentage use of procedural methods to solve subtraction combinations to 10 
Table 5.12 
47% of the solutions to the additions combinations to ten were obtained through the use 
of procedural methods by the 'below-average' group of children. The overall use of 
count-all and count-on was almost equal amongst the children although the younger 
children tended to use the former and older children the latter. In contrast amongst the 
'average' and 'above-average' there was no evidence of count-all. Count-on was 
extensively used amongst the younger 'average' children, 7+2,4 + 5,3 +5 and 
8+2 evoking the greatest proportion of procedural responses. 
When dealing with the subtraction combinations to ten a similar pattern emerged 
amongst the 'below-average' children. Take-away, the complementary strategy to 
count-all, was extensively used amongst the younger children groups. It remained in 
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evidence amongst the ten year old children but it was gradually replaced by the direct 
complementary strategy to count-on - count-back. Thus the procedural growth of the 
'below-average' children was from take-away to count-back. There was very little 
evidence of count-up. 
Although take-away was used extensively by the 8+ 'average' children the general 
trend amongst this whole group was to use of count-back. There was some evidence of 
children using only count-up. 
Apart from the seven year olds, the use of procedures did not figure prominently 
amongst the 'above-average' children, but count-up was the dominant form of 
procedure used. 
5.4.2. Number Combinations to Twenty. 
Tables 5.11 and 5.12 indicate the extent of the use of procedural methods to obtain 
solutions to the addition and subtraction combinations to twenty. The bracketed figures 
in table 5.11 indicate the percentage of solutions attempted through the use of 
procedural methods. In some cases these methods led to errors. Non-bracketed figures 
show the success rate through procedures. 
A fl^mKinafl^na Catariorv 13 combinations 
-N--1 10+2 12+1 14+4 3+16 18+2 15+44 1133+ 5 9+8 8+6 4+7 
'Below-Averag; ' Group 23 31(34) 34(36) 48(58) 61(68) 39(45) 79(90) 78 go go 83(90) 61(74) 78(90) 
'Average'Group 23 26 26 26 39 39 22 57 35 48 48 
'Above-Average' Group 24 8 88 17 13 13 33 25 38 33 
ý-Ull Sample 22 23 27 29 30 38 48 - 49 63 
The percentage use of procedural methods to solve addition combinations to twenty 
Table 5.13 
A tnmkinntinne CatAnnri R enrnhinatinns 
1'5-4 16-3 18-9 15-9 12-8 16-10 17-13 20-8 19-' 
'Below-Average'Group 19 42 63 58 63 68 68 36 84 68 95 
'Average'Group 23 30 43 25 26 39 47 17 53 34 58 
'Above-Averaqe' Group 
' 
24 21 13 21 17 21 25 8 29 17 29 
Pull Sample 70 31 40 35 35 43 47 20 55 40 61 
Ile percentage use of procedural methods to solve subtraction combinations to twenty 
Table 5.14 
ill 
It is apparent from Tables 5.13 and 5.14 that, compared to their use in the Category A 
combinations, the percentage use of procedural methods increased when children 
solved the addition and subtraction combinations to twenty. What is of particular 
interest is that this increase was not reflected by an increase in count-all and take-away 
but to a large extent was identified as an increase in count-on and its complementary 
subtraction procedure, count-back. 
Amongst the 'below-average' children procedural approaches were used in equal 
measure to resolve both addition and subtraction combinations: 61% for addition and 
63% for subtraction. Take-away was used more extensively for subtraction than count- 
all was used for addition. Neither of these procedures was used by children ten and 
older. 
The most frequent use of take-away was seen amongst the eight- year-olds, but both it 
and count-back when used by these children caused errors. Indeed even ten-year-olds 
had difficulty with count-back which was used as the dominant procedure amongst all 
'below-average' children above the age of nine. Samples of errors include: 
Michael (10+), identified as "below-average" chose to write 18 -9 in the standard 
vertical layout as 
18 
9 
and, as is usual in the decomposition process, put a 'little one' by the eight. 
'This is the easy way of working it out. I can't take nine from eight but if I put a little 
one it makes it easier because now its nine from eighteen. " 
He failed to realise that this is the same combination he had started with, and, after a 
considerable time trying to cope with this problem, he resorted to his more usual 
procedure for subtraction by placing eighteen marks from left to right on his paper, then 
starting from the left and counting from one to nine as he crossed out nine marks. He 
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recounted the remaining marks from left to right to complete the correct solution by 
"take away. " 
Jay (9+) solved the problem 5-4 by casually displaying rive ringers on the edge of 
the desk and counted back, "five, ... four, three, two, one. " At each count apart from 
the five he put slight pressure on each finger in sequence. The solution was provided 
by last count in the sequence. When attempting 15 -4 he wanted to use a similar 
method but had a problem, declaring "I'm too old for counters! " but neither did he want 
to be seen using his fingers because "My class don't use counters or fingers. " He felt 
he should operate in the same way as other children in his class (most of whom 
appeared to recall the basic facts from memory) yet he did not know the solutions and 
knew that he required a counting support. His use of fingers for obtaining solution for 
number combinations was almost always covert. When dealing with combinations to 
twenty he combined a casual display of ten splayed fingers on the edge of his desk with 
an imagined repetition of his fingers just off the desk. He spent a considerable time 
obtaining individual solutions and had a tendency to be very cautious in giving 
responses. He used his imaginary fingers to attempt to rind a solution to 15 -9 by 
counting back. Eventually he became confused and couldn't complete the problem. 
There was no evidence of the use of count-all amongst 'average' children but take- 
away was the sole strategy used by one eight year old to solve the subtraction 
combinadons. 
Evidence of the flexibility to use count-back, count-up to or count-up was only 
obtained from one seven-year-old, who displayed the use of both count-up and count- 
back; the solutions for 17-13 and 19-17 being achieved through count-up. This 
flexibility was also demonstrated by a ten year old. Thus amongst the 'average' 
children we see some evidence of "choice". 
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None of the 'above-average" children used either count-all or take-away. Once again 
count-up was the most frequently used procedure for subtraction. The evidence of 
children using both count-back and count-up came from the seven year olds. 
5.4.3 Summary of the Use of Procedural Methods 
There were only a very few instances where children carried out their procedures 
without the external evidence of the use of a referent, whether it be fingers, head 
nodding or pointing. The 'above average' group of children were the general 
exceptions to this pattern. Much of their counting was abstract counting though at times 
it was accompanied by inaudible verbal utterances. 
Overall the use of procedural methods by the children in the sample can be summarised 
as follows: 
Procedural methods were more extensively used for the addition and 
subtraction combinations to twenty than for the addition and subtraction 
combinations to ten. 
(ii) There was no strong evidence to indicate that procedural methods were used 
more for subtraction than for addition. 
(iii) The general evidence shows that where 'below-average' children used count- 
on for addition they used 'count-back for subtraction. 
Some of the issues that arise from the analysis of the use of procedural methods would 
seem to provide additional support for the view that suggests that 'below-average' 
children' are doing a qualitatively different form of arithmetic than their apparently more 
able peers. 
41 'Above-average' children make less, and, more sophisticated use of 
procedural methods than do the less-able. 
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'Average' ability children appear to follow the same trends as the above 
average ability children but over a wider age span. 
'Below-average' ability children make extensive use of procedural methods 
and, apart from both age and problem related exceptions noted for some 
subtraction combinations to twenty, appear to use procedural methods as the 
dominant alternative to the use of known facts. Where children used count-all 
or take-away there was no evidence of the use of derived facts. 
5.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Any assumption that children of a particular age "know the number facts" must be 
treated with extreme caution. However, the failure to retrieve the solution to a number 
combination from memory generally triggers the application of an back-up strategy 
which is usually successfully applied so that a correct response to a problem can be 
made. The analysis of the approaches used by the children extends the notion of the 
strategies outlined by Carpenter et al (1982) to numerical problems, indicates that these 
strategies change over time (e. g. Carpenter & Moser, 1984; Groen and Parkman, 
1972, Woods et al 1975), confirms, to some extent the notion of an interaction 
between both knowledge and procedures (e. g. Ashcraft, 1982, Riley, Greeno & 
Heller, 1983) and thus provides some indication of the link between the use of 
procedure and automatic fact retrieval ( Siegler & Shrager, 1984). It is in the interaction 
between knowledge and procedure that we see the qualitative differences between the 
& above-average' and the 'below-average'. 
'Below-average' children display the use of known facts with a 
counting procedure. The 'above-average' display the use of known 
facts, and derived facts and, more generally among the younger, 
children, a procedure. 
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* The procedures used by the 'below-average' children evoked the use 
of external referents. They may be defined as perceptual counters 
(S teffe et al, 198 1) 
e The procedures used by the 'above-average' children did not generally 
evoke the use of referents. They may be described as 'motor' counters 
or 'abstract' counters (Steffe et al, 198 1) 
9 'Below-average' children generally used count-back to resolve 
subtraction combinations they did not know. It many cases this caused 
difficulty and for the most part it was the hardest subtraction 
procedure the children may have used. 
* 'Above-average' children only showed evidence of "choice" when in 
the 7+ group. The general trend was to use count-up. 
* Even when they knew proportionally the same number of known facts 
as a younger 'above-average' group, older 'below-average' children 
did not use derived facts. 
It would appear from the evidence of this sample that the less able do not simply learn 
the same techniques more slowly. They develop different techniques. The more able 
who use procedures, for example, display not only procedural competence at all ages, 
but also procedural efficiency. The less able appear to take some considerable time to 
develop procedural competence and then operate within the security of that competence. 
It is concluded that the more able demonstrate procedural efficiency within a conceptual 
framework whilst the less able develop procedural competency within a procedural 
framework. 
From the evidence it would be concluded that there are qualitative differences in the 




DUALITY, AMBIGUITY AND FLEXIBILITY: 
A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Within Chapter 5 we see the strategies that are integrated by different groups of children 
to solve basic combinations in addition and subtraction. The evidence suggests that 
there is a dichotomy between the procedural approaches used by the 'below-average' 
children and the more flexible strategies used within a conceptual framework by the 
'above-average' children. Although the dichotomy is easily seen amongst the younger 
children, the evidence suggests that eventually the difficulties the 'below-average 
children' experience with their procedures are overcome, and, their procedural 
approaches become efficient enough to enable them to retrieve the solution to most 
number combinations. The evidence of diverging approaches to simple arithmetic 
remains however. 
In the study described in Chapter 5. verbal descriptions of the strategies used by the 
sample of 70 children to solve the complete range of 19 addition combinations and 19 
subtraction combinations indicated an important difference in the children's perceptions 
of mathematics. Such a difference, also noted by Cobb (199 1), may be described in the 
following terms: 
children who relied extensively on procedural methods explained the 
mathematics they used in terms of a procedure. It seemed that for them 
mathematics was an activity to be carried out in accordance with a sequence of 
actions. The numbers used did not symbolise anything but themselves. 
- even though many of the 'above-average' children were unable to articulate their 
use of derived facts there was an implication behind what was explained and 
what was observed; these children saw their mathematics as actions on numbers 
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as arithmetical objects. The numbers had a quality which was both concrete and 
available for manipulation; they could symbolise other relationships. 
Within this chapter the focus is placed on such differences seen from the theoretical 
perspectives that arise from an interpretation of symbolism. The early part of the 
chapter illustrates how, in mathematics, symbols take on a double meaning and 
represent both process and object. To draw together the procedural and conceptual 
possibilities that are represented by symbolism the theoretical the notion of procept is 
introduced. The distinctions between those who demonstrate thinking based upon the 
flexible use of processes and concepts and those who think procedurally leads to the 
notions of proceptual and procedural thinking, which is followed by the formulation of 
a theoretical analysis of the growth of proceptual thinking in simple arithmetic. This 
suggests that the difference between proceptual and procedural thinking leads to a 
divergence termed the proceptual divide. 
6.2 THE AMBIGUITY OF MATHEMATICAL SYMBOLISM 
The notion that there are two forms of thinking in mathematics, procedural thinking and 
conceptual thinking, tends to enforce the notion of dichotomy and yet almost by 
definition the latter subsumes the former and certainly within the field of arithmetic it is 
notions of procedure that leads us into notions of concept. This of course is the very 
essence of Piagetian belief of action interiorised as object. It is the representation of this 
'interiorised action' which is the focus of interest. 
Dubinsky (1991) provides a sense of the transformation which may be attached to the 
action becoming internalised through the use of the term 'encapsulation' which has 
frequented these pages. By implication, it is this notion which enables us abstract the 
similarities from different experiences and provide a name for these abstractions. In the 
mathematical sense such abstractions are not concepts until they are named and have 
symbolic representations (Skemp, 1971; Vergnaud, 1987). Thus we may see the notion 
of the experiences or actions encapsulated within a symbol which represents a concept. 
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As we have seen we may regard a symbol as something which is perceived by the 
senses. It can be written or spoken so that it can be seen or heard. What is important 
about the physical representation for the current theoretical development is the way in 
which it is interpreted by different individuals or by the same individual at different 
times. In particular the interest is in the way in which a symbol can be conceived as 
representing a process or an object a conception which lead to Sfard's rhetorical 
question "How can anything be object and process at the same time? " (Sfard, 1989) 
Gray and Tall (1991) suggest that the answer to the question lies in the working 
practices of professional mathematicians and all those who are successful in 
mathematics. 
They employ the simple device of using the same notation to represent both a 
process and the product of that process. It is through using the notation to represent 
either process or product, whichever is convenient at the time, that the mathematician 
manages to ciýcompass both - neatly side-stepping the problem. We believe that this 
ambiguity is the root of successful mathematical thinking. It enables the process of 
mathematics to be tained into a state of subjection. 
(Gray & Tall, 1991, p. 2) 
In practice then, for the successful mathematician, since the same notation can be used 
to represent the process or the product of that process, there is hardly a variation 
between the two. 
Such ambiguous use of symbols for process and concept pervades the whole of 
mathematics: 
The symbol 5+4 represents both the process of adding through 
counting all or counting on and the concept of suin (5+4 is 9), 
The symbol 4x3 stands for the process of repeated addition "four 
multiplied by three" which must be carried out to produce the product 
of four and three which is the number 12. 
The symbol 3/4 stands for both the process of division and the 
concept of fraction, 
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The symbol +4 stands for both the process of "addfoue, or shift four 
units along the number line, and the concept of the positive number 
+4, 
The symbol -7 stands for both the process of "subtract seven", or 
shift seven units in the opposite direction along the number line, and 
the concept of the negative number -7, 
The algebraic symbol 3x+2 stands both for the process "add three 
times x and two" and for the product of that process, the expression 
&'3x+2", 
The trigonometric ratio sine opposite represents both the hypotenuse 
process for calculating the sine of an angle and its value, 
The function notation f(X)=X2-3 simultaneously tells both how to 
calculate the value of the function for a particular value of x and 
encapsulates the complete concept of the function for a general value 
of X, 
An "infinite' decimal representation 7c=3.14159... is both a process of 
approximating 7c by calculating ever more decimal places and the 
specific numerical limit of that process, 
The notation lim f(x) represents both the process of tending to a limit x4a 
and the concept of the value of the limit, 
Within the context of the analysis given in Chapter 5 it is conjectured that the 'above- 
average' ability children, instead of having to cope consciously with the duality of 
concept and process, think ambiguously about the symbolism for product and process. 
They simplify "the cognitive complexity ofprocess-concept duality by the notational 
convenience ofprocess-product ambiguiV' (Gray & Tall, in press). 
It is conjectured that the children who formed sections of the sample considered within 
Chapter 5 provide examples of the qualitatively different thinking that stems from the 
ability or inability to interpret symbolism in such an ambiguous way. For example 
James (8+) gave an almost instantaneous response to the sum 6+3. When asked how 
he did it he replied "Well its easy isn't it. Three threes are nine aren't they? " Faced with 
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3+2 such a child might see 3 as "one more than 2", he might know the double 2+2=4 
and hence derive the fact that 3+2 is "one more", namely 5. Such ability provides a 
powerful feedback loop using known facts to derive new known facts and develops 
great flexibility. The addition of 3+2 may be seen equivalently as 2+3=5,5 -2=3, 
allowing subtraction to be seen as directly related to addition giving a fluent and easy 
way to develop subtraction facts. 
It is conjectured that the seeming inability of the below-average children to recognise 
the object1process ambiguity contained within mathematics symbolism encourages them 
to use a procedure as a fall back to knowing a combination. Thus 5 is the process of 
counting five ones or it is "5": it does not signal 3+2,6 -1 etc. 
6.3 THE NOTION OF PROCEPT 
Within Chapter 2 we saw how the contemporary view of Piaget's notions of "actions" 
and "actions as thematised objects of thought" is expressed by the contemporary 
notions of "procedurar' and "conceptual". We have also seen within Chapter 2 how the 
transformation between the two forms of knowledge has been variously described as 
&encapsulation', 'reification' and 'entification'. The need to see the two forms of 
knowledge bridged through such processes as encapsulation etc. implies that there is a 
permanent dichotomy between notions of process and concept. Yet, we have just seen 
how a mathematical symbol can represent both at one and the same time. 
In an attempt to consider children's behaviour in an integrated way it has been felt 
necessary to introduce new language for a theoretical construct which draws together 
the procedural and conceptual possibilities that are represented by symbolism. A 
mathematical symbol cannot be described as a concept since a concept is an idea held 
within the mind of an individual. We have already noted how symbolism allows the 
compression of a considerable amount of information in a small space. It is the means 
through which complex ideas, which include any procedural aspects which led to the 
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formulation of the symbolism, can be chunked and represented and then manipulated 
as an object. Thus symbolism may evoke either conceptual considerations or procedural 
considerations. The actions of the children reported within Chapter 5 indicates that they 
used one or other or both of these considerations. Whichever they used was triggered 
by their interpretation of the qualities inherent within symbolism - it either evoked an 
automatic response (which, as has already been indicated can cloud the theoretical 
issues), indicated something to do, for example, count, or signalled a relationship 
which was used to resolve a problem. Since a mathematical symbol can be seen as a 
carrier of two notions and an individual interprets symbolism to use one or both of 
these notions, it is felt essential to furnish the cognitive combination of process and 
concept with its own terminology. 
As a first step towards this terminology, and in an attempt to: 
(i) see it in a way which reflects the cognitive reality, and 
(ii) avoid the complexities of a two phase definition which becomes more 
complex. 
(Gray & Tall, in press) present the notion of an elementary procept . This is identified 
as the amalgam of three components; the process which produces a mathematical object 
and the symbol which is used to represent either the process or object. 
This preliminary definition allows the symbolism to evoke either process or concept, so 
that a symbol such as 5 can evoke either the process of counting five or the concept of 
'5'; 2+3 can be seen to evoke either the process of addition of the two numbers or the 
concept of sum 
But not only is a single symbol viewed in a flexible way but the same object can be 
represented symbolically in different ways. These are often seen, not only as different 
processes to give the same object, but as different names for the same object. In order 
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to reflect this growing flexibility of the notation and the versatility of thinking processes 
that encompass such relationships, the definition is refined so that: 
a procept consists of the collection of 'elementary procepts' which have the same 
object. 
The development of a two stage definition is an attempt to avoid the complexities of a 
definition that, in the first instance, identifies "procepf', and then take this definition a 
stage further to identify, for example, a "complex procepf '. In particular the two phase 
definition as given encompasses the growing compressibility of knowledge 
characteristic of successful mathematicians. 
Thus we can talk about the procept 6. It includes the process of counting 6, and a 
collection of other representations such as 3+3,4 + 2,2 + 4,2 x 3,8 - 2, etc. All 
of these symbols may be considered to represent the same object, yet indicate the 
flexible way in which "six" may be decomposed and recomposed using different 
processes. 
A procept, then, is a special kind of concept: one in which appropriate symbolism is 
used to evoke either a process or the object produced by that process. It is an extremely 
powerful kind of concept, for it embodies a procedure to be able to compute the product 
and it is a mental object that can be manipulated at a higher level. The procept 2+3 
represents both the process of calculating the sum of 2 add 3 (perhaps by counting), 
and also the expression which can be manipulated as part of a larger expression such as 
(2 + 3) - (2 + 1). 
It is to be hoped that the elementary procept grows in richness as the individual's 
knowledge grows, so that the procept "Y' includes not only the result of the process 
4+1, but also 3+2. As processes 4+1 and 3+2 are quite different: the first might count- 
on one from four, the second counts on two from three. However, as outputs, they are 
the same thing. For these to be seen as representing the same underlying procept 
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requires a degree of flexible thinking; a procept can be decomposed in different ways, 
be reorganised and transformed into an equivalent symbolism which represents a 
different process but the same product. A procept is envisaged as being plastic - 
something flexible that can be re-moulded and reconstructed at will. In such a way the 
various different forms combine to give a rich conceptual structure in which the symbol 
5 expresses all of these links, the conceptual ones and the procedural ones, the 
processes and the product of those processes. 
The use of the notion of procept can to produce a theoretical synthesis of the 
development of arithmetical concepts. 
6.4 PROCEDURAL AND PROCEPTUAL THINKING 
The fundamentally different ways of thinking exhibited by children performing 
arithmetic usually represented by the terms procedural and conceptual, may be 
described more incisively as procedural and proceptual. Proceptual thinking includes 
the use of procedures. However, it also includes the flexible facility to view symbolism 
either as a trigger for carrying out a procedure or as the representation of a mental object 
which may be decomposed, recomposed and manipulated at a higher level. This 
ambiguous use of symbolism is at the root of powerful mathematical thinking to 
overcome the limited capacity of short-term memory. It enables a symbol to be 
maintained in short-term memory in a compact form for mental manipulation or to 
trigger a sequence of actions in time to carry out a mathematical process. It includes 
both concepts to b? ow and processes to do. 
The need for flexibility in arithmetic is a regular feature in the literature. For instance, 
Steffe, Richards & von Glaserfeld (1981) and Fuson, Richards & Briars (1982) 
suggest that the use of the sequence of number words for the solution of addition and 
subtraction problems leads to the understanding that addition and subtraction are 
inverse operations, and this contributes to the flexibility of solving addition and 
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subtraction problems. However, proceptual, flexibility gives new insight. The existence 
of flexible proceptual knowledge means not only that the number 5 can be seen as 
3+2 or 2+3 but that if 3 and something makes 5, then the "something" must be 2. 
When thinking proceptually, addition and subtraction are so closely linked that 
subtraction is simply a flexible reorganisation of addition facts. 
6.5 THE GROWTH OF PROCEPTUAL THINKING IN ARITHMETIC 
The procedural and conceptual approaches that children use to form the sum of two or 
more amounts introduced through word problems have already been documented (for 
example, Fuson, 1982; Carpenter et al, 1981,1982) and identified within Chapter 4. 
Translating some or all of these approaches into a framework for cognitive development 
has been the focus of these and other studies (Herscovics & Bergeron, 1983; Secada, 
Fuson and Hall, 1983; Gray, 1991; Fuson & Fuson, 1992). 
Although even finer gradations of these categories have been proposed (e. g.. Steffe et 
al, 1982), and these can be helpful in distinguishing the development of children's 
thinking processes, the underlying theme within this study has been to view the 
approaches children use to solve basic arithmetic combinations in an integrated manner 
so that the distinctions between procedural and conceptual thinking may remain to the 
fore. Now the notion of procept is used to conceptualise the cognitive development in 
an integrated manner, referring only to the growing facility for compression of ideas 
from procedures of counting to the procept of number. However it should be 
recognised that this is a coarse analysis that builds upon the fine grained analyses of, 
for example, Steffe et al (1982) and Carpenter et al (198 1), but it perhaps goes some 
way towards explaining the divergent thinking identified within the last chapter. 
By both utilising the summary given by Carpenter, Moser & Hiebert (1981) and 
resorting to analysis of the evidence given within Chapter 5 it is specified that the 
procedure of "count-all" consists of three separate sub-procedures: count the first set, 
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count the second set, then combine the sets as a single set and count all the objects 
(figure 6.1). 
Count-all] 
three plus two is: one two thme one two 
IPROCED plus IPROCEDURE I 
gives 00000 
one two thme four five 
IPROCEDURE 
Figure 6.1: count-all as a combination of procedures 
It is conjectured that the most salient memory that the child has of this process is the 
final object counted. This represents the value of the set which is the union of two sets 
formed from the two sub procedures which involved counting two and counting three. 
The total of this set, five, is the last point of reference for the child. Since such a 
procedure occurs in time, it is hypothesised that any proceptual relationship between the 
input (3 plus 2) and the output (5) is likely to obscured by the lengthy counting routine 
used to obtain the solution. The nature of such a procedure can mitigate against the 
encapsulation of 3+2=5 as a known fact. It is suggested then, that count-all is a 
procedure which extends the counting process and is unlikely to lead directly to an 
encapsulated procept. Within Chapter 5 we have already noted that there was no 
evidence of the use of a derived fact by a child who used count-all or take-away. 
The count-on procedure is a more sophisticated strategy than count-all (see, for 
example, Secada, Fuson & Hall, 1983; Carpenter 1986; Baroody & Ginsburg, 1986; 
Gray 1991). The notion of elementary procept helps the analysis of cognitive 
development that may arise from implementing the procedure. To one number, the 
second is added through a count-on procedure. (We have seen how it is actually a 
sophisticated double-counting procedure where 3+2 involves saying "four, five" 
whilst simultaneously keeping track that "two" extra numbers are being counted (e. g. 
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Steffe et al, 198 1). Count-on is therefore seen as an elementary procept plus procedure, 
one number is incremented in ones to form a successive series of elementary procepts 
through a counting procedure (figure 6-2). 
Count 
three plu f two is: (three) four five 
I PROCEPTI plus IPROCED 
Figure 6.2: counting-on as procept plus procedure 
It is suggested that "count-on" as a procedure can have two qualitatively different 
outcomes, as a (counting) procedure of addition or as the procept of sum. 
(i) Count-on as procedure is essentially a compression of count-all into a 
shorter procedure. It remains a procedure that takes place in time so that 
the child is able to compute the result without necessarily linking input 
and output in a form that will be remembered as a new fact. It is 
conjectured that some children - often those with a limited array of 
known facts - may become so efficient in counting, that they use it as a 
universal method that does not involve them in the risk of attempting to 
use a limited number of known facts (see also Steinberg, 1985). 
Count-on leading to procept produces a result that is seen both as a 
counting procedure and a number concept. The notation 3+2 is seen 
to represent both the process of addition and the product of that process, 
the sum. 
When input numbers and their sum can be held in the mind simultaneously then the 
result is a meaningful known fact which may be envisioned as a flexible combination of 
procept and procept to give a procept (figure 6.3). 
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Known Facýj] 
(0 0 CO' 00 *- 70) 
three plus two is: 3+25 
1 PRO plus I PROCEP: T] 
Figure 6.3: (Meaningful) known fact as procept plus prompt 
It is important here to distinguish between a meaningful "known facf ' generated by this 
flexible form of thinking and a fact that is remembered by rote. In any isolated incident 
such a distinction may be hard to make. The difference becomes more apparent when 
such facts are decomposed and recomposed to give "derived facts. " As we have seen 
merely "knowing facts" does not necessarily lead to "deriving facts". But the language 
used by children who do derive facts shows that they freely decompose and recompose 
the component parts in a proceptual way. For instance, faced with "four and five, " one 
may know that "four and four makes eight, " and respond that it is "one more, " which is 
"nine. " Some facts such as those for, say, "3 + 16 is 19" based on "3 +6 is 9, " can be 
so fast as to be virtually instantaneous. On occasion it may be difficult to distinguish 
between a "known fact' 'and a quickly constructed "derived fact. " 
When thinking procedurally, addition as "count-on" is considered to have subtraction 
as inverse through "count-back" or "count-up. " Within the context of this study we 
have already seen that children identified as 'below-average' often favour "count-back" 
as the natural reverse process even though its cognitive complexity is enonnous. Such a 
procedure, especially when carried out by less successful children, is highly prone to 
error. Because the proceptual thinker has a simpler task than the procedural thinker, the 
likely divergence between success and failure is widened. 
6.6 A PROCEPTUAL DIVIDE IN SIMPLE ARITHMETIC 
The snapshots presented within Chapter 5 present a picture of how children respond to 
basic number combinations if they cannot immediately retrieve them from memory. As 
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snapshots, it is conjectured that they provide an indication of what may he happening 
over a period of time. 
Figures 6.4 and 6.5 illustrate the ways strategies used by the more able and less able in 
the study diverge. 
LOWER AGE GROUP OF CHILDREN 7+ and 8+ 
I 
Category A Addition 
I Category B Addition Category C Addition 
5+0 0+2 4+4 2+1 8+2 6+3 7+2 4+5 3,5@12+110 +2 18+2 14+4 3+16 15+4 13+51 8+6 4+7 9+8 
Percentage 
0- Above 
of children 20- 
Average 
rnaldng use 40 - 
Ability 
I particular r'O - 
Children 








5+0 0+2 4+ 4 2ý 1 H-1 +45 14, -1 A+ 16 1+418,6 4, H 
Category A Addition Category B Addition 
Category G 
Addition 
MIDDLE AGE GROUP OF CHILDREN 9+ and 10+ 
1 11 Category C CaleqorN/ A Addition Category B Addition Addition 
,0 0-) 4ý4 1 6,3 7+2 1+5112+11001812 14+4 3,1(ý 1 11R, t, 
4ý7 9.8 
Percentage Above 
of children verage 
making use 4() - 
Ability 
of particular f 
Children 
strategies N8 
10(, - Holow 






0 4,4 2+1 8+2 6+3 7+2 4, ', 4+79+8 (,. ttegory C 
- Category A Addition Category B Addition Addition 
UPPER AGE GROUP OF CHILDREN 11+ and 12+ 
129 
Known Facts E= 
Derived E= Count-on M Count-all= Errors=3 I Fads 
I 
Figure 6.4: Divergingapproaches Io basic addition combinafions: Age and abifily compitfisons. 
They pair age groups together, two years at a time to give more viable group sizes. 
Combinations are arranged in order of difficulty, established by considering the overall 
percentage of children within the sample who responded to individual combinations 
through the use of known facts. The categories of combinations are as those previously 
identified within Chapter 4. 
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Figurc 6.5: Divaging approaches to basic subtraction combinations: Agc and abilily comparisons. 
The graphs not only illustrate differences between the 'below-average' and the 'above- 
average' children but also how individual combinations evoke different particular 
responses, and within each group a different mix of integrated strategies. The 'above- 
average' children show a high incidence of known facts and how much of what they do 
not know is derived. The 'below-average' rarely use derived facts, instead they almost 
always count. 
The combinations involving single digits and a sum between 10 and 20 evoke the use 
of derived facts by the upper age group of 11 and 12 year old children. At the other 
extreme the successful procedural methods used by the youngest 'below-average' 
children to obtain solutions to number combinations to ten fail to generalise and provide 
some of them with a means of obtaining solutions to combinations to twenty. 
An additional feature of the graphs indicates that within the field of basic number 
combinations, even when a group of 'below-average' children know approximately the 
same proportion of known facts they do not use derived facts as a prominent back-up 
strategy to obtain facts they do not know. This feature is illustrated if we compare the 
youngest 'above-average' group with the eldest 'below-average' children. Even when 
they know a substantial number of combinations the 'below-average' make little use of 
derived facts. It would seem that even when the children close the achievement gap they 
are doing things differently. 
Proceptual thinking includes the meaningful use of known facts to arrive at solutions 
through derived facts. It may also include the use of a procedure. A single item analysis 
of children's responses may not be sufficient to allow a distinction to be made - how 
do we distinguish between a rote learned fact and a meaningful known fact? If a child 
uses a procedure to solve one problem does that mean that the next problem will also be 
solved procedurally? Only through analysis of the solution strategies to a range of 
problems may we get our answer. We may then see either the flexibility, which is a 
keynote of the proceptual interplay between conceptual and procedural methods, or the 
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limitations imposed by the reliance on fixed counting procedures. It is conjectured that 
the latter may provide considerable success at one level but may ultimately lack the 
generality to lead to success in more sophisticated problems. 
The empirical evidence obtained from the snapshots presented within Chapter 5 
therefore tends to support the hypothesis that there is a qualitatively different approach 
to simple arithmetic between children who tend to display the use of more flexible 
proceptual techniques (including the selection of more appropriate procedures) and 
those who rely upon flexible procedural methods of counting. 
Proceptual thinking appears to be a quality demonstrated by the more successful. 
Flexible back-up strategies used by them produce new known facts from old, giving a 
built-in feedback loop which acts as an autonomous knowledge generator. Many of the 
least successful have only a back-up strategy which is a procedure of counting. Ibis 
can grow ever more lengthy as the problems grow more complex. In between these 
extremes, the less able who do attempt to derive facts from a limited range of known 
facts may end up following an inventive but tortuous route that succeeds only with the 
greatest effort. The high sense of risk generated may then lead to such a child falling 
back to the security of counting. It is therefore hypothesised that what might be a 
continuous spectrum of performance tends to become a dichotomy in which those who 
begin to fail are consigned to become procedural. It is believed that this bifurcation of 
strategy - between flexible use of number as object or process and fixation on 
procedural counting - is one of the most significant factors in the difference between 
success and failure. The divergence that stems from such a bifurcation is termed the 
Proceptual &vide. 
6.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Throughout history the mathematics of those cultures that emphasised the use of 
procedures without an effective symbolism to communicate their ideas has been 
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doomed to failure. The invention of symbolism provided mathematicians with the 
means of representing processlobject ambiguity; the outcome of procedures used to 
assess, compare and generalise the logic and order of the environment was represented 
within a symbol which also provided a sense of how the outcome was obtained. This 
ambiguity is seen in symbolism that represents, for example, number, the numerical 
processes, measurement and algebra. Those fortunate enough to maintain sight of this 
ambiguity continue to develop and utilise the power of symbolism. It is hypothesised 
that the notion of procept provides a new way of interpreting the mathematical 
proficiency of the more able whilst at the same time providing some explanation for the 
difficulties of the less able. It provides a means of expressing the cognitive 
development which gives power to the more able and exhibits their diversion away 
from the procedural cul-de-sac that, it is suggested, is the inevitable destination of the 
less able. 
It is hypothesised the divergence between those who think proceptually and those who 
think procedurally stems from the qualitative difference that may arise through the use 
of count-on. Although it may be the source for short term success a longer term 
prognosis may lead to a very different outcome. 
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CHAPTER 7 
POINT OF DEPARTURE: A QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
OF ARITHMETIC ACHIEVEMENT 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Within the previous chapter the qualitative differences in the theoretical distinction 
between procedural and proceptual thinking were introduced. The notion of proceptual 
was ascribed to thinking which was characterised through the flexible use of symbols 
used to denote process or object. Within the framework of this form of thinking, count- 
on may be viewed as process which can become encapsulated in the concept of sum. 
Within in the context of procedural thinking, count-on is identified as a procedure 
which though it may provide a successful means of resolving basic number 
combinations it may not be encapsulated into the concept of sum. 
Similar distinctions in thinking may be applied to the process of subtraction. In 
proceptual terms subtraction is another way of viewing addition facts. In procedural 
terms, the reverse of the count-on procedure is count-back. This is a much more 
difficult operation to carry out. 
The experiment reported within this chapter is partially designed to replicate the study 
reported within Chapter 5 but more particularly it is designed to consider the issues 
raised within Chapter 5 within the context of children's level of mathematical 
achievement. Within the chapter the theoretical distinctions between procedural and 
proceptual thinking are used to analyse the arithmetical achievement of a class of 
children. The children were initially interviewed at the age of approximately seven, and 
then, they were interviewed 10 months later. It is hypothesised that distinctions made 
between children in terms of arithmetical achievement may ignore distinctions that may 
be determined from the quality of their arithmetical thinking. The chapter provides 
evidence which highlights the freedom that is available to children who may be 
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described as proceptual thinkers, and contrasts this with the sometimes hard-won 
success or failure that may be achieved by children for whom arithmetic is a sequence 
of procedures. By considering the responses made by a class of children to the items 
within the Mathematics Assessment Tasks used in 1992, the evidence indicates that at 
the age of seven, children who achieved Level 2 may have done so through procedural 
or proceptual thinking. Those who achieved Level 3 did so through using the flexibility 
attached to the notion of proceptual thinking. 
7.2 CONTEXT OF THE ANALYSIS 
Children who are around seven years of age, identified as Y2 within the English and 
Welsh school system, now face Standard Attainment Tasks (SAT's) designed to 
measure their level of attainment in a range of Mathematics Attainment Targets 
(MAT's). Depending on their degree of success or otherwise, the result of a SAT 
provides an indication of a child's level of competence at a particular task. After the 
analysis of their results, children within the current sample were placed at one of three 
levels as a result of achievement on a criterion linked SAT - thus a child may be 
identified as having achieved Level 1, Level 2, or Level 3. This scale identifies the 
levels of competence expected of the average seven year old who would normally be 
expected to achieve a Level 2 standard of attainment. However, it is worth noting that 
specification of these levels of attainment does not arise from the standardisation 
normally associated with the use of objective tests. The levels of attainment must be 
seen as manifestations of a child's ability to match a set of criteria that are established 
subjectively within a somewhat traditional framework (e. g. Board of Education, 1905). 
Within the current discussion, the notion of achievement is restricted to an analysis of 
some of the numerical components of the Key Stage I series of SAT's. A child who 
satisfied the Level 2 requirement within these components will be considered to achieve 
the 'average' level of attainment. Those who do not achieve Level 2 will be identified as 
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'below-average', whilst those who achieve higher than level 2 will be deemed 'above- 
average'. 
Although the MAT's cover a range of mathematical areas - Number, Shape and Space, 
Data Handling, Algebra and Measurement -a compulsory component of the MAT's is 
the numerical component. One Statement of Attainment (SoA) required for the 
achievement of Level 2 is that the child "knows and uses the addition and subtraction 
facts to terf ' (D. E. S., 1989, Ma3/2a, p. 9), whilst an equivalent statement of attainment 
for Level 3 indicates that the child should demonstrate that (s)he 'knows and uses the 
addition and subtraction number facts to twenty' (D. E. S., 1989, Ma3/3a, p. 9). 
7.3 METHOD 
The responses made by children within a mixed ability class (N=29), aged between 6 
years 8 months and 7 years 7 months (7+), to the numerical components of a series of 
Standard Assessment Tasks (SAT), (SEAC, 1992a, 1992b, 1992c) were considered. 
The children's level of attainment within the formal element of the SAT was matched 
with their responses in individual interviews carried out: 
(i) in May 1992 and within a period of three weeks of the formal testing. 
Oi) over a three week period during March 1993. 
In the course of the discussion the children's age as a result of the second series of 
interviews will be deemed as 8+ 
The tests were administered at the end of April, 1992. The numerical aspects, 
compulsory components of the 1991 Mathematics Assessment Tasks (MAT), which 
also included the option of Data Handling or Probability, included addition and 
subtraction number combinations, within a contextual situation and in a context free 
situation. Assessment through the context free SAT's was aimed at the children's 
ability to recall number facts without calculating (S. E. A. C, 1992a). It is the children's 
responses to the four context free components that form the basis for the ensuing 
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discussion. Both the formal testing, carried out by the class teacher, and the individual 
interviews, conducted by myself, were recorded on video. During the individual 
interviews the children were presented with the same combinations under similar 
conditions to the formal testing but they were then invited to consider how particular 
solutions were obtained. The strategies used by the children were noted in the way 
outlined in Section 4.5. Validation of many of the strategies used by individual children 
was through the independent assessment of colleagues. 
On both occasions the combinations were presented orally. During the individual 
interviews this oral presentation matched that of the class teacher who carried out the 
formal testing. Addition combinations such as 5+4, were presented as "5 add 4" 
whilst subtraction combinations of the form 4-3 were presented as "4 take away 3". 
During the formal testing solutions were written, during individual interviews solutions 
were given orally. In the manner of the formal test, children were not provided with 
counting aids. 
During the formal test it was envisaged that maximum time allowed for each item was 
to be five seconds - in practice this turned out to be eight seconds. During the 
individual interviews, since the time to respond to each item between its delivery and 
the child's first response was recorded, breaches of the five second limit could be 
identified. 
For a child to achieve a level of attainment only one error in addition and one error in 
subtraction at a particular level was allowed. To attempt the Level 2 tasks children had 
to satisfy the criteria for the achievement of Level I- "they could add and subtract 
objects where the numbers involved were no greater than ten". As a result of their 
responses children were identified as having the following levels of achievement in the 
statements of attainment under consideration: 
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Level 2 (L2): children had achieved Level 1 and illustrated that they were able to 
"recall the number combinations to ten without calculation" 
(S. E. A. C. 1992a, pp 36-37; S. E. A. C. 1992b, pp 30-31) 
The combinations considered as part of this SAT were: 
Addition: I+6; 5+4; 3+7; 4+3; 1+5; 6+2; 4+4 
Subtraction: 9-6; 8-2; 5-3; 7-5; 9-4; 4-3; 10-7 
Level 3 (L3): the children achieved Level 2 and they illustrated that they were able 
to "recall the number combinations to twenty without calculation" 
(S. E. A. C. 1992a, pp 39-40; 1992b, pp 34-35). 
The combinations considered as part of this SAT were: 
Addition: 9+6; 8+ 10; 4+ 11; 7+7; 15 + 2; 17 +0 
Subtraction: 19 - 13; 18 - 10; 20 - 5; 17 - 6; 11 - 9; 15 -0 
7.4 SUCCESS AND FAILURE AT SEVEN 
The analysis of both test video and interview video indicates that for many of the 
children, even though the purpose of the time limit was to prevent calculation, counting 
was the dominant means through which solutions were obtained. The overt actions of 
many of the children during the formal test and the individual interview included 
perceptual representation of numerical equivalents and finger counting. Arguably, such 
actions should have negated any responses within the formal test. Motor acts or abstract 
counting would not have been noticed by the class teacher. Only through the ensuing 
individual interviews was it possible to identify those children who obtained solutions 
through "knowing" and those who obtained solutions through a less overt form of 
counting. Overall there was very little evidence of count-all amongst the children 
7.4.1 Failure to Achieve 'Average' Attainment 
The five children who were unsuccessful at level 2, not only failed to recall the 
solutions to most of the number combinations but they attempted to use a procedure 
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which also failed; it was either inefficient or too lengthy to satisfy the criteria that 
solutions must be given within five seconds. For example, Simon during the formal 
test component attempted to obtain solutions using his fingers to support a count-all 
procedure. His procedure was so inefficient and lengthy that he not only ran out of time 
to obtain a solution but his concentration on the application of the procedure to solve 
one combination inevitably meant that he also failed to hear the first part of a 
subsequent one. Joanne used her fingers to support her efforts to obtain the solution to 
3+7 by counting-on seven from three. She was very slow and illustrated no overall 
pattern when tagging her extended fingers. Although she recited the number words in 
sequence each finger was indicated (through a slight movement) and tagged in a quite 
arbitrary way. Her lengthy procedure gave the solution "8". Joseph, on the other hand, 
tried to carry out all of the counting in his head with no external physical support. He 
complained during the formal test because he couldn't keep up. 'Mere is no evidence to 
indicate whether he was attempting count-all or count-on. Whichever, he found his 
strategy very hard and would sit for extended periods with no obvious sign of action 
but he ...... liked trying to do things my head. I like them to be harder because when I 
grow up I will be able to do harder things. " Interestingly, during the 1993 interviews 
Joseph continued to use the same procedures for the same reasons. In 1992 he failed to 
obtain the solution to any of the L2 addition or subtraction combinations but he was a 
little more successful in 1993. 
7.4.2 The Success of the 'Average' Child 
Relatively few of the combinations were known as facts by seventeen children who 
achieved Level 2 in 1992. Addition combinations were only completely known by one 
child, two knowing three or less, the remainder knowing between three and six out of 
the total of seven. No child knew all of the subtraction combinations, seven knew one 
or less - five none of them - and the remainder knowing between 2 and 5, again out of 
a total of seven. Their competent use of procedures allowed these children to achieve 
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Level 2. The procedures were generally compatible with those used by children who 
had failed to achieve level 2, the essential difference being that they were more efficient. 
Count-on was the dominant procedure used for addition and usually fingers were used 
very effectively as referents to support the counting. Most frequently a set of ringers 
equivalent to the amount to be counted-on was subitised prior to incremental tagging 
from the value of the first set. 
A complementary approach was frequently used for the subtraction combinations - 
children used fingers to aid counting back from the value of the larger set and, in a very 
few cases, to check the amount counted up from the small set to the large set. 
However, many children used an approach which involved a subitised display of the 
large amount (minuend) on their fingers, subitising and bending the number of fingers 
equivalent to the value of the smaller set (subtrahend) and subitising of the value of the 
remainder. This strategy is termed enactive subitising following Bruner's (1962) notion 
of enactive. Within this approach, which involved no actual counting, a child seemed 
to need visual support of the numbers in a concrete form; to see, for example, that four 
take away three is one. Modifications of this approach, not termed enactive subitising, 
included counting the value of the subtrahend prior to subitising the remainder. 
Whereas 'below-average' children always tried to use the same procedure, without the 
necessary procedural competence, amongst the 'average' group of children there was 
more evidence an integrated combination of strategies. For example Rebecca and Tara 
used an integrated combination of strategies which involved counting, enactive 
subitising and knowing. Rebecca very quickly used her fingers to count-on and obtain 
solutions to the addition number combinations she could not recall. She completed each 
problem within 5 seconds. For those subtraction solutions she could not recall she used 
enactive subitising. Tara knew most of the addition combinations to ten but again used 
enactive subitising for the subtraction ones. 
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An indication that a child had achieved Level 2 standard of attainment in basic arithmetic 
takes no account of the means through which the children reached this level of 
achievement. Success at Level 2 does not distinguish children such as the above from 
children who solved every Level 2 combination by recalling the related addition and 
subtraction facts. Ile procedural efficiency of many of the children within the 'average' 
group had the potential of clouding the whole issue of achievement at Level 2. It was 
only when the children began to attempt the level 3 stage that the consequences of these 
differences began to emerge. 
7.4.3 Success and Failure at Level 3 
For many children, failure to evoke the recall of a number combination to twenty 
evoked highly idiosyncratic procedures. Some were so inefficient that even when they 
provided a successful outcome they generously exceeded the time constraints. The 
general pattern that emerged from all of the children who achieved success with the 
number combinations to ten but failed to achieve success at level 3 was that they 
recalled solutions to combinations such as 17 + 0,7 +7 and 15 -0 but for most of the 
others i. e. 9+6,4 + 11,15 + 2,17 - 6,11 - 9, and even 18 - 10 they attempted to use 
a counting procedure. 
The success of those children who achieved Level 3 did not arise immediately from the 
combinations they knew but from their flexibility in obtaining a solution. Indeed, one 
child failed to directly recall any Level 2 subtraction combination-he used related 
addition combinations. He had known six out of seven of those. Another knew most of 
the combinations at both levels but if immediate retrieval failed him he displayed a 
considerable degree of flexibility, particularly to solve the Level 3 combinations: 
* For 9+6 he described his solution by saying, 
"You get nine, add one to make ten, and then add five. " 
* For 19 - 13 he described his approach by saying, 
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"You have thirteen and count on to the nineteen-you add some of the nineteen 
onto the thirteen. " 
* For 11-9 he, 
"... took one away from the eleven. That leaves ten. You take one away from 
that and that leaves nine. " 
Simon and Jacob also demonstrated some flexibility. Simon, for example, recalled all 
of the solutions to the level 2 combinations. To obtain the solution to 17 -6 he counted 
back six from seventeen When attempting 20-5 he knew that "fifteen add five is twenty 
so twenty take away five is fifteen". 
7.4.4 An Interim Conclusion 
In the absence of the ability to recall a combination some children attempted to use 
counting procedures that totally failed them, they did not achieve Level 2. Many 
children had developed procedures that though they proved successful at Level 2, the 
children were not able to generalise them to the Level 3 combinations. Others who had 
developed procedural competence to achieve Level 2 failed at Level 3 because their 
procedure was not efficient. Those who did achieve Level 3 appeared to do so with 
relative ease even though, on one or two occasions, they too used counting. Some 
children were able to recognise the limitations of their counting procedure within the 
framework of the time constraints and consequently did not use it if they felt it was an 
unreasonable approach. Jacob didn't do 19-13 because "... it was a bit too hard and I 
knew I couldn't count it in quickly ". 
The distinctions in achievement between procedural and proceptual thinking were 
clouded at a level where procedural thinkers could succeed through procedural 
competence. At the next higher level it was those who had demonstrated a flexible 
approach at Level 2, the proceptual thinkers, who achieved success at Level 3. 
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7.5 THE USE OF PROCEDURES THAT ARE COUNT BASED 
Almost every child who responded to the series of attainment tasks used some form of 
counting to solve at least one combination within either the level 2 or the level 3 
components. 
Figure 7.1 illustrates the overall percentage of number combinations attempted through 
the use of a counting procedure during the individual interviews in May 1992. Figure 
7.2 shows the percentage of occasions when these attempts provided a successful 
outcome in that the solution to a combination was obtained within 5 seconds. Had this 
time limit been strictly adhered to during the formal aspect of the test it is suggested that 
five children who achieved level 2 may not have done so. Those who achieved level 3 
obtained at least 6 of the 7 solutions for the Level 2 combinations within 5 seconds 
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Figure 7.1: Percentage of solutions to basic number combinations attempted through counting 
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Figure 7.2: Ile percentage of counted solutions that led to success. 
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Although the percentages presented in the above graphs can be somewhat misleading - 
contrast the 66% success rate within the time limit of the 'above-average' children 
solving the level 3 subtraction combinations (representing four successful procedures 
out of six that were used) with the 74% success rate of the 'average' group on the level 
2 subtraction combinations (representing 73 successful procedures out of 98 used) - of 
particular interest is the overall extent in which counting was used and the extent with 
which it led to success. The difference in the extent to which counting was used at 
Level 2 between those who did not achieve L2, those who achieved Level 2 but not 
Level 3, and those who achieved L3, is particularly striking. The use of a counting 
procedure not only declined the higher the level of attainment the child achieved, but the 
procedural efficiency and generalisability of procedures used by children who achieved 
Level 3 was likely to be an improvement upon the procedures of the children who failed 
to achieve this level. Not only did children who achieved level 3 use counting less 
frequently than the other children but when they used it was more likely to lead to 
success. Compared to those children who did not achieve Level 3, the 'above average' 
children demonstrated that generally they possessed a procedural competence that 
transcended arithmetical difficulty. 
7.5.1 Procedural Efficiency-Addition and Subtraction Combinations to 
Ten. 
Figures 7.3 and 7.4 show the approximate periods of time that it took during the 
individual interviews each child who counted to complete their procedure. Periods of 
time were taken from the end of the interviewers verbal presentation of the combination 
to the start of the first spoken response of the child. They were recorded on the video. 
Children had been told to respond to each problem as quickly as they could. It is not 
claimed that these times are necessarily accurate, particularly those that are very short, 
for example, those up to three seconds. Margins of error could be such that to make too 
much of the distinctions between them would lead to erroneous conclusions. However, 
144 
as the length of time taken to resolve a combination increases such errors will become 
marginalised. It is a sense of the time taken by different groups to provided a solution 
to a combination that it is wished to communicate within the discussion. 
In both figures the number combinations are arranged from left to right to reflect the 
numbers of children that solved the particular combination through the use of a 
counting procedure. 
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Figure 7.3: Time taken for seven year old children to complete addition procedures. 
We see immediately the excessive period of time it took the children who did not 
succeed at level 2 to use their procedure. In contrast, only in two instances could the 
length of time used with an addition procedure have had an affect on the success or 
otherwise formally recorded for children who achieved level 2. It is interesting too to 
note the time that those who achieved Level 3 took over their count-up procedure. 
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Denotes child who took in excess of 30 secs for a particular combination. 
It was diff icult to assess the strategy that this child used to solve the 
combinations. The time element involved implies that counting, of some 
form was used. The mean time given for the below average group of 
children excludes the times taken by this child. 
Denotes response given through count-up 
? Strategy not identified 
Figure 7A Tune taken for seven year old children to carry out subtraction procedures 
Table 7.5 indicates the mean times taken for each group to solve individual 
combinations. 
It is not appropriate to consider whether differences between them are significant or 
not-it is the trend of the differences, together with a notion of the extent to wish 
procedures were used by each group that it is wished to communicate. 
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Table 7.5. Chromatographic summary of counting procedures used at Level 2 by 7+ children 
It has already been indicated that use of external referents characterised the counting 
procedures used by most of the 'average' and 'below-average' children but there was 
very little evidence if their use amongst the 'above-average' children. In one way it is 
their use and non use that may account for time differences. Amongst the 'below- 
average' group of children there seemed to be a lengthy period of time devoted to a 
procedural search. Time was expended looking for and consolidating the use of 
appropriate referents, even if such referents were always fingers. Initial tagging of the 
selected referents was always slow and frequently children had to be reminded of the 
combination they were dealing with. It would appear that the limits of short term 
memory were reached during the initial counting procedure. It is suggested, for 
example, that when some of the 'below-average' children attempted 9-6 the limits of 
short term memory were expended during the initial count of the nine. It is suggested 
that the children then had to spend time refocusing on the problem or requested that the 
problem be repeated. 
The lower mean times taken by the 'average' group can generally explained by their 
more efficient procedures, count-on in the case of addition and either count-back or 
take-away for subtraction. Enactive subitising proved to be very efficient. Tara, for 
example, used this procedure to obtain four of the seven solutions to the subtraction 
combinations within three seconds. Combinations that could be resolved through 
enactive subitising making use of only one hand e. g. 4-3,5 - 3, were solved quicker 
than those that involved two hands. Even the use of count-back meant that some of the 
combinations were solved within the time limit. 10 -7 and 9-6 are exceptions to these 
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generalisations. For example, some children who used enactive subitising seemed to 
have some motor difficulty in representing the nine and then concentrating on that 
without being distracted by the extra digit, usually the thumb. As a count-back 
procedure will influence the time taken to carry out the procedure (Woods et al 1975) 
we would expect these combinations to take the longest time. 
Where procedures were required amongst the 'above-average' children they proved to 
be efficient and unsupported by external referents. 'Choice' strategies identified by 
Woods et al were noted amongst the children within this group. There was no evidence 
of 'choice' amongst the 'average children'. 
7.5.2 Procedural Efficiency-Addition and Subtraction Combinations to 
Twenty. 
Children who did not achieve level 2 were not required to attempt level 3. 
At level 3,67% of the solutions were attempted through the use of procedures by the 
"average" group of children. Figure 7.1 indicates the extent to which these procedures 
led to success or failure. Although given an appropriate amount of time during the 
individual interviews many children demonstrated that their counting procedure could 
lead to a successful outcome, the "success" rate, given the time restriction, dropped 
dramatically. However, in only 40% of the cases where counting was used for addition 
was the outcome achieved within five seconds. Almost 50% of these cases were 
accounted for by a count-on procedure used for 15+2. In these successful cases the 
average success time was 3 seconds. Children who failed to resolve this combination 
within the time limit took up to 18 seconds which not only implies that the child used a 
counting procedure which involved at least 17 counts, that is, "one, two, 
three ..... fourteen, fifteen" and then "sixteen seventeen" but the child's explanation 
supported this view. 
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At least half of the 'average' children who used a counting procedure for any one 
combination apart from 15 +2 took in excess of 5 seconds. (17 +0 was known by all 
of the children). The mean times for these "slower" counting procedures being as in 
table 7.6. 
Counting procedures used for addition at level 2 were applied to the combinations at 
level 3. They were often were applied considerably slower. 
4+ 11 9+67 +7 8+ 10 
Total C ounted 15 151 41 --------- 
13 
VOW Count" 10 8 21 9. 
Mean slow count ----------- 15.7 11.751 12.51 12.8 
Table 7.6: Means of slower procedures used by children 
to obtain solutions to Level 3 addition combinations 
In some cases children illustrated similar difficulties to those experienced by the 
'below-average' children at level 2. Some of the 'average' group of children, 
particularly those who used count-all, had difficulty nominating items beyond ten that 
were to be tagged, a factor that caused difficulties for even more children when they 
attempted the subtraction combinations. 
73% of the solutions to subtraction combinations were attempted through the use of a 
counting procedure. Of these approximately 34% did not lead to a correct outcome, 
whilst 80% of those that did only did so by being carried out over an excessive length 
of time. For example, only two solutions provided for the two combinations 17 -6 and 
20 -5 were given in less than five seconds. A more detailed analysis of the length of 
time taken to obtain solutions indicates the difficulty children have with subtraction if it 
is seen in procedural tenns. 
Table 7.7 indicates the extent to which procedural methods were used to obtain 
solutions to the level 3 subtraction combinations during the individual interviews. 
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Table 73: Analysis of the success of procedures used by children 
to obtain solutions to Level 3 subtraction combinations 
17 -0 is not included in table 7.7 because all of the children knew the solution. 
Eleven children had successfully completed the requirement to have at least 5 of the 6 
Level 3 addition combination correct during the formal aspect of the SAT but the 
difficulty caused by the subtraction combinations for the 'average' children was 
indicated by the large number of incorrect or missing solutions to particular 
combinations. 
During the individual interviews almost half of the 'average' group attempted a take- 
away procedure for at least one combination. This presented particular difficulties for 
those who had successfully used enactive subitising at level 2. They appeared to have 
no effective strategy to resolve the level 3 subtraction combinations. Children who had 
successfully obtained the solution to 10 -7 using enactive subitising, could not take the 
next step and obtain the solution to 11 - 2. Enactive subitising, as used by these 
children, is a procedure that does not generalise. 
By far the most extensively used back up procedure for these subtraction combinations 
by the 'average' group was count-back. None of the 'average' ability children used 
count-up although two children used count-back-to on one occasion. 
We have discussed the cognitive complexity of count-back. Tbere were many examples 
to illustrate its diff iculties: 
* Richard tried to extend his count back procedure from the number combinations 
to ten to those between ten and twenty. He used his ringers to keep check of the 
amount counted but he could not remember the count back sequence so that his 
solution to 18 - 10 was 6 because: 
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" 17,16,15,14,13,12 ....... 9,8,7,6" 
* Christopher tried 19 - 13 through count back. His count back sequence was, 
"19,18,16,14 ..... no ... 15 ...... 14 ....... 14 ..... 
13,12 . ........ 
He gave the correct solution "six" but his procedure took 37 seconds. At the 
point where he made his error he had to create a loop; he moved from a count 
back sequence to a count up sequence and then to a count-back sequence. 
Many of those children who had achieved Level 2 had used an integrated strategy 
approach to solve the combinations which may have involved counting, subitising and 
knowing. Such a combinations was efficient enough to provide them with a level of 
achievement which satisfied the criteria for level 2. However, the procedures they used 
proved to be either too inefficient or lacked the generalisability to enable the children to 
obtain a spectrum of achievement which would enable them to satisfy criteria for 
level 3. 
The problem with these children being recognised as "successful" at level 2 was that 
their route to success did not distinguish them from those children who eventually went 
on to succeed at level 3. 
7.6 A PROCEPTUAL APPROACH 
As identified within the sample considered within Chapter 5a distinguishing factor 
between those who were identified as the 'above-average' and those who were 
identified as the 'average' was flexibility. Flexibility of approach was the feature 
distinguishing of the children eventually identified as 'above average' amongst this 
sample. This flexibility extended to the use of derived facts, extensively at level 3, and 
the use of the efficient counting procedures. These procedures do not extend to the use 
of enactive subitising. 
In comparison to children within the other two groups, whose integrated strategy 
approach could be surnmarised as knowing together with the use of a procedure, 
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children within the 'above-average' group tempered their use of procedural approaches 
by using a 'choice' model and through the use of derived facts. There was no evidence 
of the use of the latter amongst 'below-average' children and very limited evidence of 
its use amongst the 'average' children. The evidence of the use of derived facts 
amongst the 'average' children was restricted to five, only two of whom derived more 
than one solution. 
7.7 STRATEGY INTEGRATION: GROUP DIFFERENCES 
Figure 7.8 illustrate the cumulative percentages of strategies used by children in each of 
the three groups. The graphs for 1992 indicate the overall use of each strategy identified 
as a result of the first series of interviews, that is when the children ages ranged from 
between 6 years 8 months and 7 years 7 months. Those for 1993 indicate the use of 
strategies by groups containing the same children 10 months later-when the children 
were aged 7 years 6 months to 8 years 5 months. It is worth noting at this point that the 
children's level of achievement bore no relationship to their age. 
The trends that are apparent from the snap shots of the seven and eight-year-old 
children shown within figures 5.5 and 5.6 are also apparent amongst the seven and 
eight-year-old children within the current sample as seen in figure 7.8. Firstly, we see 
the extensive numbers of difficulties, indicated by errors, amongst the 'below-average' 
children and to a lesser extent the 'average' children. Secondly, there is the extensive 
use of take-away amongst the 'average' and 'below-average' children. Thirdly, only 
the 'above-average' children illustrate the extensive use of derived facts. 
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PERCENTAGES OF DIFFERENTSTRATEGIESUSED BY THREE GROUPS OF CHILDREN TO 013TAIN 
SOLUTIONS TOADDITION AND SUBTRACTION COMBINATIONS WITHIN KEY STAGE I MATHEMATICS 
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fact. We see that procedures tended to dominate the s(rategies used by tile 'averagc' 
group at 7+ and tend to be dominant again at 8+. This is the case even though in some 
instances by 8+ there seem to be conditions available which could promote tile use of* 
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7.8 THE PARTING OF THE WAYS 
Table 7.9 indicates the percentage change in the use of each successful strategy by each 
group of children between the ages of 7+ and 8+. Each of the general strategy 
classifications are specified; known facts (KF), derived facts (DF), count-on (CO) - 
note in this case CO is not only used for inverse addition and subtraction procedures, 
that is, count-on for addition and count back for subtraction, but it also used to denote 
subtraction procedures of count-back-to and count-up. Count-all, (CA), is also used to 
denote the inverse strategy take-away. Errors are denoted by E. 
'Below Averag e' Group: n=5 - Average Group: nzl7 'Above Aver go roup: no 
- Add ition Subtraction Addition bUbtraction =Mition Subtraction 





-- - KIF 12 0 9 _ 0 1-2 1-2 -19- 20 -1 0 T 3 TT 
DF 0 0 0 0 
1 
2 3 0 3 12 6 .4 -10 
CO 14 0 14 0 -15 .5 14 1 .7 -6 -9 0 
CA -3 0 -17 0 0 .5 -34 -12 0 0 0 0 
E- 
- -23 01 11 0 0 -5 . 0 -13 -0- 
0 0- -4 
Note: a) Percentage changes for L2a subtraction within the 'below average' group 
includes strategies not identified at 7+ 
b) There are no changes for the "below average' group at L3a since they did not 
attempt the combinations at the age of 7+ 
Table 7.9: Percentage change in ten months in the use of strategies and errors of three groups of 
children identified by ability at 7+ 
Amongst all groups, apart from the one instance apparent within the 'above-average' 
group, we see an increase in combinations that are known. In the exception previously 
known combinations were derived. 
7.8.1 Procedural Stagnation and Procedural Change 
Generally, amongst the 'below-average' and the 'average' groups, the shift to known 
facts was accompanied by the decline in procedural methods. There were some 
exceptions: the combinations 5+4 and 9-5, based as they are on doubles, encouraged 
some children to derive solutions but the proportions were small, 23% and 18% 
resPectively; only one child derived them both. 
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Although there was some slight increase in the use of known facts amongst the 'below- 
average' group - whilst attempting the Level 2 combinations, 11% to 23% for addition 
and 0% to 9% for subtraction - their strategies were once again dominated by 
procedures, particularly count-on and take-away. Simon, continued to use enactive 
subitising for subtraction, Joseph continued his efforts to compute solutions mentally. 
Lee, who had mixed success with the subtraction combinations, always used count- 
back. Sometimes he tried this mentally, sometimes with his fingers. He exceeded the 
time limit to solve every combination, marginally when he counted back mentally, 
excessively when he used fingers. With mental counting there were no verbal 
utterances, with figurative counting there were and they were often repeated. He 
explained that the method he used depended upon how short the 'take-away' was; 
subtract 2 or 3 appeared to be short, 4,5,6 and 7 long. He wanted to do them all in 
his head . ..... when I do them on my fingers somebody might hear me, and will copy 
09 me.... 
Even though there was a decline in the use of procedures amongst the 'average' group 
of children and thus a increase in the combinations that were known, the use of 
procedures still played a large part in the children's solutions to the number 
combinations to ten. The evidence of the interviews with the children at the age of 8+ 
indicated that, whilst all of the 'average' group may have satisfied Level 2 criteria for 
addition, four of the children exceeded the time criteria quite excessively for at least two 
of the subtraction combinations. Their achievement of Level 2 may be described as 
& marginal'. 
It is particularly interesting to note the effect of the decrease in the use of 'take-away' at 
level 2 amongst the 'average' group. 'Take-away' comprised 69% of the procedures 
the 7+ children used for the subtraction combinations to ten. It accounted for 48% of 
the procedures amongst the 8+, overall a decline of 34%. 36% of this decline is 
accounted for by children who moved from take-away to known fact-one child 
accounting for one third of this percentage-whilst the balance was accounted for by 
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children who changed from 'take-away' to 'count-back'. 46%, or to count-up, 17%. 
One child continued to solve all of these subtraction problems using 'take-away' whilst 
a further 5 continued to solve over half of the combinations through this procedure. 
Only two children indicated any evidence of moving from count-back to a known fact. 
Overall, at eight the children were more successful with the Level 3 combinations than 
they had been the previous year. We can see from figure 7.8 and table 7.9 that the 
number of errors declined to the extent that there were none amongst the 'average' 
ability children for addition and they were almost halved for subtraction. However, 
although the percentage of Level 3 combinations known by the 'average' group 
increased within the year - addition, 34% to 46%, subtraction 16% to 36% - the 
addition increases were accounted for by strategy changes of less than half of the 
children. Where there was a change it was accounted for in the solutions given for 
7+7,8 + 10 and 15 + 2. Overall, when solving the L3 addition combinations there 
was a remarkable consistency in the solution procedures the 'average' children used at 
7+ and 8+- Generally the improvement in success was accounted for by the more 
efficient use of a procedure. Once again we are facing the situation where procedural 
efficiency can cloud the issues of differences in qualitative thinking. Nine of the 
children within the average group now obtain at least six addition solutions within the 
time limit. 
Consider Shelley when asked to add 4+ 11: 
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Age 7 
There were several moments hesitation. 
Finally four fingers were extended on the left 
hand without counting. Incremental counting 
continued on the her remaining fingers 
accompanied by verbal utterances ': f1ve, six, 
seven, eight, nine, ten, " until each finger of 
both hands had been tagged. A pencil on the 
table was tagged as eleven. There is a 
pause ..... extended fingers of both hands are 
slowly but continually flexed. 
Finally the five of the right hand are very 
positively extended. The five fingers of the left 
hand are incremented to ten. Again the pencil 
is pointed to on the utterance of eleven. 
Eleven is given as a solution. 
Time 14 seconds 
Age 8+ 
Several moments hesitation. head 
resting on left hand. Left hand 
moved to the desk top. Hand rested 
on the desk top with pressure on the 
little finger. The other four fingers 
are suspended. 
Left thumb placed on top of desk 
where it remains as the remaining 
three raised fingers are one at a time 
placed on the desk top. Each finger 
movement is accompanied by verbal 
utterances, "twelve, thirteen, 
fourteen, fifteen ...... fifteen" the final 
statement signifies the solution. 
Time 4 seconds. 
Interestingly Shelley had only known one of the addition combinations to ten when she 
was seven. She had used count-on to solve the remainder, one of which, 3+7, had 
been incorrect. At eight she knew five combination and counted the other two within 
five seconds. At seven she had used 'take-away' to obtain solutions to the subtraction 
combinations within 5 seconds. She had not been able to develop an appropriate 
strategy for the combinations to 20. At eight she still extensively used 'take-away' for 
the combinations to ten but relatively successfully used count-back for the combinations 
to twenty. However, some of these took an excessive amount of time. 
If procedural efficiency had marked the change in addition for the 'average' children 
over the ten months, procedural difficulty continued to be a hall-mark of some of the 
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children in subtraction. Even if, as eight year olds, they displayed procedural 
competence they remained unable to complete the procedure within 5 seconds. Some 
children still took considerably longer, but others only need some improvement before 
being able to achieve Level 3. 
Some children continued to perpetuate the same mathematical errors as those identified 
the previous year although there was a qualitative change in the use of referents. 
Rebecca, for example, apart from knowing 15 - 0, failed to obtain a correct solution to 
any of the other combinations to twenty in both years. 
During 1992, when solving 20 - 5, she subitised 10 on her fingers, and then objects 
around the room were tagged from 11 to 20. A similar procedure had worked 
reasonably well for addition; Rebecca showing extraordinary ability to remember the 
a external' items that were tagged. Her subtraction procedure was take-away; after 
having tagged the ten 'external' items, she started with the last one nominated and 
tagging the items in reverse order renamed them I to rive. The next item in reverse 
order she renamed as one and continued until the remaining five 'external' items had 
also been renamed I to 5. Five was given as a solution. Rebecca had shown 
considerable powers of memory, but it is suggested that considerable aspect of her 
thinking had been expended first in finding and tagging the additional ten items, and 
then remembering them in reverse order. The consequence was that the ten was 
forgotten. A similar procedure was used in the more recent interview. Ten was 
identified in the same way but this time her ten fingers were used to count-on from ten 
to twenty. Take-away was carried out in the same way as previously, the fingers were 
now renamed in reverse order. However the solution was once again given as rive. 
Successful take-away procedures at seven were used at eight. Fiona, when attempting 
II-9 in 1992 proffered ten extended fingers and uttered "ten". The right thumb was 
then extended backwards as she uttered "eleven". Concentrating on this thumb she then 
moved it twice and uttered "one, two". On this second occasion she folded it across her 
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palm whilst she renamed the other fingers I to 9 staring from the right index finger. At 
the final tagging, "nine, she looked up and said "nine". The same procedure was 
repeated in 1993. 
Two 8+ children from the 'average' group, both of whom had shown some evidence of 
the use of derived facts at 7+, reached a level of attainment to achieve Level 3 as a result 
of the 1993 interviews. They achieved this level of attainment by using a combination 
of known facts, derived facts and "choice". They were the two 'average' ability 
children who had solved at least two of the combinations at the age of 7+ through the 
use of derived facts. 
7.8.2 Proceptual Competence 
There are instances where subtraction combinations to ten, described as known in 
1992, are in 1993 claimed to have been solved through related addition combinations. 
At the start of the study the problems of interpreting children's mental thinking from 
verbal statements are indicated. Perhaps this is a case in point. At 7+ the children may 
have resolved the solutions to some of the subtraction combinations through a related 
addition combination but their thinking may be so automatic that a difference between 
the two may not have occurred to them. Two points emerge: (i) there may have been a 
greater use of derived facts amongst these children at 7+ than is described and (ii) the 
relationship between a known fact and a derived fact for the children may be so linked 
that at times they are unable to articulate the difference. 
Such difference seem to be clearer at level 3 not least because of the consistency of the 
responses that the children gave to the subtraction combinations. Five of the six 
children within the group used a derived fact to obtain a solution to at least one of these 
combinations when age 7+. At 8+ the children had 'turned' some of these derived facts 
into known facts, three of the children continued to derive some of the solutions and 
some instances gave different derivations. Consider some responses: 
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Solutions to 17 -6 
Vincenzo (7+): "Seven take away six is one so II because you add the ten" 
Vincenzo (8+): "If you take away seven it's ten, so add one more is eleven" 
Solutions to 20 -5 
Jonathan (7+): "Tbat five from ten is five add the other ten is fifteen" 
Jonathan (8+): "Its three fives.. fifteen" 
For these children the duality inherent in the symbolism of simple arithmetic is treated 
with ambiguity to give the flexibility that leads to their success in simple arithmetic. 
They fit the mould of the proceptual thinker. 
7.9 SUMMARY 
Clearly the 1992 SATs relating to knowing number combinations achieved their 
purpose of differentiating between children over three levels of achievement. However, 
a longer term prognosis, which only takes note of a child's current level of attainment 
as a starting point without noting how the attainment was achieved, may lead to a very 
different outcome. 
Distinctions between the 'below-average' children and the 'above-averagc' children are 
illustrated by the attempts of the former to use procedures whilst for the latter they 
appear to be 'an optional extra'. 
Clearly, asking children to attempt what is considered to be the same range of problems 
presents each child with a different level of difficulty. This is not only dependant upon 
what they know and the way in which they use what they know but it is also a function 
of their procedural approach and particularly: 
" the child's competence with the procedure, 
" the efficiency of the procedure, 
" the ease with which the procedure can be generalised. 
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In the context of simple arithmetic, the procedures used qualify as counting procedures 
in the sense that counting is defined by Steffe et al (198 1). We see amongst the 'below- 
average' children evidence, that with few exceptions, appears to support Cobb (1987); 
the children are only able to construct enactive relationships between the numbers. To 
do this they generally require external referents. These may provide some support 
which enhances the child's procedural competence but the child does need to recognise 
that they require such a support. We see that the actions of the children in both addition 
and subtraction are far from the point where in Piaget's terms they may become 
internalised as the concepts of 'sum' and 'difference'. In the short term an addition 
procedure for, for example, 3+7, is not encapsulated into the object 10, and this 
leaves the children very much within a procedural paradigm when dealing with 
subtraction. 
But this paradigm is one in which we are able to detect the more expanded procedures 
of count-all and take-away contracted into the more 'efficient' procedures of count-on 
and ...... and count-back? Efficiency in count-back is dependant on, in the first 
instance, competence with Fuson et al's (1982) 'elaboration phase' for advanced 
backward counting skills. The absence of this alone seems to indicate that in subtraction 
procedural competence is diminished for the 'below-average' group. As such the 
procedures still remain so protracted that any sense of the notion of encapsulation is 
itself diminished. Thus, although difficult to implement, the children rely on their 
procedures and any sense in which they may develop a notion of the part-whole 
relationship is undermined. 
As we consider the 'average' group of children we may see two different groups 
emerging; those whose procedural competence remains relatively unsophisticated and is 
thus suspect, and those whose procedural competence is increasing in efficiency to the 
point that it has the potential to further cloud the distinction between procedural thinkers 
and proceptual thinkers in the context of simple arithmetic. 
The significant decline in the use of procedures and the increase in known facts for the 
combinations to ten provides many of these children with the potential to derive 
solutions for combinations to twenty. It could be expected that as their number 
knowledge increases these children would think in the same way that the 'above- 
average' group of children had done almost a year before. In fact, apart from two 
instances, this does not happen. This suggests that there is a different quality attached 
to the combinations that are known. In one case they are isolated, in the other they are 
part of an expanding relationship between number combinations. A known addition 
combination can be used to solve a subtraction combination. The flexibility this attaches 
to the child provides an enormous step forward. It is a flexibility that those 'average- 
ability' children who know the combinations to ten do not appear to possess at this 
time. 
Isolated knowledge can cloud theoretical issues within the context of the number 
combinations. So too can the efficient use of procedures cloud the issues of 
achievement. It is believed that the notions of procedural and proceptual thinking go 
some way towards clarifying distinctions between the ways in which children think 




QUALITATIVELY DIFFERENT THINKING 
8.1 REFLECTIONS 
Through the qualitative analysis of the integrated strategies that various groups of 
young children use to solve simple arithmetic tasks, this study has examined the 
different approaches perceived in children of various ages and abilities. It was seen that 
whilst some children resolved combinations they did not know through the use of 
procedures, others demonstrated flexibility; at one moment they may use a procedure to 
compute a solution whilst at another they used the arithmetical object produced through 
a process. 
It was suggested that such differences in behaviour were manifestations of the 
interpretation of properties possessed by mathematical symbolism which represents 
notions of process and concept at one and the same time. The cognitive representation 
of process and concept represented by symbolism was given the name procept which is 
seen as an extremely powerful form of concept - it embodies a procedure to be able to 
compute the product and a mental object that can be manipulated at a higher level. 
From the theoretical construct of procept it was hypothesised that there is a qualitative 
difference in children's arithmetical thinking which is: 
(i) on the one hand manifest as a spectrum of performance in the operations 
on numbers as a procedure that relates to counting and 
(ii) on the other, the flexible manipulation of procepts. 
This chapter reviews the evidence that supports this hypothesis, provides a 
hypothesised development of the theory of procepts and in the light of this 
hypothesised development makes suggestions for future research. 
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8.2 A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 
Two experiments were set up to consider the evidence to support the hypothesis. The 
first considered the evidence of a divergence in thinking taken from a series of 
snapshots of different groups of children over a variety of ages. From this evidence we 
saw that children acquired knowledge of basic number facts over a period of years, and 
that groups of different ability acquired known facts at a different rate. However, there 
were no indication that 'below-average' children would acquire the same facility in the 
subtraction combinations to twenty as the 'above-average' children by the time they left 
the combined school. What was of particular interest though, was the form of the back- 
up strategies that the children used if they did not know the number combinations. 
We saw amongst all of the younger children the use of procedural methods but there 
was a qualitative difference in their use. Whereas, for example, below average children 
used count-back as the natural inverse of count-on, we see the 'above-average' children 
of seven using either count-back or count-up, whichever is appropriate. Later we see all 
of the 'above-average' using count-up if they needed to use a procedure. Through their 
choice of procedures the children demonstrated the difference between making things 
easy for themselves or making things difficult. But there were not just procedural 
differences. There were also difference in the quality of the 'units' used for counting. 
Whereas the 'below-average' children used perceptual items, the 'above-average' used 
6 motor' or 'abstract' units. Thus, we see the more successful children who use 
procedures using them more efficiently, and more particularly, with some flexibility. 
Amongst the older children we saw a general decline in the use of procedural methods. 
This decline was not matched amongst the 'above-average' children with an immediate 
increase in known facts, but the emergence of significant use of derived facts. The use 
of this strategy was hardly apparent amongst the 'below-average' children, even when 
older 'below-average' children knew the same number of combinations as a group of 
younger 'above-average' children. 
164 
The evidence from the first experiment indicated that when more successful children 
used procedures they used them competently, efficiently and flexibly. The 'below- 
average' may have demonstrated procedural competence at one level but this only 
Provided procedural efficiency after a period of development and they seldom displayed 
procedural flexibility. 
Such qualities as those possessed by children whose arithmetic is seen in terms of 
procedures is quite distinct from the qualities displayed by those whose thinking is 
manifest in the flexible use of procedures, and derived facts. More able children were 
doing a qualitatively different arithmetic to the less able. 
The difference in thinking between the 'below-average' and the 'above-average' in the 
first experiment may be expressed in procedural and conceptual terms. However, two 
issues clouded any distinctions that it was wished to make. Firstly most of the children 
knew some number facts whilst many of those who were considered to be flexible also 
used procedures. We have seen that conceptual knowledge about simple arithmetic is 
identified as knowledge about the relationship between numbers, but there is no explicit 
statement in this notion that children who possess conceptual knowledge also have the 
flexibility for the compression and decompression of procedures. 
If we look at all children and attempt to draw conclusions from our observations we 
frequently conclude by formulating a particular theory. This has been consistently 
apparent in the review of literature. At times there then may appear to be a conflict 
between the theory and reality. As a case in point we may consider the general 
conclusions that can be drawn from some chronometric studies (e. g. Ashcraft, 1982, 
who based on his predictions concluded that 6 and 7 year old children in America 
consistently use count-on for addition) and some of the protocol based studies (e. g. 
Carpenter & Moser, 1982, who indicated that children used a variety of approaches). 
By looking at two extremes within the first investigation rather than at one whole, a 
theory of two components was established which does not carry the apparent 
165 
dichotomies that may be seen in the development of two theories established through 
considering different wholes. Such a theory stems from the notion of procept. 
Establishing a theory of procepts centres upon a close analysis of the interpretations that 
may be placed upon mathematical symbolism. Rather than perpetuating a potential 
dichotomy between object and process, the duality of mathematical symbolism 
encompasses the two in an ambiguous way. Recognising this ambiguity provides the 
user of symbolism with considerable flexibility. 
The second experiment was designed to relate this postulated theory with a widely used 
standard assessments task and to trace the development within specific children over a 
period to compare this development with that seen in the snapshots. 
Once again flexibility of approach was a distinguishing feature of the children 
eventually identified as 'above-average' within this second sample. Again the children 
used derived facts, the only group to extensively do so. The evidence shows that the 
children's use of procedures proved to be efficient, flexible, unsupported by external 
referents and supported by the use of derived facts. The 'above-average' children 
within the second sample display similar qualities to those displayed by their 'above- 
average' peers in the first sample. Both groups display the flexibility of thought 
consistent with proceptual thinking. For these children the duality and ambiguity 
inherent in the symbolism of simple arithmetic is reflected in the flexibility that leads to 
their success. They fit the mould of the proceptual thinker. Thus, although the samples 
were drawn in two different ways, evidence of proceptual thinking occurred in seven 
and eight-year-old children within the 'above-average' groups of both samples. 
In the second experiment the results were clouded somewhat by the nature of the 
assessment mechanism used to assign children to the various groups. As a measuring 
instrument the SAT it is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between children within 
the average group, i. e. those achieving Level 2 but not Level 3, although teacher 
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assessment may be equally blunt if it does not take into account how attainment is 
achieved. 
The procedural competence of the 'average' group within the second experiment was 
such that any deficiency in their knowledge of the number combinations was 
compensated for by the use of a procedure efficient enough to satisfy the constraints of 
the time limit. Technically, had the application of the test be rigorously applied - 
successful achievement restricted to non-counted responses - none of the 'average' 
group of children would have achieved Level 2. A more rigorous application of the test 
procedure would have been difficult. It has already been indicated that motor counters 
and abstract counters would not have been easily identified. As it was, the head teacher 
and the senior advisor for the County were both present during the administration of the 
test to one group and neither questioned the teacher's administrative procedure. Such 
was the procedural competence of many of the 'average' ability children that their 
achievement at this level was hard to distinguish from the performance of the 'above- 
average'. It was only when their procedures failed them at a higher level that the 
distinction could be made - which of course was part of the overall testing 
intention. 
Some consequences of the procedural approaches used by the 'average' children were 
apparent at the end of the ten month period. Although several of the children had failed 
to improve their procedural competence, the greater proportion had improved it to the 
point where they were now almost achieving the same level of attainment in the basic 
number combinations as the 'above average' group. Only two children had 
demonstrated any flexibility and these were the only children to achieve Level 3 after 
the ten months. 
8.3 A CONCLUSION 
What we seem to be seeing amongst the 'average' ability children is a demonstration of 
the point of bifurcation of the proceptual divide. Although many of them by Y3 
demonstrated that they had learned some number combinations, most were not using 
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the number knowledge they possessed to derive combinations they did not know. 
Instead they had developed efficient count-on procedures for addition and were in the 
process of developing procedural competence for subtraction based on the use of count- 
back. In the opinion of Steffe et al (1982) they would not meet the crucial preconditions 
to enable them to identify the benefits of the part-whole relationship. Ibis would be a 
major step forward in a move towards a proceptual view of subtraction. 
Amongst 'average' children who used procedures three main groups may now be 
idenfified, 
0 those who are procedurally competent and efficient, 
those who are procedurally competent and inefficient, 
0 those whose procedure is unsound. 
This last group would also contain the 'below-average' children for whom the 
procedures generally remain so protracted that any sense of the notion of encapsulation 
is itself diminished. The children rely so much on their procedures, even if they are 
difficult to implement, that any sense in which they may develop a notion of the part- 
whole relationship is undermined. 
The qualitative differences that exist in the ways children think about in simple 
arithmetic may be viewed from a proceptual perspective. It is hypothesised that 
successful mathematical thinker uses a mental structure which is manifest in the ability 
to think proceptually which, it is conjectured, explains qualitatively different thinking 
between those who are successful and those who are not successful in arithmetic. Ile 
notion of using count-on, on the one hand as a procedure, and on the other as a means 
of obtaining flexible number knowledge, may be the parting of the ways between an 
increasingly inflexible method in which arithmetic becomes more and more difficult, 
and a flexible method which can lead to long-term success. 
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8.4 COUNT-ON: 'THE PARTING OF THE WAYS' 
This second experiment provides some indication of what may be happening at tile 
point of bifurcation which leads to either the development of compctcnce in a 
compressed procedure or procedural encapsulation. It is concluded that count-oil is a 
point of bifurcation in simple arithmetic (Gray, 1993). 
PROCEDURAL THINKING 
Remembered through 
experience. A known KNOWN DU fact, kept in isolation arK] FACT recalled from memory 
when appropriate . 
Result computed without 
linking ir a and output 
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Figure 8.1: Count-on: A pivot for a procep(ud divide in simple arillunet ic 
Figure 8.1 (from Gray, 1993) provides an indication ofhow count-on may he seen as 
such a point. It provides children with a compressed counting procedure which is 
potentially efficient. However, it also appears to act as a springboard to a different 
quality of thinking. In this sense it acts as a-, junction box": it can cause a bifurcation 
that leads to a 'parting of the ways' between those who are successful and those who 
are not successful. 
From a procedural point of view the essence of strategies such as count-on, count-back 
or count-up is that they may he refined to such a degree that though they may become 
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very efficient at one level they may not only mitigate against reflection but also against 
success at the next higher level. One of the consequences is the development of 
qualitatively different approaches to simple arithmetic. 
8.5 LIMITATIONS OF STUDY 
The theoretical argument established through the analysis of the protocols must of 
course be seen within the context of the limitations of the study. Within Chapter 4 the 
specified limitations directly attributable to obtaining protocols were considered. Two 
central issues were highlighted: 
theoretical constructs, which arise from the notion that external 
representations made by children reveal something of how the child has 
represented information internally, are not entirely free of the observer's 
expectations and theories, however objective these may appear to be at the 
time, and 
the nature of interaction between the interviewer and the child may cause the 
child to use different approaches during the interview to those that may have 
been used if the interviewer had not been present. 
Ile totality of the action which provided the protocols formed the basis for both the 
analysis of the data and the resulting theory. However, further limitations are imposed 
by the sampling method and the level of reporting subsequently presented. The study 
itself is concerned with a coarsely grained analysis of behaviour and this must be placed 
within a context that accepts a third form of limitation; the selection of samples and their 
size. 
Although it has been indicated earlier that the nature of the SAT used for the second 
series of interviews must be seen as a blunt instrument in terms of its ability to 
differentiate between children, the nature of the selection of the first sample must also 
be seen as a blunt instrument. Twelve teachers were involved in making an assessment 
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of children's ability, but teacher's notions of a child's ability may not be restricted to 
the actual quality being considered (Secada, 1992) and they may be reflected in the 
child's level of achievement in the sense that the child may rise or fall to the teacher's 
level of expectation (Nash, 1973). 
The small discrete samples identified within the first series of interviews may serve to 
be both the weakness and strength of the initial analysis of the data and the later 
theoretical development. The weakness stems from the relatively small differences that 
are particularly apparent between the average and the above-average groups of children 
whilst the strength lies in the observation that different forms of thinking appear to be 
consistent over several different samples of children. Such differences are again 
apparent within the second sample, which, although taken from only one class within 
one school, does appear to support the notion that children display different qualities of 
thinking. 
It has not been the intention of this study to indicate proportions of children that reflect 
different styles of thinking. Neither has it been the intention to stereotype children 
through their quality of thinking to establish a long term prognosis which predicts 
different levels of success in mathematics. However, it was the intention to indicate 
whether or not children may display qualitatively different thinking and then consider 
the consequences for achievement as the immediate level of difficulty increased. 
Although the results of the first series of interviews do not represent the effects of 
differences that may be seen within the same children taken over a period of time, they 
suggest that there are qualities that are worthy of further investigation. In the second 
sample, from a different school, each child is allocated to a group as a result of their 
level of achievement. The analysis of the results of this second sample suggests that the 
features identified through the snapshots of the seven and eight year olds within the 
first sample may be consistent over a period of one year. However, although short term 
effects and changes that may arise through qualitatively different thinking are 
considered within the context of this second sample, a conclusive long term prognosis 
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for these children would be conjecture. There may well be cumulative longer term 
effects but, for the moment, these remain in the realm of a new set of hypotheses. 
8.6 A HYPOTHESISED CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE 
PROCEPTUAL DIVIDE 
Proceptual encapsulation occurs at various stages throughout arithmetic: repeated 
counting becoming addition, repeated addition becoming multiplication and so on, 













Figure 8.2: 1 ligher order encapsulations 
concept of 
product 
Such a theory is the one proposed by Sfard (1991). Using this theory we may explain 
the encapsulation process; the operational aspect of counting may be reiried into the 
structural aspect of number. This is then used as the operational aspect of count-on 
which is then reified into the structural aspect of sum. It is conjectured that this is the 
way that the less able see simple arithmetic. This is, for them, an extremely difficult 
process. If they are faced with a problem two levels up, then the structure will almost 
certainly be too burdensome for them to support (see Linchevski & Sfard, 1991). 
Multiplication facts are almost impossible for them to coordinate whilst they are having 
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difficulty with addition. Even the process of reversing addition to give subtraction is 
seen by them as a new process ("count-back7' instead of "count-up! ). 
It is conjectured that the more able, proceptual. thinker is faced with an easier task. The 
symbols for sum and product again represent numbers. Thus counting, addition and 
multiplication are operating on the same procept which can be decomposed into process 
for calculation purposes whenever desired. A proceptual view which amalgamates 
process and concept through the use of the same notation therefore collapses the 
hierarchy into a single level in which arithmetic operations (processes) act on numbers 




procept of number 
FlIgurc 8.3: Collapse of hierarchy into operations on numbers 
It is conjectured that this is the development by which a more able thinker develops a 
flexible relational understanding in simple arithmetic, which is seen as a meaningful 
relationship between notions at the same level. We have seem some examples of this in 
the way that some of the children used multiplication as the derived fact to solve some 
of the addition and subtraction combinations. The less able are faced with a hierarchical 
ladder which is more difficult to climb. It is suggested that children across a wide 
spectrum of performance face this challenge at each stage of encapsulation, and that at 
each stage more children fail. 
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'Ibis provides an insight into why the practising expert sees mathematics as such a 
simple subject and may find it difficult to appreciate the difficulties faced by the novice. 
It is conjectured that as proceptual thinking grows in conceptual richness, proccpts can 
be manipulated as simple symbols at a higher level or opened up to perform 
computations, to be decomposed and recomposed at will. Such forms of thinking 
become entirely unattainable for the procedural thinker who fails to develop a rich 
proceptual structure. 
The difficulties that children have in establishing a proceptual view of simple arithmetic 
should be a signal us to the difficulties they may have in more complex areas of 
arithmetic. How may we reasonably expect children to understand the multiplication 
and division if in simple addition and subtraction that are still procedural? It is 
conjectured that the problem of the proceptual. divide that occurs in simple arithmetic is 
a microcosm of the problems that occur as mathematics becomes more complex; at each 
higher level a proceptual divide occurs. Some children take to the fast route fairly easily 
to become successful, others take the slower, procedural route to achieve success at one 
level only to be faced with another parting of the ways through which they take an even 
slower route which eventually leads to failure. 
The ability to use the proceptual nature of mathematical symbolism would seem to 
provide those who are able to do mathematics with a very powerful tool. The wonder is 
that such mathematicians do not consciously realise that they make use of the tool; they 
possess tremendous flexibility because of the inherent ambiguity of the symbolism, 
they are able to select the quality appropriate to the moment without conscious thought. 
Lesser beings who rely on memory and a procedure, and I include myself in this 
category, only see half a picture and for them the same flexibility is not an option. 
8.7 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
In highlighting the qualitative different thinking that children apply in simple arithmetic 
I believe several issues arise which question values which provide acclaim to extensive 
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use of procedures and give some concern for some of the children's progress through 
the wider mathematics curriculum. It is the latter that I believe will lead to fruitful 
research. 
1. To what extent would a longitudinal study of mixed-ability children confirm or deny 
the conclusion of this study and provide further evidence of the proceptual divide 
within afithmaic? 
The difficulties that arise from the proceptual divide in simple arithmetic would secrn to 
indicate that a longitudinal study establishing the veracity of the divide with a wider 
group of children is called for. 
From the evidence presented the notion of the proceptual divide within simple 
arithmetic calls for consideration of the consequences in more complex areas of 
arithmetic. How may we reasonably expect children to understand the multiplication 
and division if in simple addition and subtraction that are still procedural? How can 
children who remain procedural within whole number arithmetic develop a proceptual 
view of fractions. It may be hypothesised that, whilst in simple arithmetic, it is 
advantageous for the child to think proceptually, when operating with rational numbers 
it is incumbent upon them to do so. For the child to operate the addition and subtraction 
Of fractions successfully they need to be able to see the same fraction in many different 
ways. The notion of fraction may be a significant point of bifurcation in the same way 
that count-on appears to be. 
2. What is the role ofprocepts in other areas of mathenzatics? 
Recognising the proceptual nature of mathematical symbolism implies that the 
proceptual divide will be a recurring theme in mathematical development. At the level of 
school mathematics, children's difficulties in algebra (Tall & Thomas. 1991) arise from 
a procedural interpretation of the symbolism and can be explained by the inability of the 
children to see algebraic expressions as procepts. Similar conclusions may be drawn 
from an examination of efforts in trigonometry (Blackett 1990, Blackett & Tall, 1991). 
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The conception of trigonometric ratio as a process of calculation (opposite over 
hypotenuse) and not a flexible procept causes difficulties. Process application involves 
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reliance on an encapsulated hierarchy in which misconception, inconsistency and 
confusion is bound to appear. It would seem that the examination of the use of prompts 
within these and other areas would also be profitable. An interesting question may 
consider whether procedural thinkers in arithmetic may become proceptual thinkers in 
algebra. 
Other areas of the mathematics curriculum lend themselves to an in-depth study of the 
Proceptual divide and an examination of the relationship between process and object 
orientations of mathematical thinking. We have seen that the notion of procept pervades 
the whole of mathematics. It what way does this proceptual nature of mathematics 
effect learning and understanding particularly if through design or otherwise the nature 
of the input to the learner is procedural. 





This is used to denote knowledge that is understood. It makes use of the 
underlying relationships which exist within, or between, mathematical objects 
themselves: 
a unit of conceptual knowledge cannot be an isolated piece of information; by 
definition it is part of conceptual knowledge only if the holder rccognises its 
relationship to other pieces of information. 
(Hiebert and Lefevre 1986, pp. 34) 
Conceptual Thinking: 
Thinking that reflects the use of conceptual knowledge: 
Elementary procept: 
The amalgam of three components; the process which produces a mathematical 
object and the symbol which is used to represent either the process or object. 
Enactive representation: 
A mode of representing past events through appropriate motor response and it 
"is based, it seems, upon a learning of responses and forms of habituation" 
(Bruner, 1968, p. 11). 
Enactive Subitising: 
The representation, without counting, and usually with fingers, of numbers in a 
concrete form to support addition and subtraction procedures. 
The term follows Bruner's notion of enactive representation and it is 
conjectured that the habitual use of fingers as a counting aid leads to their use as 
a means of displaying amounts less than ten without counting. 
Encapsulation (Following Dubinskey, 1991) : 
The cognitive process of forming a (static) conceptual entity from a (dynamic) 
process. Such a process has variously been called "entification" (Kaput, 1982) 
and "reirication" (Sfard, 1989,1991). 
177 
Object (of thinking): 
The encapsulated entity created through a mathematical process. The notion of 
object means that we can refer to the entity as if it were a real thing; we can 
recognise it at a glance and manipulate it as a whole. Thus we may see how the 
process of counting five leads to the encapsulated entity "five" which qualifies 
as an object when it is permanently available for manipulation. 
Procedural Thinking: 
Thinking that reflects the use of procedural knowledge. 
Procept: 
A collection of elementary procepts which have the same object. 
Proceptual Divide: 
The divergence in thinking that stems from the flexible use of procepts as object 
or process on the one hand and the excessive reliance on procedures on the 
other. It is conjectured that this is one of the most significant factors in the 
difference between success and failure. 
Proceptual Thinking: 
Thinking which portrays the flexibility to view symbolism either as a trigger for 
carrying out a procedure or as the representation of a mental object which may 
be decomposed, recomposed and manipulated at a higher level. Proceptual 
thinking includes thinking that demonstrates, where appropriate, the use of 
procedural knowledge. It is conjectured that the possession of such a quality is 
at the root of powerful mathematical thinking. 
Within the context of simple arithmetic proceptual thinking includes the 
meaningful use of known facts to arrive at solutions through derived facts and it 
may include the use of procedures. 
Process (Theme of action) 
Within this study the term "process" is used in a general sense, as in the 
"process of addition", the "process of multiplication", the "process of solving 
an equation". It means the cognitive representation of a mathematical operation. 
It need not be a process that is currently being carried out in thought, for 
instance we may speak of the process of addition without actually performing it 
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and neither is there any implication that the process must be carried out in a 
unique manner 
Procedure: 
The term "procedure" is used in the sense of Davis (1983, p. 257); it is a 
specific algorithm for implementing a process. 
Procedural Knowledge: 
Procedural knowledge is seen as knowledge which focuses on doing through 
applying. It is usually hierarchically arranged and prescribes instructions on 
how to complete tasks which operate on objects which are represented either by 
concrete materials, spoken words, written symbols, or mental images. It may 
be seen as the knowledge of the sequence of actions or procedures which may 
allow mathematical tasks to be completed efficiently. 
Although such knowledge may be applied mechanically without reference to 
related conceptual knowledge, for the successful mathematician it is conjectured 
that the compression of processes, such as count-all to count-on, is manifest 
through procedural competcnce reflecting more sophisticated forms of 
procedural knowledge. Such compression forms a route which has the potential 
to lead to the encapsulation of the process. For example, the process of count- 
all is first compressed into count-on which, implemented through increasingly 
sophisticated procedural knowledge, has the potential to be encapsulated as the 
conccpt of 'sum'. 
Subitising: 
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24 4+4 44 44 43 H 44 4 31 3 
1 FI II 11 
+ 
31 
25 44 214 24 44 42 4_ 4 4 3 
21 1 42 2- 1 _ 22 
26 414 4 -- 4 23 22 24 23 4 2 3 
_2 
2 21 32 33 42 33 2 1 
27 44 44 24 44 24 42 4 4 3 
- 





4 4 414 42 23 4 3 2 3 ' 41 4 41 3-1 1 1 
1 23 42 2 2 
I 
413 2 2, 
4 Known Fact 2 Count-on 0 Errpr InSAT: 
3 Derived Fact I Count-all Time ise'conds) given In italics 
(1)7 Strategy and time at Interview 
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APPENDIX 10 
STRATEGY USED AND TIME TAKEN: SUBTRACTION SoT 312a 
SUBTRACTION LEVEL 2 Ma 3 
Child 9-4 7-51 4-3 1 10-71 9-61 1 5-31 2a 
199t 1993 1992,1993 1992 11993 1992! 1993 199211993 
11992 





010 0 10 0 12 010 1012 012 1 
(? )a T 34- 1)131 42 (1)5 1(1)7 j-1)26 1 26 1)161 59 11)111 12 Wo! a 
2 011 011 011 01 0 11 102 0 10 1 
11 24 ")501 4 7)301 11 
. 
(? )15 21 ? )90 30 1*7)20 15 7)45 1 30 
3 
1 
11 oIi IiIo 1 
3 10 1 41 5 41 4 31 30 
4 02 010 1 14 11 12 012 24 0 
IM101 8 T (1)9 T 12 6 13 14 19 10,3 (1,14 2 
5 0 oIi o11 1111 oI I o i o I1 1 
M61 4 (1)31 5 1 (1)51 7 -(I)-8- T-5 
6 21 1214 214 24 211 
-3 
2 2 
55 1 31 1. 21 1 52 91 6 13 15 
7 4 3 11 14 44 1 2 114 4 4 _4 
4 2 
2 5 15 11 21 3 5 3 51 5 5 4 15 13 
8 21 1 11 14 1 12 1 
- 
12 2 
34 12 14 23 2 14 3 13 
9 3 4 14 14 2 2* 21 2' 4 1 2* 2 
2 4 12 12 2 13 221 3 2 13 
10 1 2 
a 3 1 71 5 51 2 1 71 12 51 5 4 3 31 
_3 11 2 2* 12 14 44 2 2* 21 2* 0 12 4 
_I 
4 2 
41 4 14 13 21 42 31 4 1 1 31 2 
12 
_4 
12 41 2* 14 12 11 2* 11 2 1 2 
41 9 _ 21 8 52 153 91 7 13 7 1 41 3ý 
13 112 0 13 42 144 2 4 13 41 31 4 2 
81 5 010 1-5 119 125 9 4 1 31 21 1 
_ 14 1 13 212 114 122 1 3 11 21 11 2- 2 
3 12 31 3 31 1 153 61 4 3 51 31 4 
15 1 12 1 1 1 11 11 11 o I I II II 1 2 
- 51 3 31 -10 3 31 41 6 (1,141 5 4 91 31 3 
16 1 1 2 11 2 2 
71 9 4 51 91 5 41 It 31 3 
17 212 24 2 4 21 4 0 2* 2 4 31 4 2 
41 5 21 2 101 3 30 4 4[ 2 
is 412 12 1 1 2 
51 3 51 10 4 31 1 
19 11 1 41 1 11 2 1 1 2 
- 
41 7 31 5 3 4 4 5 7 5 21 5 3T 5 
20 11 4 111 11 4 11 1 11 1 11 2 1 4 2 
21 1 151- 7 21 1 131 11 221 9 121 2- It 1 1 
21 113 114 4 4 11 4 11 4 2 
81 11 61 2 3 2 -75 T -3 -31 
_2 22 14 114 11 4 11 4 11 2' 1 2* 11 2* 2 
3 3. 31 2 3 2 41 2 31 4 3 2 31 2 
23 4 31 414 41 4 41 4 414 41 4 41 4 3 
2 31 11 1 11 1 11 1 3-F--T -2 -1 31 1 
- 24 441 414 41 4 - 414 
1 
1 4 41 4 3 
3 11 51 1 3 1 41 1 ' 24 1 21 11 
25 3 41 314 31 4 33 212 31 4 31 4 3 
3 31 21 3 3 1 _ 3 2, _5 61 --- 3T --2 4 2 
26 2 
-1 
2* F1 4 3 414 2 2* 21 2 i. 
t 
3 7. 3 
1 315 4 11 51 2 33 3 1 3 
! 
2 2 4 4 
27 .2141 413 4t 41 213 313 3 31 31 4 
- -3 
71 11 31 2 21 11 31 51 2 31 31 21 2. 
28 31 2 412 31 41 2* 1 2* 2' 13 41 31 21 L 2 
3 F 31 113 11 21 31 3 -8 T-3 21 31 21 ,1 - -d 
KF Known Fact 2 Count-Back 
DF Derived Fact 2' Count-up 
I Count-all 0 Effor MAT 
Time (seconds) given in italics . .. 
(1)7 Strategy and time at inteMiew 
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STRATEGY USED AND TIME TAKEWADDITION SoT 3/3a 
APPENDIX 11 
ADDITION LEVEL 3 
Child 9+6 17+0, 7+7 4+11 8+10; 15+2 
1992 1993 1992 1993 1992 1993 1992 1993 1992 191K! 1 
2 i 
3 2 4 2 2 2 0 
17 i1 - 29- 60 o 
4 2 1 4 4 2 2 4 
10 2 
- 3 - - 12 10 2 
5 2 4 2 2 4 2 

















7 03 4 ý4 41 4 0 2 4 4 2 2 
5 2f 7 13 2 2 4 4 
a 212 4 1 4 4ý 4 0 j 2 0 2 2 2 
- -- q5 -- - ---- 21 1 --- 2 - 3 -- , (2)14 4 2(14) 4 10 2 
9 22 44 4 4 2 2 0 2 2 4 
5! 9 21 2 2 10 4 11 6 2 2 
10 02 44 
_2 
2 0 2_ 0 1 0 2 
05 21 4 2 4 (1) 15 13 (1,122 32 (2)18 
11 22 44 4 4 2 2 2 4 
__ 
2 4 
64 21 4 1 5 3 41 1 
12 22 4 4 2 4 21 2 I 2 4 2 4 
44 2 5- 1 - 5ý _ 2 _ 5 _ 2 2 





5,5 2 2 2 4 is 5 2 3 2 
14 012 44 0 4 2 3 2 4 21 4 
(2)8 5 22 (4)2 1 _ 7 4 13 3 3 2 
15 0 1 2 4L4 4 ý2 2 1 2 2ý 2 
_ - - (1)22 6 31 _ 8ý 6 (1)38 5 0 6 5 
16 22 4 4 247 7 2 2_ 
_2_ 
2 2 
_ 3 12 _ 2 1 2 3 8 9 
17 2 2 4 4 41 4 2 2 0-1 2 4 2 
3T--5 - 2 11 21 2. 8 _ 3 12 1 7 2 
18 
-0-1 _2 
414 0L 4 0 2 0 2 2 2 
(1)21 3T 1 (1) 15 2 2(23) 4 (2)19 9 5 
19 22 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 2 2 4 
_ 7 61 
+ 
1 --- 12 1ý f 2 6 4 2 6 3 1 
20 2_L 2 414 2 4 2 2 0 4 2 4 
81 10 212 5! 2 23 6 (4)3 1 C, 1 
21 2 2 4 2 2 2 3 21 2 
57 21 1 _ 10 _ 2 13 7 11 9 3 2 
22 0 2 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 4 21 4 
- (2)5 8 Y 
ý 
2. 2, _ 2 4 5 5 3 3 
23 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 2 4 
2,1 1 2 1 2 1 21 1 1 
24 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 
_ 2 11 1 1 1 -1 2 1 2 2 
25 3 13 41 4 4f 4 2 3 3 4 3 3 
_ _ 32 11 3 1 4 3 2 1 2 2 
26 2 44 4 4 4 4 21 2 
55 22 3 2 2 1 3 
27 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 __ __ 
-33 
_ ýý _ 1 i 1 4 4 2 
2 2 44 4 4 2 3 4 4 
_ _ 51 3 _ 22 2 2 3 3 3 2 
4 Known Fact 2 Count -on 
0 Error inSAT 
3 Derived Fact 1 Count-all Time (seconds) given in italics 
(1)7 Strategy and time at interview 
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STRATEGY USED AND TIME TAKEN: SUBTRACTION SoT 3138 
APPENDIX 12 
SUBTRACTION LEVEL 3138 
- 
Ma 3 
Child 17 77 -7!; --13 20-5 11-9 la-10 15-0 
30 
1992 199 2 1992 1993 1992,1993 1992 1993 1992 1993 1992 1993 Att. L 
2 
3 
4 2 10 12 2 2 4 1 
--! -- - 45 -- -- 7 9 13 3 
5 i0 o 
(1)40 1 (1)24 
6 01 2' 
- 
00 0ý 2* 2 2' 01 2* 4ý4 2 
(2)11 -60 P29 (2)29 - (Z - 21 10 84 (2)23 -- 33 -3 21 
7 3 0 2' 34 2 04 44 _ 2 
13 2 0 29 - -34 5 10 (3 - )3 4- -22 
8 
--- 
112 12 0 012 02 012 4 -ý 4 2 ___ 20,14 - - 
- 





01 2* 2 4 04 44 2 
(2) 18 1(2) 11 (2)2 512 -F2)12 "' 12 -- - 21 - (2)15 1 --- 21 
10 0L0 0 10 0 0 1 00 0 0 011 2 - - - - - i 
012 0 2' 33 01 2' 04 44 2 
















L3 2 L 2 L 2 0 04 02 012 44 2 
__ _ 12 . 
21 - __ _ _ [21 ' 10 (2)6 3 (2) 26 12 [21,3 22 
14 013 01 2' 4 2 2* 214 44 2 
(2)62 9 038,20 13 2 (2)47 4 _ (2)36 41 21 
15 11 11 014 011 014 414 2 
- 01 63 lo Mo 2 (1,10, Mo 2 22 
16 L2 00 24 22 210 414 2 
[21 24 f2f [21 [21 4 [21 43 1ý11 [ZI 2* 11 
17 22 0 2* 33 24 04 44 2 
_ 58 6 (2 ') 14 5 3- 3- 73 
. 
(2*)17 2 22 
18 
-01 -0 __o 
10 010 010 011 0i4 2 
MI5 [21 M15 Ill [11 , 40 (40 2 
19 0J 3 0 11 213 12 014 014 4 0 4! 4 2 
_ _ 07 -- 0 tyl - (2)13 8 (1)14 3,1? 0, 0 0 3' 2 
20 12 11 0 2* 1 0 11 114 14 4 4! 4 2 
9ý 15 - [111 12 - . (1)36 : 10 7 11 12 
,4 1,4 4 712 
21 11 o 0 013 04 114 4 4 414 2 
4; [21 _ [21 ! 13 (3)32 2 (10 2 (1)23' (1 ), 3 
22 I2 012 0 2* 014 4 
d0 
44 2 
_ 10,15 (2to)8_1 5 (2)9 7 2(7) 4 (2) 11 2 
23 3 314 34 2to 4 34 34 44 3 
3,4 _ 51 3 22 2 23 3 2 
24 44 1 3 0 414 4 2 4, ' 4 44 3 
22 - - (2*)10 2' 2 42 
25 33 0 0 33 .13 44 44 
44 3 
32 __j [31 121 42 10 3 3 21 
26 33 0 2' 33 3 2' 34 44 3 
24 o5 33 44 2* 1 
27 31 3 00 313 313 313 4i4 3 
1 

















0 Denotes method used but incorrect solution 
(2)10 Denotes method used during interview with lime taken 
KF Known Fact 2 Count Back 0 Error inSAT DF Derived Fact 2' Count-up Time (seconds) given in italics 
1 Count-all (1)7 Stralogy and linle at interview 
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